

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N | C | B | E | P | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While installing a jumper in an RPS panel for performance of a routine surveillance  
0 3 | requirement, the I&C technician detected an odor of burning insulation. An investi-  
0 4 | gation determined that RPS relay C72-K6C had melted insulation around its coil. This  
0 5 | relay is actuated by reactor vessel low level instrument B21-LTM-N017C and provides  
0 6 | a low level scram signal and a PCIS groups 2, 6, 7, and 8 isolation signal. This  
0 7 | event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

0 8 | \_\_\_\_\_ Technical Specifications 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 6.9.1.9b \_\_\_\_\_  
7 8 9 80

0 9 | I | A | B | A | R | E | L | A | Y | X | A | X | 17 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | L | 0 | 0 | A | X | B | X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | Y | Y | N | G | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47  
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.  
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The problem was caused by overheating of the relay. This type relay, Model No.  
1 1 | 12HFA51A49F, has a documented history of insulation failures. The coil and armature  
1 2 | were replaced with a recommended improved model and returned to service. These relays  
1 3 | (HFAs) are being inspected monthly until they are replaced with improved components  
1 4 | in an effort to detect potential failures before they occur.

1 5 | E | 0 | 6 | 4 | NA | B | Routine surveillance  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80  
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

1 6 | Z | Z | NA | NA  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80  
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | NA  
7 8 9 11 12 13 80  
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | 8302150129 830204 PDR ADOCK 05000324 S PDR  
7 8 9 11 12 80  
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

1 9 | Z | NA  
7 8 9 10 80  
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

2 0 | N | NA  
7 8 9 10 80  
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION

LER 2-83-04 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: January 5, 1983

While performing routine surveillance, an I&C technician discovered an HFA relay with melted insulation around its coil. This relay, C72-K6C, is actuated by B21-LTM-N017C and provides a low vessel level scram signal and a PCIS isolation signal for groups 2, 6, 7, and 8. When the relay was deenergized for repair, the coil did not drop out, thus indicating that the relay would not have performed its designed function. The relay coil and armature were replaced using improved components recommended by the vendor.

An investigation of other HFA relays on Unit No. 2 determined that two other relays showed indications of insulation melting. It was determined that these relays were operable, and they were rebuilt using the improved components. The vendor is currently evaluating the failure mode of two BSEP HFA relay failures. Following a determination of the failure mode, appropriate corrective actions will be initiated. Until then, the HFA relays are being inspected once per month in an effort to detect potential failures before they occur.