

Initial Telephone  
Report Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of  
Occurrence: November 29, 1978

Initial Written  
Report Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time of  
Occurrence: 0500

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Reportable Occurrence  
Report No. 50-219/78/28-1P

IDENTIFICATION  
OF OCCURRENCE:

Valve V-1-106 (Main Steam Line Drain Valve) and the TIP isolation valves for TIPs 1-1 and 1-3 failed to close during the performance of a low-low reactor water level primary containment isolation test.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.(3).

CONDITIONS PRIOR  
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	_____

DESCRIPTION  
OF OCCURRENCE:

On ~~Nov 28, 1978~~ November 29, 1978, at approximately 0500, while performing a low-low reactor water level primary containment isolation test, valve V-1-106 (a main steam line drain valve) failed to close. Additionally, two traveling incore probes (1&3) failed to fully withdraw, preventing the isolation valves for these penetrations to primary containment from closing. Failure of V-24-29 (reactor coolant sample valve) to close was noted during the test but was later discovered to be a failure of the 6K27 relay to provide power to the valve closed indication.

APPARENT CAUSE  
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/> Installation/ Construction	<input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental
<input type="checkbox"/> Operator	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X(1&3) Component Failure
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X(2) Other (Specify)

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- (1) The inability of the 6K27 relay to provide closed indication is attributed to the jamming of one of the stationary contacts into the armature of the relay. This prevented the relay from traveling to its fully de-energized position, but did not prevent it from performing its intended function of de-energizing the V-24-29 isolation valve and de-energizing the seal in circuit.
- (2) TIP 1-1 did not fully withdraw because of the setting for "in shield" was corresponding to the setting for machine "stop" in the control logic; therefore, the isolation valve did not close. TIP 1-3 required an "in shield" plunger switch adjustment in order to provide a valve closure signal.
- (3) The V-1-106 valve failed to close because of a faulty power fuse holder which prevented the energizing of the valve motor operator.

ANALYSIS OF  
OCCURRENCE:

The containment integrity isolation valves are provided to maintain containment integrity following the design basis loss of coolant accident. Failure of the above valves to close caused a loss of redundancy in all cases. Primary containment was not required at the time the test was being performed, and additionally, if primary containment had been required in an emergency situation, redundant valves could have operated to provide isolation of the primary containment.

CORRECTIVE  
ACTION:

The 6K27 relay was replaced. The power fuse holder in the motor control center for valve V-1-106 was repaired, and the position switches and logic for the TIP system were adjusted.

FAILURE DATA:

To be provided later.

Prepared by:

J. E. Quintenz  
T. E. Quintenz

Date: 11-30-78