

ATTACHMENT B

RETYPE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

DPR-29

Table of Contents, page ii  
Table of Contents, page v  
3.6/4.6-12  
3.6/4.6-12a\*  
3.6/4.6-13  
3.6/4.6-14  
3.6/4.6-15  
3.6/4.6-15a\*  
3.6/4.6-15b\*  
3.6/4.6-15c\*  
3.6/4.6-15d\*  
3.6/4.6-24 (Bases)  
3.6/4.6-25 (Bases)  
3.6/4.6-25a\* (Bases)  
3.6/4.6-36\* (Table 4.6-3)  
Figure 4.6-2\*\*

DPR-30

Table of Contents, page v  
3.6/4.6-5c  
3.6/4.6-5d\*  
3.6/4.6-5e\*  
3.6/4.6-5f\*  
3.6/4.6-5g\*  
3.6/4.6-5h\*  
3.6/4.6-6  
3.6/4.6-7  
3.6/4.6-14 (Bases)  
3.6/4.6-14a (Bases)  
3.6/4.6-22\* (Table 4.6-3)  
Figure 4.6-2\*\*

\* Asterisked pages represent new, additional pages.

\*\* These figures have been added.

QUAD CITIES  
DPR-29

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

	Page
3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM	3.4/4.4-1
A. Normal Operation	3.4/4.4-1
B. Operation with Inoperable Components	3.4/4.4-2
C. Liquid Poison Tank-Boron Concentration	3.4/4.4-2
3.4 Limiting Conditions for Operation Bases	3.4/4.4-4
3.5/4.5 CORE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS	3.5/4.5-1
A. Core Spray Subsystems and the LPCI Mode of the RHR System	3.5/4.5-1
B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System	3.5/4.5-3
C. HPCI Subsystem	3.5/4.5-5
D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems	3.5/4.5-6
E. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System	3.5/4.5-7
F. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability	3.5/4.5-8
G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe	3.5/4.5-10
H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection	3.5/4.5-11
I. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)	3.5/4.5-13
J. Local LHGR	3.5/4.5-13
K. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)	3.5/4.5-14
3.5 Limiting Conditions for Operation Bases	3.5/4.5-15
4.5 Surveillance Requirements Bases	3.5/4.5-23
3.6/4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY	3.6/4.6-1
A. Thermal Limitations	3.6/4.6-1
B. Pressurization Temperature	3.6/4.6-2
C. Coolant Chemistry	3.6/4.6-3
D. Coolant Leakage	3.6/4.6-5
E. Safety and Relief Valves	3.6/4.6-6
F. Structural Integrity	3.6/4.6-6
G. Jet Pumps	3.6/4.6-9
H. Recirculation Pump Flow Limitations	3.6/4.6-11
I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)	3.6/4.6-12
3.6 Limiting Conditions for Operation Bases	3.6/4.6-16
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS	3.7/4.7-1
A. Primary Containment	3.7/4.7-1
B. Standby Gas Treatment System	3.7/4.7-12
C. Secondary Containment	3.7/4.7-17
D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves	3.7/4.7-18

a

QUAD CITIES  
DPR-29

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

APPENDIX A

LIST OF TABLES

Number	Title	Page
3.1-1	Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirements-Refuel Mode	3.1/4.1-11
3.1-2	Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirements-Startup/Hot Standby Mode	3.1/4.1-12
3.1-3	Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirements-Run Mode	3.1/4.1-13
3.1-4	Notes for Tables 3.1-1, 3.1-2, and 3.1-3	3.1/4.1-14
4.1-1	Scram Instrumentation and Logic Systems Functional Test-Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instrumentation, Logic Systems, and Control Circuits	3.1/4.1-15
4.1-2	Scram Instrument Calibration-Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels	3.1/4.1-17
3.2-1	Instrumentation that Initiates Primary Containment Isolation Functions	3.2/4.2-15
3.2-2	Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems	3.2/4.2-17
3.2-3	Instrumentation that Initiates Rod Block	3.2/4.2-19
3.2-4	Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation Requirements	3.2/4.2-21
3.2-5	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation	3.2/4.2-24
3.2-6	Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation	3.2/4.2-25
4.2-1	Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core and Containment Cooling Systems Instrumentation, Rod Blocks and Isolation	3.2/4.2-27
4.2-2	Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	3.2/4.2-30
4.2-3	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	3.2/4.2-32
4.2-4	Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	3.2/4.2-33
4.6-1	Inservice Inspection Requirements for Quad-Cities	3.6/4.6-26
4.6-2	Revised Withdrawal Schedule	3.6/4.6-35
3.7-1	Primary Containment Isolation	3.7/4.7-33
3.7-2	Primary Containment Leakage Test Penetrations	3.7/4.7-39
4.7-1	Temporarily Untested Pathways	3.7/4.7-40
4.8-1	Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program	3.8/4.8-27

4.6-3 snapper visual inspection criteria

3.6/4.6-36

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

- d. The flow biased RBM Rod Block setpoints, as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, shall be reduced by 4.0%.
- e. The suction valve in the idle loop shall be closed and electrically isolated except when the idle loop is being prepared for return to service.

DELETE

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)	I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)														
1. During all modes of operation except Shutdown and Refuel, all snubbers on safety-related piping systems shall be operable except as noted in 3.6.I.2 following.	The following surveillance requirements apply to all snubbers on safety-related piping systems.														
	1. Visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule utilizing the acceptance criteria given by Specification 4.6.I.2.														
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="966 1110 1258 1282">Number of Snubbers Found Inoperable During Inspection or During Inspection Interval</th> <th data-bbox="1364 1153 1534 1282">Next Required Inspection Interval</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="1079 1315 1096 1347">0</td> <td data-bbox="1388 1315 1534 1379">18 months ±25%</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1079 1412 1096 1444">1</td> <td data-bbox="1388 1412 1534 1476">12 months ±25%</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1079 1509 1096 1541">2</td> <td data-bbox="1404 1509 1534 1573">6 months ±25%</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1079 1606 1128 1638">3,4</td> <td data-bbox="1372 1606 1502 1670">124 days ±25%</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1079 1703 1161 1735">5,6,7</td> <td data-bbox="1388 1703 1502 1767">62 days ±25%</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1079 1811 1112 1843">≥8</td> <td data-bbox="1388 1811 1502 1875">31 days ±25%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Number of Snubbers Found Inoperable During Inspection or During Inspection Interval	Next Required Inspection Interval	0	18 months ±25%	1	12 months ±25%	2	6 months ±25%	3,4	124 days ±25%	5,6,7	62 days ±25%	≥8	31 days ±25%
Number of Snubbers Found Inoperable During Inspection or During Inspection Interval	Next Required Inspection Interval														
0	18 months ±25%														
1	12 months ±25%														
2	6 months ±25%														
3,4	124 days ±25%														
5,6,7	62 days ±25%														
≥8	31 days ±25%														
	The required inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.														

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

I. Snubbers

1. During Run, Startup/Hot Standby, and Hot Shutdown, and during Cold Shutdown and Refuel for snubbers located on systems required operable during Cold Shutdown and Refuel, all required snubbers shall be operable. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse impact on any safety-related system.
2. With one or more snubbers inoperable, on any system, within 72 hours:
  - a. Replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to operable status, and
  - b. Perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.6.1.7 on the attached component.

Otherwise, declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

I. Snubbers

Each snubber shall be demonstrated operable by the performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program.

1. Inspection Types

As used in this specification, "type of snubber" shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

2. Visual Inspections

Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these categories (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule determined by Table 4.6-3. The visual inspection interval for each type of snubber shall be determined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.6-3<sup>(a)</sup>.

3. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) the snubber has no visible indications of damage or impaired operability, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for the attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of

---

a The first inspection interval determined using this criteria shall be based upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before amendment ( ).

DELETE PAGE  
AND REPLACE WITH  
RETYPE PAGE

3.6/4.6-13

1. (Cont'd)

Snubbers may be categorized in two groups, 'accessible' or 'inaccessible' based on their accessibility for inspection during reactor operation. These two groups may be inspected independently according to the above schedule.

Snubber service life monitoring shall be followed by the snubber surveillance inspection records and maintenance history records. The above record retention method shall be used to prevent the snubbers from exceeding a service life.

2. From and after the time that a snubber is determined to be inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 72 hours only if the snubber is sooner made operable.

3. If the requirements of 3.6.I.1 and 3.6.I.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 36 hours.

2. Visual inspections shall verify:

- a. There are no visible indications of damage or impaired operability, and
- b. Attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure.

3. Once each refueling cycle a representative sample of 10% of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For each snubber that does not meet the functional test criteria, an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

visual inspections shall be classified as unacceptable. A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber. If continued operation cannot be justified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.2 shall be met.

Snubbers originally classified as unacceptable may be reclassified as acceptable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined operable per Specification 4.6.1.6.

#### 4. Transient Event Inspection

An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients, as determined from a review of operational data or a visual inspection of the systems, within 72 hours for accessible systems and 6 months for inaccessible systems following this determination. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

4. If a snubber is determined to be inoperable while the reactor is in the Shutdown or Refuel mode, the snubber shall be made operable prior to reactor startup.

4. The mechanical snubber functional tests shall verify:

- a. That the breakaway force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum force.
- b. That the activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of acceleration in both tension and compression.

5. When a snubber is deemed inoperable, a review shall be conducted to determine the mode of failure and to decide if an engineering evaluation should be performed. If the engineering evaluation is deemed necessary, it will determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

DELETE PAGE  
REPLACE WITH  
RETYPE PAGE  
3.6/4.6-14



5. Functional Tests

At least once per 18 months, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using one of the following sample plans for each type of snubber. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

- a. At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.6.1.6, an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or
- b. A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested, in accordance with Figure 4.6-2. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.6.1.6. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.6-2.

DELETE PAGE  
REPLACE WITH  
RE-TYPED PAGE  
3.6/4.6-15

- e
6. If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e., frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and if determined to be generically deficient all snubbers of the same design, subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. |
  7. In addition to the regular sample, snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested during the next test period. If a spare snubber has been installed in place of a failed snubber, then both the failed snubber (if it is repaired and installed in another position) and the spare snubber shall be retested. Test results of these snubbers may not be included for the resampling. |

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

If at any time the point plotted falls on or above the "Reject" line, all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or the "Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested. Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time, providing all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested; or

- c. An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers of each type shall be functionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor,  $1 + C/2$ , where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria. The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows the equation  $N = 55(1 + C/2)$ . Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

"Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated. If the point plotted falls above the "Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls on or below the "Accept" line or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure as far as practical that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type.

Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan, and failure of this functional test shall not be the sole cause for increasing the sample size under the sample plan. If during testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional testing results shall be reviewed at the time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

6. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The snubber functional test shall verify that:

- a. Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression;

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

- b. Snubber bleed, or release rate where required, is present in both tension and compression, within the specified range (hydraulic snubbers, only);
- c. For mechanical snubbers, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and
- d. For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

7. Functional Test Failure Analysis

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause for the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the operability of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.

For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the

snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to activate or fails to move, i.e., frozen-in-place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.6.1.5 for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

8. Functional Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test result shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

9. Snubber Service Life Program

The service life of all snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be operable. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.5.B.

#### H. Recirculation Pump Flow Limitations

The LPCI loop selection logic is described in the SAR, Section 6.2.4.2.5. For some limited low probability accidents with the recirculation loop operating with large speed differences, it is possible for the logic to select the wrong loop for injection. For these limited conditions, the core spray itself is adequate to prevent fuel temperatures from exceeding allowable limits. However, to limit the probability even further, a procedural limitation has been placed on the allowable variation in speed between the recirculation pumps.

The licensee's analyses indicate that above 80% power the loop select logic could not be expected to function at a speed differential of 15%. Below 80% power, the loop select logic would not be expected to function at a speed differential of 20%. This specification provides a margin of 5% in pump speed differential before a problem could arise. If the reactor is operating on one pump, the loop select logic trips that pump before making the loop selection.

Analyses have been performed which support indefinite single loop operation provided the appropriate restrictions are implemented within 12 hours. The MCPR Safety Limit has been increased by 0.01 to account for core flow and TIP reading uncertainties which are used in the statistical analysis of the safety limit. The MCPR Operating Limit, as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, has also been increased by 0.01 to maintain the same margin to the safety limit as during Dual Loop operation.

The flow biased scram and rod block setpoints are reduced to account for uncertainties associated with backflow through the idle jet pumps when the operating recirculation pump is above 20-40% of rated speed. This assures that the flow biased trips and blocks occur at conservative neutron flux levels for a given core flow.

The closure of the suction valve in the idle loop prevents the loss of LPCI flow through the idle recirculation pump into the downcomer.

DELETED

#### I. Snubbers

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on non-safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.



DELETE

Snubber service life monitoring will be followed by the existing snubber surveillance inspection records and maintenance history records. The above record retention method should be used to prevent mechanical snubbers from exceeding a service life of 40 years.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible, and verified by inservice functional testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber by visual inspection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at refueling cycle intervals. Functional testing of the mechanical snubber will consist of verification that the force that initiates free movement of the snubber in either tension or compression is less than the maximum breakaway friction force and verification that the activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of acceleration in both tension and compression.

When a snubber is found inoperable, a review shall be performed to determine the snubber mode of failure. Results of the review shall be used to determine if an engineering evaluation of the safety-related system or component is necessary. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the support component or system.

Observed failures of these sample snubbers shall require functional testing of additional units.

DELETE PAGE  
REPLACE WITH  
RETYPE PAGE  
3.6/4.6-25

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

3.6/4.6.1 Snubbers

Mechanical and hydraulic snubbers are provided to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic event or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers are classified and grouped by design, manufacturer and accessibility. A list of individual snubbers with information of snubber location, classification or group, and system affected is maintained at the plant. The accessibility of each snubber is determined and documented for each snubber. The determination is based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operation (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to the systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies with the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous inspection, the total population or category size for each snubber type, and the previous inspection interval. A snubber is considered unacceptable if it fails to satisfy the acceptance criteria of the visual inspection. Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible. These categories may be examined separately or jointly as determined and documented prior to the inspections. The categorization is used as the basis for determining the next inspection interval for that category.

If a review and evaluation can not justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber, the snubber is declared inoperable and the applicable action taken. To determine the next surveillance interval, the unacceptable snubber may be reclassified as acceptable if it can be demonstrated that the snubber is operable in its as-found condition by the performance of a functional test. The next visual inspection interval may be twice, the same, or reduced by as much as two-thirds of the previous inspection interval, depending on the number of unacceptable snubbers found in proportion to the size of the population or category for each type of snubber included in the previous inspection. The inspection interval may be as long as 48 months and the provisions of Specification 1.0.DD may be applied.

When a snubber is found to be inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide additional assurance of snubber functional reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested at 18 month intervals. This sample is identified using one of three methods:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure, or
2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.6-2, or

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.6-2 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the NRC if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubber for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted are listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replace, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.) The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-29

Table 4.6-3


SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION CRITERIA

Population <sup>(a)(b)</sup> or Category	NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE SNUBBERS		
	Column A <sup>(c)(f)</sup> Extend Interval	Column B <sup>(d)(f)</sup> Repeat Interval	Column C <sup>(e)(f)</sup> Reduce Interval
1	0	0	1
80	0	0	2
100	0	1	4
150	0	3	8
200	2	5	13
300	5	12	25
400	8	18	36
500	12	24	48
750	20	40	78
≥1000	29	56	109

- 
- a The next visual inspection interval for a snubber population or category size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval. Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible. These categories may be examined separately or jointly. However, the decision must be made and documented before any inspection and shall be used as the basis upon which to determine the next inspection interval for that category.
- b Interpolation between population or category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible. Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B, or C if that integer includes a fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by interpolation.
- c If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the previous interval, but not greater than 48 months.
- d If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column B but greater than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval shall be the same as the previous interval.
- e If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval shall be two-thirds of the previous interval, but not less than 31 days. However, if the number of unacceptable snubbers is less than the number in Column C but greater than the number in Column B, the next interval shall be reduced proportionally by interpolation, that is, the previous interval shall be reduced by a factor that is one-third of the ratio of the difference between the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to the difference in the numbers in Columns B and C.
- f The provisions of Specification 1.0.DD are applicable for all inspection intervals up to and including 48 months.

Figure 4.6-2

SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TESTING



N = Cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested

C = Total number of snubbers of a type not meeting acceptance requirements.

QUAD CITIES  
DPR-30

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

APPENDIX A

LIST OF TABLES

Number	Title	Page
3.1-1	Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirements-Refuel Mode	3.1/4.1-8
3.1-2	Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirements-Startup/Hot Standby Mode	3.1/4.1-9
3.1-3	Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirements-Run Mode	3.1/4.1-10
3.1-4	Notes for Tables 3.1-1, 3.1-2, and 3.1-3	3.1/4.1-11
4.1-1	Scram Instrumentation and Logic Systems Functional Test-Minimal Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instrumentation, Logic Systems, and Control Circuits	3.1/4.1-12
4.1-2	Scram Instrument Calibration-Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels	3.1/4.1-14
3.2-1	Instrumentation that Initiates Primary Containment Isolation Functions	3.2/4.2-11
3.2-2	Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems	3.2/4.2-12
3.2-3	Instrumentation that Initiates Rod Block	3.2/4.2-14
3.2-4	Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation Requirements	3.2/4.2-15
3.2-5	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation	3.2/4.2-15b
3.2-6	Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation	3.2/4.2-15c
4.2-1	Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core and Containment Cooling Systems Instrumentation, Rod Blocks and Isolation	3.2/4.2-16
4.2-2	Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	3.2/4.2-18
4.2-3	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	3.2/4.2-19
4.2-4	Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	3.2/4.2-20
4.6-1	Inservice Inspection Requirements for Quad-Cities	3.6/4.6-16
4.6-2	Revised Withdrawal Schedule	3.6/4.6-21A
3.7-1	Primary Containment Isolation	3.7/4.7-20
3.7-2	Primary Containment Leakage Test Penetrations	3.7/4.7-23
4.8-1	Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program	3.8/4.8-20

4.6-3 Snubber Visual Inspection Criteria 3.6/4.6-22

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

1. During all modes of operation except Shutdown and Refuel, all snubbers on safety related piping systems shall be operable except as noted in 3.6.I.2 following.
2. From and after the time that a snubber is determined to be inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 72 hours only if the snubber is sooner made operable.
3. If the requirements of 3.6.I.1 and 3.6.I.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 36 hours.
4. If a snubber is determined to be inoperable while the reactor is in the Shutdown or Refuel mode, the snubber shall be made operable prior to reactor startup.

DELETE PAGE  
REPLACE WITH  
RETYPE PAGE  
3.6/4.6 - 5c

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

The following surveillance requirements apply to all snubbers on safety related piping systems.

1. Visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule utilizing the acceptance criteria given by Specification 4.6.I.2.

Number of Snubbers Found Inoperable During Inspection or During Inspection Interval	Next Required Inspection Interval
0	18 months ±25%
1	12 months ±25%
2	6 months ±25%
3,4	124 days ±25%
5,6,7	62 days ±25%
≥8	31 days ±25%

The required inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

Snubbers may be categorized in two groups, 'accessible' or 'inaccessible' based on their accessibility for inspection during reactor operation. These two groups may be inspected independently according to the above schedule.

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

I. Snubbers

1. During Run, Startup/Hot Standby, and Hot Shutdown, and during Cold Shutdown and Refuel for snubbers located on systems required operable during Cold Shutdown and Refuel, all required snubbers shall be operable. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse impact on any safety-related system.
  
2. With one or more snubbers inoperable, on any system, within 72 hours:
  - a. Replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to operable status, and
  - b. Perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.6.1.7 on the attached component.

Otherwise, declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

I. Snubbers

Each snubber shall be demonstrated operable by the performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program.

1. Inspection Types

As used in this specification, "type of snubber" shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

2. Visual Inspections

Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these categories (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule determined by Table 4.6-3. The visual inspection interval for each type of snubber shall be determined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.6-3<sup>(a)</sup>.

3. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) the snubber has no visible indications of damage or impaired operability, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for the attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of

---

a The first inspection interval determined using this criteria shall be based upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before amendment ( ).



visual inspections shall be classified as unacceptable. A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber. If continued operation cannot be justified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.2 shall be met.

Snubbers originally classified as unacceptable may be reclassified as acceptable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined operable per Specification 4.6.1.6.

#### 4. Transient Event Inspection

An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients, as determined from a review of operational data or a visual inspection of the systems, within 72 hours for accessible systems and 6 months for inaccessible systems following this determination. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

5. Functional Tests

At least once per 18 months, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using one of the following sample plans for each type of snubber. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

- a. At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.6.1.6, an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or
- b. A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested, in accordance with Figure 4.6-2. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.6.1.6. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.6-2.

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

If at any time the point plotted falls on or above the "Reject" line, all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or the "Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested. Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time, providing all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested; or

- c. An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers of each type shall be functionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor,  $1 + C/2$ , where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria. The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows the equation  $N = 55(1 + C/2)$ . Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

"Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated. If the point plotted falls above the "Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls on or below the "Accept" line or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure as far as practical that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type.

Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan, and failure of this functional test shall not be the sole cause for increasing the sample size under the sample plan. If during testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional testing results shall be reviewed at the time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

3. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The snubber functional test shall verify that:

- a. Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression;

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

- b. Snubber bleed, or release rate where required, is present in both tension and compression, within the specified range (hydraulic snubbers, only);
- c. For mechanical snubbers, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and
- d. For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

7. Functional Test Failure Analysis

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause for the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the operability of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.

For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the

DELETE PAGE  
AND REPLACE  
WITH RETYPED  
PAGE

3.6/4.6-6

Snubber service life monitoring shall be followed by the snubber surveillance inspection records and maintenance history records. The above record retention method shall be used to prevent the snubbers from exceeding a service life.

2. Visual inspections shall verify:

a. There are no visible indications of damage or impaired operability, and

b. Attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure.

3. Once each refueling cycle a representative sample of 10% of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For each snubber that does not meet the functional test criteria, an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

4. The mechanical snubber functional tests shall verify:

a. That the breakaway force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum force.

b. That the activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of acceleration in both tension and compression.

snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to activate or fails to move, i.e., frozen-in-place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.6.1.5 for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

8. Functional Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test result shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

9. Snubber Service Life Program

The service life of all snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will

DELETE

DELETE AND  
REPLACE WITH  
RETYPE PAGE  
3.6/4.6-7

5. When a snubber is deemed inoperable, a review shall be conducted to determine the mode of failure and to decide if an engineering evaluation should be performed. If the engineering evaluation is deemed necessary, it will determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.
6. If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e., frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and if determined to be generically deficient all snubbers of the same design, subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested.
7. In addition to the regular sample, snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested during the next test period. If a spare snubber has been installed in place of a failed snubber, then both the failed snubber (if it is repaired and installed in another position) and the spare snubber shall be retested. Test results of these snubbers may not be included for the resampling.



QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be operable. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.5.B.

DELETE

I. Snubbers

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on non-safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

Snubber service life monitoring will be followed by the existing snubber surveillance inspection records and maintenance history records. The above record retention method should be used to prevent the mechanical snubbers from exceeding a service life of 40 years.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible, and verified by inservice functional testing, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber by visual inspection, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration.

To provide assurance of snubber reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at refueling cycle intervals. Functional testing of the mechanical snubber will consist of verification that the force that initiates free movement of the snubber in either tension or compression is less than the maximum breakaway friction force and verification that the activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of acceleration in both tension and compression.

DELETE AND REPLACE  
WITH RETYPED PAGE  
3.6/4.6-14

3.6/4.6.1 Snubbers

Mechanical and hydraulic snubbers are provided to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic event or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers are classified and grouped by design, manufacturer and accessibility. A list of individual snubbers with information of snubber location, classification or group, and system affected is maintained at the plant. The accessibility of each snubber is determined and documented for each snubber. The determination is based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operation (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to the systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies with the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous inspection, the total population or category size for each snubber type, and the previous inspection interval. A snubber is considered unacceptable if it fails to satisfy the acceptance criteria of the visual inspection. Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible. These categories may be examined separately or jointly as determined and documented prior to the inspections. The categorization is used as the basis for determining the next inspection interval for that category.

If a review and evaluation can not justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber, the snubber is declared inoperable and the applicable action taken. To determine the next surveillance interval, the unacceptable snubber may be reclassified as acceptable if it can be demonstrated that the snubber is operable in its as-found condition by the performance of a functional test. The next visual inspection interval may be twice, the same, or reduced by as much as two-thirds of the previous inspection interval, depending on the number of unacceptable snubbers found in proportion to the size of the population or category for each type of snubber included in the previous inspection. The inspection interval may be as long as 48 months and the provisions of Specification 1.0.DD may be applied.

When a snubber is found to be inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide additional assurance of snubber functional reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested at 18 month intervals. This sample is identified using one of three methods:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure, or
2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.6-2, or

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

DELETE

When a snubber is found inoperable, a review shall be performed to determine the snubber mode of failure. Results of the review shall be used to determine if an engineering evaluation of the safety-related system or component is necessary. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the support component or system.

Observed failures of these sample snubbers shall require functional testing of additional units.

DELETE AND REPLACE WITH  
RETYPE PAGE

3.6/4.6-14a

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.6-2 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the NRC if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubber for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted are listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replace, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

Table 4.6-3


SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION CRITERIA

Population <sup>(a)(b)</sup> or Category	NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE SNUBBERS		
	Column A <sup>(c)(f)</sup> Extend Interval	Column B <sup>(d)(f)</sup> Repeat Interval	Column C <sup>(e)(f)</sup> Reduce Interval
1	0	0	1
80	0	0	2
100	0	1	4
150	0	3	8
200	2	5	13
300	5	12	25
400	8	18	36
500	12	24	48
750	20	40	78
≥1000	29	56	109

- a The next visual inspection interval for a snubber population or category size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval. Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible. These categories may be examined separately or jointly. However, the decision must be made and documented before any inspection and shall be used as the basis upon which to determine the next inspection interval for that category.
- b Interpolation between population or category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible. Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B, or C if that integer includes a fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by interpolation.
- c If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the previous interval, but not greater than 48 months.
- d If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column B but greater than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval shall be the same as the previous interval.
- e If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval shall be two-thirds of the previous interval, but not less than 31 days. However, if the number of unacceptable snubbers is less than the number in Column C but greater than the number in Column B, the next interval shall be reduced proportionally by interpolation, that is, the previous interval shall be reduced by a factor that is one-third of the ratio of the difference between the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to the difference in the numbers in Columns B and C.
- f The provisions of Specification 1.0.DD are applicable for all inspection intervals up to and including 48 months.

Figure 4.6-2

SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TESTING



N = Cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested

C = Total number of snubbers of a type not meeting acceptance requirements.

**ATTACHMENT C**  
**SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION**

Commonwealth Edison Company has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 (Quad Cities) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

- 1) **Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:**

The proposed changes adopt the format and content of the BWR-STs, as modified by the provisions of GL 84-13 and GL 90-09. As such, these proposed changes are administrative in nature and have no effect on the accident analyses or system operation.

The proposed schedule for snubber visual inspection intervals described in GL 90-09 will maintain the same level of confidence as the existing schedule as documented in Generic Letter 90-09, Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions, dated December 11, 1990. Also, the surveillance requirement and schedule for snubber functional testing remains the same providing a 95 percent confidence level that 90 to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within the specified limits. The proposed visual inspection schedule is separate from functional testing and adds to the confidence level that the installed snubbers will serve their design function and are being maintained operable. Accident analyses assume that snubbers are initially operable. Compliance with the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for functional testing in conjunction with the revised visual inspection schedule assures continued operability of the snubbers. Therefore, no initial assumptions are being changed and thus neither the probability nor consequences of any accidents previously evaluated are significantly increased.

- 2) **Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:**

The proposed changes adopt the format and content of the BWR-STs, as modified by the provisions of GL 84-13 and GL 90-09. As such, these proposed changes are administrative in nature and have no effect on the accident analyses or system operation.

The proposed schedule for snubber visual inspection intervals will maintain the same level of confidence as the existing schedule as documented in Generic Letter 90-09, Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions, dated December 11, 1990. Also, the surveillance requirement and schedule for snubber functional testing remains the same providing a 95 percent confidence level that 90 to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within the specified limits. The proposed visual inspection schedule is separate from functional testing and adds to the confidence level that the installed snubbers will



## ATTACHMENT C (cont.)

serve their design function and are being maintained operable. As a result, the supported piping, components, etc. will be maintained operable, so that supported safety systems will perform as designed. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created.

### 3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

The proposed changes adopt the format and content of the BWR-STS, as modified by the provisions of GL 84-13 and GI 90-09. As such, these proposed changes are administrative in nature and have no effect on the accident analyses or system operation. In addition, the proposed amendment maintains the same level of confidence as the current technical specification that snubbers are operable through the current snubber functional testing and the revised snubber visual inspection schedule and the associated corrective action requirements. Therefore the proposed changes do not impact the margin of safety.

## ATTACHMENT D

### ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for the identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring an environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been determined that the proposed change meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This conclusion has been determined because the proposed changes do not pose a significant hazards consideration and do not involve a significant increase in the amounts or changes in the types of effluents released offsite. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.