

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-10/79-01; 50-237/79-01; 50-249/79-01


Docket No. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 License No. DPR-02; DPR-19; DPR-25

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company  
P. O. Box 767  
Chicago. IL 60690


Facility Name: Dresden Units 1, 2, and 3

Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: January 2-31, 1979

Inspector:   
J. L. Barker

2/12/79

Approved By:   
R. L. Spessard, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 1

2/13/79

Inspection Summary

Inspection on January 2-31, 1979 (Reports No. 50-10/79-01; 50-237/79-01; 50-249/79-01)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced resident inspection of maintenance, plant operations, physical protection - security organization, physical protection - physical barriers, physical protection - access control (identification, authorization, badging, search, and escorting), physical protection - communications, review and followup on licensee event reports, review and audits, and calibration of safety-related components required by technical specifications, The inspection involved 141 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- \*B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- \*A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent
- \*B. Shelton, Assistant to the Station Superintendent
- \*R. Ragan, Lead Operating Engineer
- \*D. Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
  - E. Budzichowski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
  - J. Wujciga, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
  - C. Sargent, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
  - D. Adam, Wast Systems Engineer
  - J. Parry, Chemical and Health Physics Engineer
- \*G. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Coordinator
- \*R. Stobert, Quality Assurance
  - B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator

The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, training instructors, electrical, mechanical, and instrument maintenance personnel, contract security personnel and clerical personnel.

\*Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on January 11, 19, and 26, 1979.

### 2. Maintenance

The inspector, through direct observation and record review verified that reactivity control, instrumentation, and emergency core cooling systems maintenance were conducted in accordance with established procedures and Technical Specifications; verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; verified that maintenance activities were accomplished using approved and technically adequate procedures; verified that the activities were inspected in accordance with the provisions of licensee's requirements; verified that activities included functional testing and calibration as necessary prior to returning the component or system to an operating status; verified that quality control records were available; verified that activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; verified that radiological controls were established for worker protection, including minimizing personnel exposure; verified that materials or components used were certified as required by plant procedures; verified that QC hold points, plant status and safety controls, and tagging operations appeared adequate;

and verified that associated Limiting Conditions for Operation were met in accordance with Technical Specifications. The inspector observed maintenance activities in progress concerning the following work requests: (1) Unit 1, WR 9970-1, remove thimble support to remove CRD's; (2) Unit 2, WR 200-2, ARM channel "A"; and (3) Unit 3, WR 534, high reactor pressure scram. The inspector also reviewed the following completed work requests: (1) Unit 2, WR 84, HPCI motor speed changer linkage and WR 491, main steam line radiation monitor; and (2) Unit 3, WR 357, target rock pilot valve and WR 721, Rods 42-27 and 54-39 scram pilot valves.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Plant Operations

The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, routine patrol sheets, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs for the month of January, 1979. The inspector also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during the period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for the period was conducted to verify that no violations of the licensee's Technical Specifications were made. The inspector conducted tours of Units 1, 2, and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, fluid leads and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant and component status and problem areas were being turned over to relieving shift personnel. The inspector observed sampling and chemical analysis of water chemistry samples to verify that water chemistry was being maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Physical Protection - Security Organization

The inspector verified by observation and personal interview (once during each operating shift) that at least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization was onsite at all

times; verified by observation the the security organization was properly manned for all shifts; and verified by observation that members of the security organization were capable of performing their assigned tasks. The inspector also observed weapon qualifications conducted by contract security personnel during the month.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Physical Protection - Physical Barriers

The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers and isolation zones conform to regulatory requirements and commitments in the physical security plan (PSP); that gates in the protected area were closed and locked if not attended; and that isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Physical Protection - Access Control (Identification, Authorization, Badging, Search and Escorting)

The inspector verified that all persons and packages were identified and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA), all vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a PA, all persons authorized in the PA were issued and displayed identification badges, records of access authorized conformed to the PSP, and all personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified that all persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance with regulatory requirements, the PSP, and security procedures; verified that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within a PA or vital area; verified that vehicles authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when with the PA; and verified by review of the licensee's authorization document that the escort observed above was authorized to perform the escort function.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Physical Protection - Communications

The inspector verified by observation (during each operating shift) that communications checks were conducted satisfactorily at the beginning of and at other prescribed time(s) during the security personnel work shift and that all fixed and roving posts, and each member of the response team successfully communicate from their remote location; and verified that equipment was operated consistent with requirements in the PSP and security procedures.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

Unit 1

LER 78-34, Dropped fuel element during refueling.

Unit 2

LER 75-48 "Update," Crack in drywell-torus nitrogen surge line 1604-18".

LER 76-63 "Update," Stack gas effluent not in accordance with Technical Specifications.

LER 78-33, Unit 2 DG tripped on overspeed.

LER 78-61, Containment purge system valve A0-1601-24 failed to close.

LER 78-62, Containment purge system valve A0-1601-56 inoperable.

LER 78-63, MSIV's 2-205-1A and 2-203-1C failed to close in time specified by Technical Specifications.

LER 78-64, Lead in eductor on 2/3 waste collector tank recirculation line.

LER 78-66, Unit 2/3 DG failed to start.

LER 78-67, Drywell isolation valve A02-9207A failed to close.

LER 78-69, Routine offgas sample not taken in accordance with Technical Specifications.

Regarding LER 78-69, the licensee determined that a routine daily offgas sample was not taken on December 10, 1978, which is contrary to Technical Specifications 4.8.A.2.a. The cause of the event was determined to be an incomplete shift turnover. To prevent recurrence the licensee added the sample requirement to the Control Room Surveillance log which is reviewed on a shiftly basis by the shift engineer. This is considered a licensee identified item.

Unit 3

LER 78-52, Steam leak on moisture separator drain line.

LER 78-53, Offgas radiation monitor 3 "A" failed.

LER 78-54, MSIV 3-203-2A failed to close in time specified by Technical Specifications.

LER 78-55, Pipe leak on 3D2 feedwater heater drain line.

LER 78-56, Reactor water level Yarway LIS263-73 inoperable.

LER 78-57, Unit 3 DG fuel oil transfer to day tank failed.

Regarding LER 78-52, the licensee determined the cause of the leak to be erosion by impingement of high velocity steam/water on the elbow downstream of orifice RO 3-3041-5. The licensee has installed a split elbow repair flange as an interim repair. A permanent repair is to replace the 3000 pound rated elbow with a 6000 pound rated elbow. The inspector will review the modification when permanent repairs are effected.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Review and Audits

On January 8, 1979, the inspector sat in on an LER safety review committee meeting. The inspector verified that provisions of Technical Specifications dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were met. The inspector also verified that decisions made were reflected in the meeting minutes and that corrective actions proposed were taken.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. Calibration of Safety-Related Components Required by Technical Specifications

The inspector observed the calibration of Unit 3 reactor high pressure scram pressure switch and verified that the calibration activities were in conformance with the Technical Specifications and technically adequate procedures.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 11, 19, and 26, 1979, and summarized the scope and findings of that week's inspection activities.