

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | | | | (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(01) P | A | B | V | S | 1 | (2) | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | (3) | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | (4) | | | | (5)

CON'T (01) REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | (7) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 8 | (8) | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 8 | (9)

(02) | During the performance of Type C Containment Penetration Leak Testing, twelve |
 (03) | valves were found to be leaking at a rate greater than the maximum measurable |
 (04) | on the leak rate monitor (300 SCF per day). The leaking valves presented minimal |
 (05) | safety hazards as redundant isolation valves were available or the valves would |
 (06) | have been in service when isolation was required. |
 (07) | |
 (08) | |

(09) SYSTEM CODE S | D | (11) CAUSE CODE E | (12) CAUSE SUBCODE B | (13) COMPONENT CODE V | A | L | V | E | X | (14) COMP. SUBCODE X | (15) VALVE SUBCODE D | (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 | 8 | EVENT YEAR 7 | 8 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 | 5 | 9 | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 | 3 | REPORT TYPE L | REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN B | (18) FUTURE ACTION Z | (19) EFFECT ON PLANT Z | (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD Z | (21) HOURS 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y | (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y | (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER X | (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER X | 9 | 9 | 9 | (26)

(10) | The incident resulted from excessive valve leakage. The valves were repaired and |
 (11) | the retesting was completed satisfactorily. |
 (12) | |
 (13) | |
 (14) | |

(15) FACILITY STATUS G | (28) % POWER 0 | 0 | 0 | (29) OTHER STATUS N/A | (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY B | (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance testing | (32)

(16) ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED Z | (33) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A | (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A | (36)

(17) PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 | 0 | 0 | (37) TYPE Z | (38) DESCRIPTION N/A | (39)

(18) PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 | 0 | 0 | (40) DESCRIPTION N/A | (41)

(19) LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z | (42) DESCRIPTION N/A | (43)

(20) PUBLICITY ISSUED N | (44) DESCRIPTION N/A | (45)

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Attachment To LER 78-59/03L
Beaver Valley Power Station
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
Docket No. 50-334

During the performance of Type C containment penetration leak testing, the following valves were found to be leaking at a rate greater than the maximum measurable on the leak rate monitor (300 SCF/day):

1. TV-CC-105E1 - RCP 1A component cooling water outlet containment inside isolation valve
2. HY-119 - Recombiner 1A return line inside containment check valve
3. CH-181 - RCP 1A seal supply check valve
4. CH-183 - RCP 1C seal supply check valve
5. Personnel air lock inner door equalizing valves
6. SI-94 - BIT check valve to RCS cold leg injection
7. SI-13 - SI Pump 1A check valve to hot leg injection
8. SI-14 - SI Pump 1B check valve to hot leg injection
9. MOV-SI-890A - SI Pump 1A discharge valve to RCS hot legs
10. MOV-SI-890B - SI Pump 1B discharge valve to RCS hot legs
11. SI-451 - MOV-SI-890A valve disc vent
12. SI-452 - MOV-SI-890B valve disc vent

The safety significance of each of the leaks is discussed below.

1. Reactor Coolant Pump 1A component cooling water outlet containment inside isolation valve [TV-CC-105E1]. The redundant isolation valve outside containment [TV-CC-105E2] was available and exhibited leakage within the allowable limits. During accident conditions, leakage from this line would present no unreviewed safety problem.
2. Recombiner 1A Return Line inside containment check valve [HY-119]. The redundant isolation valve outside containment [HY-110] was available and exhibited leakage within the allowable limits. During accident conditions, leakage from this line would present no unreviewed safety problem.
3. Reactor Coolant Pump 1A and 1C seal supply check valves [CH-181] and
& 4. [CH-183]. The redundant isolation valves outside containment [MOV-CH-308A] and [MOV-CH-308C] were available and exhibited leakage within the allowable limits. During accident conditions, leakage from this line would present no unreviewed safety problem.
5. Air Lock Inner Door Equalizing Valves. Although the inner door equalizing valves leaked, the outer door equalizing valves exhibited leakage within allowable limits. During accident conditions, leakage from this pathway would present no unreviewed safety problem.

6. Boron Injection Tank check valve to Reactor Coolant Cold leg injection paths [SI-94]. Redundant valves [SI-91], [MOV-SI-867C] and [MOV-SI-867D] in this pathway exhibited leakage within the allowable limits. During accident conditions this line serves as a primary injection pathway for highly borated water which would preclude the possibility of any leakage from the containment atmosphere to the outside environment.
7. Low Head Safety Injection Pumps 1A and 1B hot leg discharge valves, check valves and valve disc vents [MOV-SI-890A], [MOV-SI-890B], [SI-13], [SI-14], [SI-451] and [SI-452]. Although these valves failed the leak rate test, this is not considered to be significant since under accident conditions the Low Head Safety Injection pumps would be operating and these lines would be pressurized to a pressure much higher than the peak containment pressure during the initial phase of safety injection and will be in injection service during the long term phase.

The valves were repaired and the tests were repeated. The valve leakage was acceptable in the retest.