itial Telephone port Date: itial Written port Date: November 30, 1978		Date of Occurrence: November 29, 1978	
		Time of Occurrence:	1400
		EAR GENERATING STATION NEW JERSEY 08731	OH
		le Occurrence 50-219/78/29-1P	
ENTIFICATION GCGURRENCE:	Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 4.5.B.1,2, when results of the Prinary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test failed to neet the allowable leakage requirement of one weight percent per day as stated in the referenced Technical Specification.		
	This event is consider in the Technical Speci		le occurrence as defined n 6.9.2.a.3.
EDITIONS PRIOR COCUMAZIOE:	Steady State Power Rot Standby Cold Skutdown X Refueling Shutdown Routine Startup Operation	Operat Load (Routin	ne Shutdown tion Changes During ne Power Operation (Specify)
	Reactor Mode Switch: Moderator Temperature: Reactor vessel head in Containment Pressure:	approximately 160° place.	
SC TICI 0 X 33.CE:	that the containment I	ing a Type A Contain conducting the Type A leakage rate was greate cause of the excession hours on November	poia (22.2 psig) for must Leak Rate Test. Test, it was discoverenter than allowable. ssive leakage continued 23, 1978. During
	1) Isolation Condens	er Vent Valves V-14-	-1 and 19 and V-14-5

 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker differential pressure sensing switches, DPS-66A and DPS-663 were isolated.

and 20 were isolated by closing V-1-71 (boundary extension).

portable Occurrence port No. 50-219/78/29-1P

7:

3) Drywell Vent Valves V-27-1 and V-27-2. V-27-2 was repaired.

The test was then restarted at 1905 hours on November 23, 1978, and was successfully completed at 0248 on November 24, 1978.

PARENT CAUSE

X	Design	Procedure
	Manufacture	Unusual Service Condition
	Installation/ Construction	Inc. Environmental X Component Failure
	Operator	Other (Specify)

The failure of the Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker D/P sensing switches are the subject of LER 50-219/78/26-1P.

The cause of failure of the Isolation Condenser Vent Valves is attributed to excessive leakage through the seat sealing surfaces. (Type C Test was not performed prior to Type A Test.) The cause of failure of the Drywell Vent Valves is attributed to excessive leakage past the butterfly disc/boot seating surfaces for V-27-1 and through the disc to stem taper pin which was found to be loose. (Type C Test was performed prior to Type A Test and passed.)

VALYSIS OF

Under design basis loss of coolant accident conditions (LOCA), the containments (LOCA), the containment isolations valves function to limit the leakage out of the containment structure to less than one (1) weight percent of the containment atmosphere per day. Conformance to this criteria assures that the release limits set forth in IOCFR100 will not be exceeded. The test results indicated that the limit of one (1) weight percent per day would have been exceeded.

CORRECTIVE

The necessary corrective actions required to satisfy the operation leak rate criteria were:

- Switches DPS66A, B were replaced with switches of a higher pressure rating and successfully type "C" tested at 35 psig. No leakage was detected.
- The isolation condenser vent valves were repaired and successfully type "C" tested at 35 psig; the results of the test were added to the type "A" test results.
- Both drywell vent valves were replaced after successful completion of the type "\lambda" test and were successfully type "C" tested.

FAILURE DATA: To be provided later.

FAILURE DATA: To be provided later.

Prepared by: Hall E. Fickeissen, Jr. Date: Monember 30, 1978