

Filed: January 12, 1983

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
before the  
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD



In the Matter of	)	
	)	
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.	)	Docket Nos. 50-443 OL
	)	50-444 OL
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)	)	
	)	

APPLICANTS' SECOND ANSWERS TO  
"THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE'S SECOND SET  
OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR  
PRODUCTION OF DUCUMENTS TO  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, INC."

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.740 and 2.740b, the Applicants hereby submits the following answers to interrogatories propounded to them by the State of New Hampshire (Attorney General) ("NHAG").

Interrogatory No. NH 9.41

NH 9.41

With regard to the answer to Interrogatory 9.23 relating to the plant ventilating system, the Applicant indicated "In some cases, these dampers are also provided with limit switches which, in conjunction with other instrumentation, will annunciate a system failure." Identify each of the "some cases" referred to which are designed with instrumentation to annunciate a system failure. Also, please identify the "other instrumentation" and explain how a system failure will be annunciated in each case.

Response

All tornado dampers shall be equipped with position switches. Damper position status will be transmitted to the nuclear plant computer for logging. No audio alarms or lights are associated with these dampers. (This information supersedes the information provided in Interrogatory No. NH 10.18 relative to tornado dampers.) The following is a tabulation of safety related dampers which function to prevent reversed air flow. The table identifies each damper, describes damper type, and the type and location of position indication and alarm, if any, and associated instrumentation such as instrumentation or limited instrumentation on related fans. If no instrumentation

is provided on a particular damper, the note section provides the specific reasons.

<u>Damper ID</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Position Indication/Alarm</u>	<u>Note</u>
CAH-DP-312 to 317	Backdraft	Position lights on MCB & CP-108	
CBA-DP-21A,B	Position	Position lights on MCC	2
CBA-DP-27A,B	Position	Position lights on MCB	
CBA-DP-53A,B	Control	Position lights on MCB	
CBA-DP-56	Backdraft	-None-	1
CBA-DP-57A,B	Backdraft	-None-	2
CBA-DP-58	Backdraft	-None-	1
CBA-DP-59A,B	Backdraft	-None-	3
CBA-DP-310A,B	Backdraft	Low flow to main plant computer with alarm in conjunction with "S" signal or air intake isolation	
EAH-DP-3A,B	Backdraft	Position lights on MCB & CP-108, fan alarm Hi/Low flow	
EAH-DP-25A,B	Backdraft	Position lights on MCB	
EAH-DP-30A,B	Control	Position lights on MCB, Status monitoring lights on damper & fan	
EAH-DP-12A,B	Control	Position lights on MCB, low flow alarm on fan	
EAH-DP-10A,B	Control	Position lights on CP-23 in the main control room	
SWA-DP-45A,B	Backdraft	-None-	4
SWA-DP-60A,B	Relief	-None-	5
SWA-DP-63A,B	Backdraft	-None-	6
SWA-DP-64A,B	Backdraft	-None-	2
SWA-DP-67	Backdraft	-None-	4
SWA-DP-68	Backdraft	-None-	4

Notes:

- 1 Damper isolates only the fan, not the system. Air exhaust can be accomplished through exfiltration in case of damper failure.

2. Damper discharges to the atmosphere; failure cannot significantly affect overall system performance. Redundant damper available.
3. Flow path provides bypass capability only. Hydrogen control capability not significantly affected if damper fails.
4. Exhaust fans have common intake plenum. A single failure will not significantly affect system performance.
5. Area pressurized by fans to keep out dust. Damper failure would not increase dust level to significantly affect system operability.
6. In the event of failure the opposite train can provide ventilation.

Interrogatory No. NH 9.42

NH 9.42

With regard to the previous Interrogatory, explain the criteria used to select which "cases" (or dampers) would be designed with limit switches such that a system failure would be annunciated. What differentiates these selected cases from other dampers which are not equipped with limit switches.

Response

In general only safety related dampers, whose failure can significantly affect system performance, are provided with instrumentation for position indications and/or alarms. The design is based on single active failure, so that if redundant flow paths are available instrumentation would not be provided. Also, if damper failure cannot significantly affect system operability

on a short-term basis, i.e., more than a few days, instrumentation may not be provided.

This type of evaluation for ventilation systems design is based on engineer's judgment and standard engineering practices.

Interrogatory No. 9.45 (NH 9)

9.45 (NH 9)

Please resolve the discrepancies between plant and detector numbers mentioned in the Applicant's response to Interrogatory NH 9.12, and those listed in FSAR Table 12.3-13.

Response

The only difference between our response to interrogatory NH 9.12 and FSAR Table 12.3-14 is that the Plant Vent Monitors have been redesigned and now have the designations given in the response. The instruments with the tags RM-RE-6533-A-1, B-1, A-2, B-2, A-3, B-3, A-4 and B-4 have been deleted.

Interrogatory No. NH 13.4

NH 13.4

Describe in detail how and to what extent each phase of the control room operator training program provides or will provide for the following aspects of emergency response training:

- (a) recognition of emergency conditions;

- (b) classification of observed emergency conditions in accordance with the emergency classification system;
- (c) notification of emergency to off-site authorities;
- (d) recommendation of protective actions to off-site authorities; and
- (e) direction of station staff to take protective actions.

Response

Emergency response training for Seabrook's control room operators is addressed in two areas of the station training program; operator license training and emergency response training.

Each operator who is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to operate Seabrook's nuclear reactors will have successfully completed the Seabrook operator license training program. The details of this program are presented in FSAR Section 13.2

Recognition of emergency conditions and corrective actions to mitigate the consequence of such conditions are specific objectives of both the classroom lecture series and simulator exercise training. Demonstration of proficiency in identification and proper response to a variety of emergency conditions is a program requirement for eligibility to be licensed by the NRC.

Classification of observed emergency conditions, notification of an emergency to off-site authorities, recommendation of protective actions to off-site authorities and direction of station staff to take protective actions are responsibilities delegated to senior shift management and station management personnel. General Physics Corporation, an experienced nuclear services consultant, has been contracted to develop Seabrook's emergency plan implementation procedures. As part of this contract, General Physics Corp. will develop the emergency response training instructional modules which will be used to train the station staff. Detailed development of the program and materials will be completed in late 1983 for a start of training in January, 1984.

Interrogatory No. SAPL Supp. 3.15

SAPL Supp. 3.15

Why was General Electric user group data used for the review of the Control Room Design Review? Are data from PWR users available?

Response

Those persons developing the survey portion of the Control Room Design Review used the checklist developed by the GE Owner's Group as a starting point for the


development of their own checklist. Checklists of this type are available from many sources. We know of no checklist which has been developed by PWR Owner's Groups.




Signatures

As to Answers:

I, Wendell P. Johnson, being first duly sworn, do depose and say that the foregoing answers are true, except insofar as they are based on information that is available to the Applicants but not within my personal knowledge, as to which I, based on such information, believe them to be true.


  
Wendell P. Johnson

Sworn to before me this  
day of January, 1983:

  
Notary Public  
My Commission expires: August 5, 1988



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robert K. Gad III, one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify that on January 22, 1983 I made service of the within "Applicants' Second Answers to 'The State of New Hampshire's Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Inc.'" by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:

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