(1,77)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 8/6/80
	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1	G A E I H 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 6 5 CAT 58
0 1 7 8	SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 7 2 0 8 0 8 0 2 0 1 8 3 9
0 2	During testing per Tech. Specs. 3.6.4.1, ACTION a, the J torus to dry-
0 3	well vacuum breaker failed to open. On 7/23/80, when the I breaker was
0 4	actuated to allow personnel to compare solenoid operations between the I
0 5	and J breakers, the I breaker failed. While complying with Tech. Specs.
0 6	3.6.4.1, ACTION b, the E breaker failed. Tech. Specs. 3.6.4.1, ACTION q
0 7	was then complied with. The health and safety of the public were not
0 8	affected by this repetitive event as last reported on LER 50-366/1980-94.
0 9 7 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE SUSCODE SUS
	TER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
	ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT SUBMITTED FORMSUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FORMSUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION ON PLANT METHOD 12 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Failure of the J and E breakers was due to broken air supply lines at
[1][0]	the air cylinders; the I breaker failure was due to a faulty air control
1 2	valve. The air control valves for all of the torus to drywell vacuum
13	breakers were replaced, as were the J and E air supply lines. The
7 8	breakers were then satisfactorily tested and returned to service on 7/29.
1 5	FACILITY SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 E 28 0 9 1 29 NA B 31 Surveillance Testing 80
	CCTIVITY CONTENT ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 Z (33) Z (34) NA NA
7 8	9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
17	NUMBER 0 37 Z 38 NA
	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 O O O (40) NA
7 8	9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
19	Z 42 NA NA NA NA NA
[2]0]	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) PDR ADOCK 05000366 S PDR
7 8	FO AN A
	MINNE TALET OF TOTAL

LER No.: 50-366/1980-108, Rev. 1 Licensee: Georgia Power Company

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch

Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report for LER 50-366/1980-108, Revision 1 Update Report - Previous Report Date 8/6/80

On July 20, 1980, with the reactor at 91% power, the "J" suppression chamber (torus) to drywell vacuum breaker failed to open during the performance of surveillance required by Tech. Specs. 3.6.4.1, ACTION a (testing being done as a result of event described in LER 50-366/1980-094). Then, on July 23, 1980, with the reactor at 99% power, the "I" vacuum breaker failed to open when it was actuated to allow maintenance personnel to compare the solenoid operation of the "J" and "I" vacuum breakers. Surveillance was then performed on the remaining torus to drywell vacuum breakers as required by Tech. Specs. 3.6.4.1, ACTION b. During this testing, the "E" vacuum breaker failed to open. Since this made four breakers inoperable, Tech. Specs. 3.6.4.1, ACTION c was complied with. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this repetitive event as last reported on LER 50-366/1980-094.

The failure of the "J" and "E" vacuum breakers was due to broken air supply lines to the air cylinders; failure of the "I" vacuum breaker was due to a faulty air control valve. The broken air supply lines were replaced on the "J" and "E" vacuum breakers, and the air control valve was replaced on all the torus to drywell vacuum breakers due to the inaccessibility of this area during operation.

Due to the discovery of three (3) broken air supply lines (i.e., the "J" and "E" vacuum breakers reported herein, and the "B" vacuum breaker for LER No. 50-366/1980-094) during this outage, a dye penetrant test was performed on the air supply line of each torus to drywell vacuum breaker. During this test, the "D" vacuum breaker was discovered to have a crack in its air supply line; this air line was then replaced. The "SUPPRESSION CHAMBER TO DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER DELTA P TEST" procedure was then performed satisfactorily on the "D", "E", "I", and "J" vacuum breakers, and the breakers returned to service on July 29, 1980.

Although the failed vacuum breakers could not be proven operable by surveillance testing due to the problems with the air cylinders, the mechanical operation of the breakers was not impaired. The breakers would have performed their designed function if an actual differential pressure had occurred between the drywell and suppression chamber.

Further investigation attributed the breakage of the air supply line(s) to vibration. In August, 1980, a design change (DCR # 80-289) was initiated which will change the existing air supply line (tubing) for all the torus to drywell vacuum breaker air control valves to a flexible tubing which will withstand the ambient vibration.