

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

January 6, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 82-054

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-054 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.10, "Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation," on December 8, 1982.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD:dwf
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer	A. R. Koon
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 8, 1982, with the Plant in Mode 1, the Loose-Part Detection System failed the daily channel check performed in accordance with Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.10.(a).

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

There were no adverse consequences from this event. The Plant had been at power for some time prior to the failure without detection of any loose parts.

CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to microprocessor failure in the Digital Metal Impact Monitor Cabinet.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

Channels 756 and 757 which monitor Steam Generator "B" were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.10. Investigation into the cause of failure by the Instrumentation Group indicated that the audio signals were still available but that they were not being adequately deciphered by the microprocessor. The microprocessor was replaced, and the Loose-Part Detection System was returned to operable status on December 16, 1982, upon the satisfactory performance of a Channel Operational Test per the appropriate surveillance test procedure.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The Licensee plans no further action other than normal surveillance testing.