

ATTACHMENT (1)

UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
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INSERT A (for Technical Specification 3.4.3 Actions)

- a. If one or both PORV(s) has excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve(s).
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 365 °F within the following 24 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore one PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 365 °F within the following 24 hours.
- d. With one or both block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in override closed. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 365 °F within the following 24 hours.

INSERT B (for Technical Specification 3/4.4.3)

* Above 365 °F, At or below 365 °F, Specification 3/4.4.9.3 applies.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

Overpressure Protection Systems

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

- a. One of the following three Overpressure Protection Systems shall be in place:
 1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a trip setpoint below the curve in Figure 3.4.9-3, or *with their associated block valves open*
 2. A single PORV with a trip setpoint below the curve in Figure 3.4.9-3 and a Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches, or *with its associated block valve open*
 3. A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent ≥ 2.6 square inches.
- b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps* shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.
- c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOV)s* shall be prevented from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS by placing their hand switches in pull-to-override.
- d. No more than one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:
 1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to ≤ 210 gpm.
 2. A Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 2.6 square inches shall exist.
- e. When not in use, the above OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump shall have its handswitch in pull-to-lock.

APPLICABILITY: When the RCS temperature is $\leq 365^\circ\text{F}$ and the RCS is vented to < 8 square inches.

* When on shutdown cooling, the PORV trip setpoint shall be ≤ 429 psia.
* EXCEPT when required for testing.

3/4:4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

IN MODE 3 with the RCS temperature $\leq 365^{\circ}\text{F}$ OR IN MODE 4

Add
Insert b
c b

a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV to **OPERABLE** status within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to **OPERABLE** status.

With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 2.6 square inch vent(s) within 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one **OPERABLE** PORV and a vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to **OPERABLE** status.

dg.

In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

ed

With less than two HPSI pumps* disabled, place at least two HPSI pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes and disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours.

f

With one or more HPSI loop MOVs* not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, immediately place the MOV handswitch in pull-to-override, or shut and disable the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, and implement the **ACTION** requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable.

gf

With HPSI flow exceeding 210 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists,

1. Immediately take action to reduce flow to less than or equal to 210 gpm.
2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4.9-1 or Figure 3.4.9-2.

* EXCEPT when required for testing.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

limit includes allowances for instrumentation uncertainty, charging pump flow addition and RCS expansion following loss of decay heat removal. The HPSI flow is injected through only one HPSI loop MOV to limit instrumentation uncertainty. No more than one charging pump (44 gpm) is allowed to operate during the HPSI mass addition.

Three 100% capacity HPSI pumps are installed at Calvert Cliffs. Procedures will require that two of the three HPSI pumps be disabled (breakers racked out) at RCS temperatures less than or equal to 365°F and that the remaining HPSI pump handswitch be placed in pull-to-lock. Additionally, the HPSI pump normally in pull-to-lock shall be throttled to less than or equal to 210 gpm when used to add mass to the RCS. Exceptions are provided for ECCS testing and for response to LOCAs.

To provide single failure protection against a HPSI pump mass addition transient when in MPT enable, the HPSI loop MOV handswitches must be placed in pull-to-override so the valves do not automatically actuate upon receipt of a SIAS signal. Alternative actions, described in the **ACTION** statement, are to disable the affected MOV (by racking out its motor circuit breaker or equivalent), or to isolate the affected HPSI header. Examples of HPSI header isolation actions include; (1) de-energizing and tagging shut the HPSI header isolation valves; (2) locking shut and tagging all three HPSI pump discharge valves; and (3) disabling all three HPSI pumps.

RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature is the appropriate indication, (2) with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation, the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of RCS temperature.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inspection programs for the ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. To the extent applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

ATTACHMENT (2)

UNIT 2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
REVISED MARKED UP PAGES

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

Overpressure Protection Systems

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

- a. One of the following three overpressure protection systems shall be in place:
 1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of ≤ 430 psia, or *with their associated block valves open*
 2. A single PORV with a lift setting of ≤ 430 psia and a Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches, or *with its associated block valve open*
 3. A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent ≥ 2.6 square inches.
- b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps[#] shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.
- c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOVs)[#] shall be prevented from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS by placing their handswitches in pull-to-override.
- d. No more than one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:
 1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to ≤ 210 gpm OR
 2. A Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 2.6 square inches shall exist.
- e. When not in use, the above OPERABLE HPSI pump shall have its handswitch in pull-to-lock.

APPLICABILITY: When the RCS temperature is $\leq 305^\circ\text{F}$ and the RCS is vented to < 8 square inches.

[#] Except when required for testing.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

3. If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1.

hg. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE** by:

- a. Performance of a **CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST** on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required **OPERABLE** and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required **OPERABLE**.
- b. Performance of a **CHANNEL CALIBRATION** on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.
- c. Verifying the PORV *lock* ~~isolation~~ valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.
- d. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above **OPERABLE** pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits or by verifying their discharge valves are locked shut. The automatic opening feature of the high pressure safety injection loop MOVs shall be verified disabled at least once per 12 hours. The above **OPERABLE** pump shall be verified to have its handswitch in pull-to-lock at least once per 12 hours.

* Except when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these vent pathways open at least once per 31 days.