



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429

January 6, 1983

FILE: B09-13510E
SERIAL: BSEP/83-035

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-324 AND 50-325
LICENSE NOS. DPR-62 AND DPR-71
RESPONSE TO INFRACTIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) has received IE Inspection Report 50-324/82-44 and 50-325/82-44 and finds that it does not contain any information of a proprietary nature.

The report identified one item that appears to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. This item and Carolina Power & Light Company's response are addressed in the following text:

Violation: (Severity Level V)

Technical Specification 3.7.8 requires all fire barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers, in fire boundaries protecting safety-related areas, shall be functional.

Contrary to the above, on October 26, cable penetration barriers in each unit's cable spreading room were not functional, in that the fire stop seals of these penetrations had been removed for plant modification work and not replaced. The integrity of the penetrations was last verified by the licensee on September 3, 1982.

Carolina Power & Light Company's Response:

Carolina Power & Light Company acknowledges that the failure to have five fire barriers operable around cable penetrations in the cable spreading room was a violation of NRC requirements.

An investigation of this event determined the subject fire barriers had been removed to allow routing of electrical conduit for a plant modification being performed by the plant Construction group personnel. The responsible Construction foreman, who was unfamiliar with the applicable LCO and fire

Mr. James P. O'Reilly


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watch requirements, failed to obtain the required documentation and establish the fire watch prior to the removal of the seals. Available plant documentation establishes that these seals were initially removed on September 5, 1982, without the applicable LCOs and fire watch, and this condition existed until the time of discovery. However, interviews with the involved Construction personnel indicated the seals' removal occurred on or about September 18, 1982.

Following the discovery of this event, the required LCOs and a fire watch were established. A functional test of the fire detection instrumentation was performed which showed the fire detectors which survey the area of the subject seals were operable. The involved plant modification work which necessitated removal of the subject fire barrier penetration seals was satisfactorily completed on October 26, 1982, within three and one-half hours of the event discovery.

To prevent future events of this nature, a class was given to Construction supervisors and foremen on December 29 and 30, 1982, explaining fire protection requirements. This class included how to define fire barriers, the necessary requirements to breach fire barriers, and the technical specification limits. This training is also scheduled to be provided during the initial indoctrination provided new supervisory personnel.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/jo/LETJ03

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung