

**GE Nuclear Energy**


ABWR

Date 3/18/94To Chet PostlusnyFax No. —This page plus 5 page(s)From Jack FoxMail Code —175 Curtner Avenue
San Jose, CA 95125Phone (408) 925- 4824FAX (408) 925-1193
or (408) 925-1687Subject Revised response to DSER (SBCY-91-235)
outstanding Issue 31Message Chet, please run this by
George Thomas. Note, this
subject appears on FSER
page 5-33 and 5-34.Jack

This is a revised response to DSER Open Item 2.31.

It was previously stated that the resolution to this issue was to trip the condensate pumps in the event of Level 8. In the SSAR this was further restricted to occur only if it was coincident with indication that the feedpump discharge valves were not fully closed. This solution imposes unreasonable restrictions on plant operation. From an operational standpoint, it is desirable to maximize the availability of the condensate pumps (short cycle cleanup mode to keep condensate in hotwell clean), even during shutdown periods, when water level could be expected to be above Level 8.

The preferable solution is to close all feedpump discharge and bypass valves in the event of Level 8. This solution isolates the condensate pumps from the vessel, but allows them to remain available and operating for short cycle cleanup mode. It resolves the concern about vessel overpressurization by isolating the condensate pump from the feedwater piping sections in between the feedpump discharge valves and the feedwater injection valves. Therefore, even if the feedwater injection valves inadvertently open, the closed feedwater pump discharge and bypass valves prevent condensate flow to the vessel.



The attached markups show the changes to SSAR chapter 7.7.1.4 (9) (Interlocks) and Figures 7.7-8 and 7.7-9 to adopt this improvement. We plan to include these changes in Amendment 34.

flow control valve signal through a linearizing function generator and then to the feedpump flow control actuator.

In the single-element control mode, which is employed at lower feedwater flow rates, only a conditioned level error is used to determine the feedpump demand. The master level controller (proportional + integral) conditions the level error and sends it directly to the feedpump actuator linearizing function generator and then to the feedpump flow control actuator itself. When the reactor water inventory must be decreased, during very low steam flow rate conditions, the CUW System dump valve is controlled by the FWCS in single element control. Reactor water is dumped through the CUW System to the condenser.

Each feedpump flow control actuator can be controlled "manually" from the main control panel by selecting the manual mode for that feedpump. In manual mode, the operator may increase or decrease the demand that is sent directly to the linearizing function generator of the chosen feedpump flow control actuator.

(9) Interlocks

The level control system also provides interlocks and control functions to other systems. When the reactor water level reaches the Level 8 trip setpoint, the FWCS simultaneously annunciates a control room alarm, sends a trip signal to the Turbine Control System to trip the turbine generator, and sends trip signals to the Condensate, Feedwater and Condensate Air Extraction (CF&CAE) System to trip all feed pumps and to close the main feedwater discharge valves. This interlock is enacted to protect the turbine from damage from high moisture content in the steam caused by excessive carryover while preventing water level from rising any higher. *This interlock also prevents over pressurization of the vessel by isolating the condensate pumps from the vessel.*

In the event that the feedwater pump discharge valves fail to close following the Level 8 trip signal, the FWCS automatically issues another signal to the CF&CAE System to trip all condensate pumps in order to avoid overpressurization of the vessel.

Upon detection of a loss of feedwater heating, the FWCS will send a signal to the Recirculation Flow Control System which will signal the Rod Control and Information System (RCIS) for initiation of automatic selected control rod run-in (SCRRI). This is done to minimize reactivity transient resulting from introduction of cold feedwater in such an event.

NOTES:

- 1 LOCAL CONTROL ALLOWS THE OPERATOR TO EITHER MANUALLY MANIPULATE DEMAND SIGNALS OR PLACE THEM IN AUTOMATIC CONTROL. A MANUAL/AUTO STATION LOGIC POWER GENERATION CONTROL SYSTEM INPUT CONTROLS ALL OTHERS. THE COMPUTER'S DIRECTLY MANUFACTURE DEMAND SIGNALS AT THE WORK STATION OR PLACE THEM IN AUTOMATIC CONTROL.
- 2 UNIFORM TRANSMITTER SIGNALS INPUTS FOR SIMILAR PROCESS SIGNALS ARE PROVIDED IN TWO SINGLE SIGNALS WITHIN EACH DDC CHANNEL. BY THE SIGNAL VALIDATION ALGORITHMS IN THE CASE OF FLOW RATES OR PARALLEL FLOW PATHS SUCH AS MODERATOR STEAM FLOW, THIS CHANNEL SHOWS SHARING THE FLOWS TO OBTAIN TOTAL FLOW. IN THE CASE OF REED-MIANT TRANSmitter SIGNALS SUCH AS REACTOR WATER LEVEL, THIS INVOLVES DETERMINATION OF A SINGLE VALID VALUE FOR THE PARAMETER. IN THIS DOCUMENT, THE COMPUTED SINGLE VALIDATED SIGNAL IS SHOWN IN GENERAL. ONE EXCEPTION IS THE REACTOR WATER LEVEL SIGNALS USED FOR ATWS INITIATION LEVEL. A SIGNAL ISSUED TO THE RCS SYSTEM (PPI) IN THIS CASE, ALL THREE LEVEL TRIGGER SIGNALS FOR THE ATWS ARE SET. THEREFORE, ALL THREE LEVEL TRANSMITTER SIGNALS ARE SHOWN IN THE LOGIC DESCRIPTION.
- 3 THE PUSH BUTTON SWITCH (PBS) SENDS A HIGH SIGNAL FOR AT LEAST ONE COMPLETE Sampling PERIOD.
- 4 THE STATUS INDICATOR (S) IS ISOLATED OR TONE DECODED SOFTWARE FACED DISPLAY.



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SH	ITEM	DESCRIPTION	CURRENT CLASS CODE
1	NOTES, REFERENCE DOCUMENTS	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
2	FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM INTERFACING	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
3	LOGIC SELECTION LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
4	REP A INTERLOCKS AND CONTROLLER INITIALIZATION	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
5	REP B INTERLOCKS AND CONTROLLER INITIALIZATION	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
6	REP C INTERLOCKS AND CONTROLLER INITIALIZATION	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
7	REP A MANUAL/AUTO STATION LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
8	REP B MANUAL/AUTO STATION LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
9	REP C MANUAL/AUTO STATION LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
10	LFCV MANUAL/AUTO STATION LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
11	DUMP VALVE FLOW CONTROL MANUAL/AUTO STATION LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
12	CURB DUMP VALVE LEVEL CONTROL MANUAL/AUTO STATION SELECTION CHANGE LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
13	CABIN CHARGE LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
14	ACTUATOR LATCHUP LOGIC, LOCKDOWN RIBBON LOGIC, DAC CONTROLLER FAILURE	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
15	LOSS OF FEEDWATER HEATING LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS


- 5 LOGIC, OR ONE ENCL. TYPICAL OF ANY THREE DDC'S. SHOWN FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES ONLY. INDICATORS AND COMPUTER POINT SYMBOLS ARE SHOWN HERE. THESE OUTPUTS ARE ACTUALLY SUPPLEMENTED BY VOTERS AS SHOWN IN REFERENCE C-103.
 - 6 USE IN THREE DDC'S. SET TO ALARM FOR VALVE STATION TIME AFTER DISCHARGE VALVE FAILSAFE CLOSE WHEN OPEN. DDC NUMBER 103. REACTOR WATER LEVEL LEVEL SELECTED LEVEL B.
 - 7 TWO FUNCTION. SHOWN WITHIN DASH LINES ARE PERFORMED BY UNDERRATE. UNDERPROCESSOR NUMBER 2. ALL FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED BY MICROPROCESSOR NUMBER 1.
 - 8 LOGIC FOR ATWS FEEDWATER RIBBON SHOWN WITHIN DASHED LINES IS PERFORMED BY SAFETY SYSTEM LOGIC AND CONTROL LOGIC. SEE ESSA ONE; AND TYPICAL FOR DIVISIONS B, D, AND E.
- SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS WHICH THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS ARE RELATED TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS DOCUMENT.

REF ID: 137C9504
REF ID: 137C9505
REF ID: 137C9506

SH	ITEM	DESCRIPTION	CURRENT CLASS CODE
1	GENERAL DOCUMENT CHANGE HISTORY	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
2	ADDED NOTES 6 & 8.	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
3	BY DOWN PRESS & OPEN Close INPUT'S. SIMPLY LOGIC LOSS OF DOWN HEATING LOGIC	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS
4	CHG BY: M. YOUNG'S C. G. HOWARD M. HOWARD	NOTES RELATED TO SYSTEMS	SAFETY RELATED TO SYSTEMS



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Figure 7.7-e



CLASS 1
EQUIPMENT
TESTING
PROCEDURE

< TRANSACTION REPORT >

03-18-1994(FRI) 10:31

[RECEIVE]

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