



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JAN 19 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Darrell G. Eisenhut*, Director
Division of Licensing

FROM: G. C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Safety Assessment
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS MEETING
OF JANUARY 7, 1981

On January 7, 1981, the Chief of the Operating Reactors Assessment Branch briefed the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives. The meeting agenda is enclosed.

The recirculation pump seal failure at Hatch 1 was discussed. The seal leakage exceeded 5 gpm and, therefore, required a plant shutdown. The question was raised about the unusually high number of problems reported by the Hatch 1 and 2 plants. This has been highlighted by a study by the Probabilistic Analysis Staff. E. Adensam suggested, based on information from the project manager, that the licensee may use a stricter criteria for event reporting than other licensees use. W. Mills (IE) indicated that the Hatch Resident Inspector also believes that this may be the reason for the larger number of reported problems. T. Murley stated that OEEB would look into the problem.

The major item discussed at the meeting was the Millstone 2 loss of DC power event of 1/2/81. The general sequence of events was presented and it was emphasized that NRR was still in an information collecting mode. IE has the responsibility for getting the complete event description from the licensee. IE indicated that they would hold the plant down until they were convinced that the licensee understands the event and until they were convinced that the plant responded as designed. They indicated the restart was expected by 1/9/81. J. Olshinski indicated that ORAB would not be in a position to define plant specific or generic licensing actions until the event was fully understood.

Mr. Denton asked if having a dedicated battery for starting the diesel generator would reduce the probability of a diesel generator failure. E. Adensam indicated that OEEB would review the diesel generator failure data to determine if loss of DC power was a significant contributor.

PDR XA
8103120107

A24
(17)


JAN 19 1981

An update of the Davis Besse 1 event of 12/5/80 was given. The licensee's proposal of 1/5/81 was presented in general; and it was indicated that we expect to complete the review of the proposed changes by approximately 1/15/81.

W. Mills (IE) presented an update of plant experience with Scram Discharge Volume, Continuous Monitoring Systems, as follows:

1. 14 of the 17 BWR have completed the operability tests (one has an extension and two are refueling);
2. 6 of the 14 could not pass the operability tests initially;
3. 2 of these 6 have been corrected; the other four are still being worked on;
4. Therefore, 10 BWRs have successfully completed the operability tests; and
5. 5 of these 10 BWRs have experienced scrams (approximately 10 scrams) and none has experienced a failure of the SDV, CMS.

J. Olshinski indicated that the performance of CMS's will be carefully observed (and reported) over time in order to determine the systems' reliability. We expect to report again on the CMS reliability at the next operating reactor events meeting.


G. C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Safety Assessment
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
Meeting Agenda

cc w/enclosure:

H. Denton	J. Olshinski
E. Case	G. Holahan
R. Vollmer	E. Adensam
S. Hanauer	T. Novak
D. Ross	W. Mills, IE
T. Murley	E. Jordan, IE
R. Purple	

JANUARY 7, 1981

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING

AGENDA

- BRUNSWICK 1 SAFETY RELIEF VALVE FAILURE
- HATCH 1 RCP SEAL LEAK
- MILLSTONE 2 LOSS OF DC BUS
- DAVIS-BESSE 1 UPDATE OF STATUS
- SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME
CONTINUOUS MONITORING
SYSTEM STATUS REPORT