PDR-016

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

August 5, 1982

Mr. Richard A. Udell
CRITICAL MASS ENERGY PROJECT
215 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Washington, DC 20003

IN RESPONSE REFER
TO FOIA-82-261

Dear Mr. Udell:

This is in further response to your letter dated June 3, 1982, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, access to nineteen categories of documents as described in your letter.

As stated in our letter to you dated July 12, 1982, "we have also identified Significant Event Reports (SERs) and Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs) that the NRC has received from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) under an NRC/INPO Memorandum of Agreement". Appendix A hereto lists INPO Significant Event Reports by "SER No." and "Subject". Appendix B hereto lists INPO Significant Operating Event Reports by "SOER Number" and "Subject".

All of the reports listed on Appendices A and B were provided to the NRC in confidence by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in accordance with the provisions of a Memorandum of Agreement between the NRC and INPO. The reports are commercial information that is held wholly confidential by INPO. The submittal of these commercial information reports to the NRC is voluntary by INPO and they provide a unique source of information to the NRC which helps this agency to function. Any public release of these documents by the NRC would impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information from this source in the future. This information is being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to Exemption (4) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)) and 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.9 of the Commission's regulation, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The persons responsible for this denial are the undersigned and Mr. Carlyle Michelson, Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data.

This denial may be appealed to the Commission's Executive Director for Operations within 30 days from the receipt of this letter. As provided in 10 CFR 9.11, any such appeal must be in writing, addressed to the Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is an "Appeal from an Initial FOIA Decision."

Sincerely,

John Philips for

J. M. Felton, Director
Division of Rules and Records
Office of Administration

Enclosures: As stated

APPENDIX A

LIST OF INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORTS

SER No.	Subject
1-81	150 Psig Reactor Pressure
2-81	RHR Service Water Pump and Diesel Cooling Water Pump Flooded
3-81	Feeder Breakers to the Penetrations
4-81	Radioactive, Unmonitored, Liquid Leaks in Underground Pipe
5-81	Design Deficiency
6-81	Unisolated Nitrogen Supply Line
7-81	Failure of Control Room Alarm Annunciator Power Supply Inverter
8-81	Design Deficiency of Emergency Bus Load Shedding Logic
9-81	Cracks in Steam Generator Support Bolts
10-81	Failure of an Electromagnetic Relief Valve to Open
11-81	Missing Hinge Pin
12-81	Safeguards Initiation
13-81	Sealed Specimen Expansion
14-81	Slow Decrease in Pressurizer Pressure
15-81	Two Main Steam Line Relief Valves Failed to Open
16-81	Broken Generator Shaft
17-81	Failure of Bonnet Seal on a Feedwater Check Valve
18-81	CAM Oxygen Analyzer Failed
19-81	Radiation Overexposure of Maintenance Personnel
20-81	Uncoupling of Control Rods by Off-Centered Rods in Drives
21-81	Backleakage of Check Valves in Air Supply to Accumulators of ADS Safety Relief Valves
22-81	Corrosion Failure of Mechanical Snubbers
23-81	Loss of 250 Volt DC Bus Could Cause Both Uncontrolled Increase in BWR Feedwater Flow and Disablement of High Level Trips Feedwater Pumps and main Turbine
24-81	High Temperature Trip of LPCI Inverter
25-81	Both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Valves Found Closed or Locked Closed
26-81	High Failure Recurrent Rate - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM)
27-81	BWR Automatic Depressurization System Operation
28-81	Design Error in Calculating the Maximum Shaft Stress
29-81	Breaker Wiring Lugs
30-81	BWR Pipe Cracks
31-81	Inadvertent Containment Spray
32-81	Inadvertent Isolation of Critical Plant Instrumentation
33-81	BWR Scram Air Header Low Pressure Scram Switches
34-81	BWRs with HPCI and/or RCIC
35-81	Corrosion of Reactor Coolant System Piping
36-81	Diesel Generator Fire Hazard
37-81	Potential Breaker Failure from Puffer Mechanism
38-81	Leaks Resulting from charging Pump Vibration
39-81	Partial Defeat of Rod Drop Protection
40-81	Design Error in Service Water Systems
41-81	Raw Cooling Water Piping Corrosion
42-81	Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure
43-81	Steam Generator Tube Degradation at the Anti-Vibration Bars
44-81	Essential Bus Inverter Fuse Failures
45-81	Potential Failure of Valves in Main Steam/Main Feedwater/Auxiliary Feedwater System
46-81	Safety Injection Pump Breaker Lock-Out
47-81	BWR Jet Pump Hold-Down Beam Cracking
48-81	BWR SDV Float Switch Malfunctions

49-81	Mode Switch Shutdown Scram Reset Permissive
50-81	Reactor Vessel Internals Loose Parts
51-81	Spent Fuel Pool Watertight Gate Seals
52-81	
53-81	Potential Loss of ECCS Room Cooler Automatic Start Capability
54-81	ECCS Piping Damaged by Water Hammer
55-81	Fire in Diesel Generator Room
56-81	Loss of Station and Reserve Auxiliary Power
57-81	BWR Electromatic Relief Valve Failures
58-81	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply Check Valve Damage
59-81	Dropped Fuel Assembly
60-81	Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System
61-81	InadvertentSpent Fuel Pool Overflow
62-81	
63-81	Instrumentation Transmitters
64-81	Reactor Coolant Leak Due to Technician's Error
65-81	Crack in Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft
66-81	Cracks in Centrifugal Charging Pump Lines
67-81	Gaseous Waste Decay Tank Hydrogen Burn
68-81	BWR Main Safety/Relief Valve Discharge Ramshead Support Damage
69-81	Potential Loss of Residual Heat Removal Capacity
70-81	Flow Blockages of BWR Gas Treatment Systems
71-81	RTD Terminal Connection Corrosion
72-81	Emergency Feedwater Pump Overspeed
73-81	HPCI/RCIC Exhaust Line Check Valve Failures
74-81	Loss of Decay Heat Removal
75-81	InadvertentDischarge from Reactor Coolant System to Containment Sump
76-81	Loss of Primary Coolant to Reactor Building Sump
77-81	Complete Loss of Auxiliary Feedwater
78-81	Erroneous Indication of Reactor Vessel Level Causes Loss of RHR
79-81	Improperly Routed Breaker Control Cable
80-81	Diesel Generator Lube Oil Fire Hazard
81-81	Swing Check Valves
82-81	Brazed Spring Guides Electromatic PORVs
83-81	Boron Dilution Events
84-81	Control and Protection Losses Due to RPV Level Instrumentation Header Isolation
85-81	Failure of Core Spray Valve to Open
86-81	Unmonitored Radioactive Liquid Release
87-81	Inadequate Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Water Level Indication
88-81	Loss of Feedwater Heaters at Full Power
89-81	Level Instrument Oscillations due to Reference Leg Flashing
90-81	High Occurrence of Degraded Hydraulic Snubbers
91-81	Steam Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System During Decay Heat Removal Cooldown
92-81	Overpressurization of SFW Suction Piping
93-81	Pressurizer Thermal Shock
94-81	Inadvertent Open Turbine By-Pass Valve
95-81	Automatic Valve Closure Causing Loss of Shutdown Decay Heat Removal
96-81	Flooding of RHR Service Water/Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Pumps Room
97-81	Over Voltage Protection of Inverter(s)

98-81	Two Stage Safety/Relief Valves
99-81	Steam Generator Tube Leak and Decay Heat Removal System Inoperability
100-81	Reduced Closure Time for MSIV
101-81	Inadvertent Actuation of HPCI Fire Sprinkler
102-81	Diesel Generator Bearing Failure Due to Inadequate Prelubrication
103-81	Possible Isolation of HPCI/RCIC Systems Due to Main Steam Line or Scram Discharge Line Break

APPENDIX B

LIST OF INPO SIGNIFICANT OPERATING EVENT REPORTS

SOER Number	Subject
80-1	Loss of Redundant Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System
80-2	Plugging of Floor Drains in Emergency Equipment Rooms
80-3	Stud Failure in Valves
80-4	Loss of Emergency Diesel Resulting from Leak in Lube Oil Cooler
80-5	Potential Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) from a Single Electrical Failure
81-1	Improper Steam Generator Level Control and Loss of Heat Sink Due to a Partial Loss of Instrumentation
81-2	System Response and Operator Uncertainty Due to Failed Instrumentation
81-3	Loss of 24 V DC Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Power Supply
81-4	Pressurizer Level Anomalies During Natural Circulation Cooldown
81-5	Instrumentation to Conduct Natural Circulation Cooldown
81-6	Unanalyzed Conditions Encountered During a Natural Circulation Cooldown
81-7	Loss of Forced Circulation in the Reactor Coolant System
81-8	Spurious Actuation of Safety/Relief Valve
81-9	Desiccant Carry-Over to the Instrument Air System
81-10	Event Sequences Not Considered in Design of Emergency Bus Control Logic
81-11	Partial Loss of Emergency Feedwater Pump Suction
81-12	Reactor Coolant Pump Closure Stud Corrosion
81-13	Concurrent Loss of High Pressure Core Cooling Systems
81-14	Cracks in PWR Charging Pump Lines
81-15	Partial Loss of DC Power
81-16	Overpressurization of Low Pressure Nitrogen System by Reactor Coolant
81-17	Potential for Steam Line Rupture to Affect Auxiliary Feedwater System
82-1	Radiation Overexposure of Maintenance Personnel
82-2	Inadvertent Reactor Pressure Vessel Pressurization
82-3	Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Overpressurization
82-4	Improper Alignment of Spray System to Residual Heat Removal System
82-5	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure
82-6	Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure and Inadvertent Primary Safety Valve Actuation
82-7	Reactor Vessel Pressurized Thermal Shock

CRITICAL MASS
ENERGY PROJECT

A Branch of Public Citizen, Inc.

June 3, 1982

Mr. Joseph Felton
Division of Rules and Records
FOIA Office
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 H Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST
FOIA-82-261
Rec'd 6-8-82

Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 5 USC § 9 (subpart A), the Critical Mass Energy Project hereby requests copies of the information detailed below.

The requested documents will be used in our annual study of nuclear reactor events and safety problems. Because our study will be published in our monthly Critical Mass Energy Journal and distributed to the press, and will therefore be used in the general public interest, we request a complete waiver of all costs you might incur in processing this information or in providing us access to it under provisions at 10 CFR § 9, 14a and the Freedom of Information Act. Nothing in this request should be interpreted as a request for the private records of a specific individual. Hence no provisions of the Privacy Act should be deemed applicable. If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the specific exemption(s) which you think justifies your refusal to release the information and inform us of the appeal procedures available to us under law.

The materials and information sought are as follows:

1. Any list or compilation of records which would show how many times the NRC Operations center was utilized or put in standby mode during 1981.

2. Any list or compilation of records which would include information about any site area or general emergency events occurring in 1981.

3. Any and all reports, memoranda, studies, SECY papers or other documents by AEOD, NRR, EDO, Division of Licensing, DEP, I&E or other NRC offices which report, analyze or evaluate events or mishaps occurring in 1981.

   LERs and PNOs are not included in this request.

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4. Any review, study, report or memorandum by NRC (including but not limited to the following offices: AEOD, NRR, Division of Licensing, Lessons Learned Task Force, DEP, I&E, EDO) that evaluate LER trends or relationship between LERs (or PNOs) and nuclear safety or economics.

   Only documents written during or since 1980 are being requested. We are particularly interested in any study similar to NUREG-0572, if such materials exist.

5. Any NRC review or critique (including but not limited to Commissioner's briefing papers) of NRC's SALP report made public in September. If NRC has in its files letters or reviews of SALP from other agencies or organizations, these are also requested.

6. Any review or critique of Critical Mass' 1980 LER study: "Nuclear Power Plant Safety Scoreboard 1980: 3,800+ Mishaps."

7. Any update of C.G. Long's July 30, 1979 memorandum for R.J. Matson, or any similar document or studies, which reviews LER's or power plant mishaps for loss of safety function due to personnel error and/or defective procedures.

8. Any NRC or industry studies which analyze LERs (or PNOs or other significant events) and note what if any relationship they have to vendor, capacity, performance record, plant management or economic indicators (e.g., bond rating).

   Only documents written during or since 1980 are requested.

9. Any and all documents, including but not limited to computer printouts and AEOD studies, that detail what if any relationship LERs (or PNOs or other significant events) have with unresolved and generic safety problems (including USIs)

10. A copy of all 1981 LERs (or those available) which includes AEOD's A,B,C,D,E, letter grade. (See last year's FOIA-81-119).

11. Any and all studies, memoranda, reports, letters, articles or other documents by NRC and/or its contractors or industry of capacity factors and/or outage times for plants written, received or routed during or since 1980.

12. Any and all studies, memoranda, reports, letters, articles or other documents by NRC, its contractors, industry or others that analyze, critique, estimate or evaluate the accuracy or reliability of LER cause codes.

13. Any and all studies, memoranda, reports, letters or other documents (including but not limited to internal memoranda between NRC staff, SECY papers, and memoranda or briefing papers for NRC Commissioners) which discuss, evaluate, analyze or explain the causes of steam generator problems at TMI I.

    Only documents written during or since 1980 are being requested.

14. Any cost benefit or value impact analysis by NRC and/or its contractors or industry of resolving or eliminating unresolved safety issues or generic requirements.

    Only documents written during or since 1980 are being requested.

15. Any and all proposals since 1979 to eliminate generic requirements or unresolved safety issues written by or routed through CRGR, NRR Division of Licensing, EDO, Commissioners' offices, or other NRC offices.

16. Any documents that identify which NRC office(s), branch(es), division(s) or individual(s) are assigned responsibility for reviewing and/or analyzing LERs and significant operating reactor events.

17. Summaries of all Operating Reactor Events Meetings and all memoranda, reports, studies or other documents arising out of those meetings or written between meeting attendees previous to the meetings.

Specifically included in this request are minutes or memos from each weekly meeting, I&E's "Items of Interest", and the rating system (1-low safety signigicance, 2-moderate safety significance, 3-high safety significance) attached to each operating reactor event. Also included in this request is "Summary of Operating Experience for the Six Months June 1981 through December 1981

18. A list of population estimates for the 10 and 50 mile radius around each nuclear plant or construction project. If no such list exists, then please inform us about what documents do exist. NUREG/CR-1856 Vol. 1 and 2 is not complete in this regard.

19. If NRC has a list of evacuation time estimates for the 10 mile radius around each nuclear plant or construction project that is either more recent or accurate than NUREG/CR-1856 Vol, 1 and 2, then we would appreciate access to it.

    Specifically we would like to know if there are new evacuation time estimates using the CLEAR model described in NUREG/CR-2504.

While your office has been most cooperative in the past, it has not always been the most prompt. We ask to receive a substantive reply to this request within ten (10) working days as is required by law. If your office will not be able to complete this request in that amount of time, then we would appreciate receiving in writing an estimate on when you think it will be complete.

Thank you so much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Udell

Richard A. Udell