



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

January 3, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-153/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-153/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

FD:ks 952

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
S PDR

Report Number: 82-153/03L
Report Date: 12-29-82
Occurrence Date: 12-13-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Air Lock - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by incident report 82-513.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 74 % - Unit Load 820 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2100 hours, December 13, 1982, while performing surveillance procedure SP(O)4.6.1.3 on the 100' elevation containment air lock, it was determined that the leakage rate exceeded the limit of 0.05 La at the design pressure of 47.0 psig, as required by Technical Specification 3.6.1.3.b. The air lock was declared inoperable, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the containment air lock leakage was excessive air flow past the inner door seal.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the containment building while providing a redundant boundary as part of overall containment integrity. This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident. Since one door remained sealed, providing containment integrity, no risk to the health and safety of the general public existed.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3a Requires:

Maintain at least the operable air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to operable status within 24 hours or lock the operable air lock door closed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Operation may then continue until the performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the operable air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The air lock outer door was maintained in the closed position. The interior door seal was repositioned in the groove and Surveillance Procedure SP(O)4.6.1.3 was performed satisfactorily. At 1345 hours, December 14, 1982, the air lock was declared operable, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated.

A number of previous problems with air lock operating linkage and door seals have been encountered. Efforts are presently underway to correct the problems including improved personnel training, installation of snubbers on the doors, relocation of test air supply isolation valves, revision of the surveillance test to more accurately simulate desired air lock performance, and installation of the Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. recommended latch mechanism modifications. Final evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures is pending full implementation.

FAILURE DATA:

Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.
Containment Air Lock
Door Seal

Prepared By F. Dickey



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-114