


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

In the matter of  
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC  
COMPANY, et al.  
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)

**NRC PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM**  
)  
) Docket No. 50-344  
) (Control Building)



JOINT EXCEPTIONS TO PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION OF DECEMBER 21, 1978,  
OF THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

The Coalition for Safe Power and the Consolidated Intervenors take exception to the Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision of December 21, 1978 and state that the Board erred in finding or ruling that:

- (1) The matter of fire protection for interim operation was satisfactorily established. (Paragraphs 59, 60).
- (2) The seismic qualification of safety-related equipment was satisfactorily established. (Paragraphs 55, 58, 60, 61, 79).
- (3) An EIS is not required for interim operation. (Paragraphs 75, 77, 78).
- (4) All safety problems concerning interim operation before the Board have been satisfactorily resolved. (Paragraph 60).
- (5) Limited authority on design deficiency issues is supported by Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 170-1 (1976). (Paragraph 76).
- (6) Fire protection equipment would survive the SSE and remain functional in the event of a fire. (Paragraph 60).
- (7) Allegations concerning the seismic qualification of equipment in the Control Building Complex were without merit. (Paragraph 60).
- (8) The Licensee provided an additional panel whose testimony included a comprehensive review of safety-related equipment in the Control Building Complex. (Paragraph 57).

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- (9) The Staff's panel of witnesses all testified categorically that they know of no unresolved safety issues, whether generic or plant-specific which have any bearing on the safety of interim operation of the Trojan facility and we find such testimony to be worthy of belief. (Paragraphs 60, 79).
- (10) Need for Power has not only been disposed of in prior proceedings, but it has no place in this proceeding because of our determination that interim operation will not have any environmental effects that differ from those previously evaluated. (Paragraph 77).
- (11) They did permit all intervenors to cross-examine fully on the nature, effect and ramifications of the identified design deficiencies, and no safety questions were left unexplored. (Paragraphs 57, 76, 79).
- (12) The contributions of the building response modes were combined by the Square Root of the Sum of the Squares method rather than the Absolute Sum Value technique. (Paragraph 13(5)).
- (13) The conservatives of the code interpretation were considered appropriate for comparison with Stick Model results but unnecessary for use with the accurate Stardyne analysis. (Paragraph 16).
- (14) Bechtel engineers developed a set of criteria to evaluate the capacities of the shear walls in a more realistic manner. (Paragraph 17).
- (15) Confidence in the structural integrity of the Control Building and the ability of the Building Structure to with stand safely the SSE is supported by consideration of a number of factors of conservatism inherent in the evaluations and analyses. (Paragraph 34).
- (16) Higher damping would lead to smaller predicted forces, representing a unaccounted for conservatism in all the analyses. (Paragraph 35).
- (17) That substantial and convincing evidence was presented supporting the credible testimony of the Bechtel engineers and the PGE expert witnesses. (Paragraphs 39, 40).

(18) Professor Laursen was a knowledgeable and convincing expert witness. (Paragraph 40).

(19) The Control Building in its as-built condition and the Control Building, Auxiliary Building and Fuel Building Complex have adequate structural capacity and strength to withstand safely the licensed SSE of 0.25g during a period of interim operation. (Paragraph 41).

(20) Additions and modifications of a limited number of pipe supports or pipe restraints are required and the Licensee is performing the required modifications. (Paragraphs 55 and IV, 3).

(21) Other concerns of Intervenors and those raised in the Limited Appearance of Robert Pollard have already been considered, considered without merit, or satisfactorily resolved. (Paragraphs 78, 79).

(22) The Licensee's procedures for actions to be taken subsequent to a seismic event requiring shutdown are appropriate and adequate to provide for prompt notification. (Paragraph 71).

(23) The NRC Staff procedures for inspection of the facility following shutdown after an earthquake are adequate to maintain safe conditions at the Facility. (Paragraph 71).


(24) The Facility can safely be brought to the cold shutdown condition after the occurrence of any earthquake up to and including the SSE. (Paragraphs 65, 67, 75).


(25) Modifications done during the period of interim operation and their effects on interim operation will be fully assessed. (Paragraph 74).

(26) Reduced capacity of the Control Building walls not adversely affect safety-related equipment within the Building Complex. (Paragraph 65).

Dated this day,  
the 5th of January, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

  
Eugene Rosolie  
Coalition for Safe  
Power

  
Nina Bell  
Consolidated Intervenors