

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-255/78-17

Docket No. 50-255

License No. DPR-20

Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI 49201

Facility Name: Palisades Nuclear Power Station

Inspection At: Palisades Site, Covert, MI

Inspection Conducted: July 24-28, 30 and August 1-3 and 14-18, 1978

Inspectors: *K.R. Bede, W.A.*
for D. R. Hunter

8/26/78

K.R. Bede, W.A.
for B. L. Jorgensen

9/26/78

Approved By: *K.R. Bede, W.A.*
for R. F. Warnick, Chief
for Reactor Projects Section 2

9/26/78

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 24-28, 30 and August 1-3 and 14-18, 1978 (Report No. 50-255/78-17)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operations, reportable events, records, review and audit procedures, reporting, safety injection system operation during loss of power, IE Bulletins and Circulars (electrical equipment environmental qualification), and selected outstanding inspection items. The inspection involved 112 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *R. B. DeWitt, Manager - Production Nuclear
- *D. A. Bixell, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- *W. Beckius, SEP Administrator
- *J. G. Lewis, Plant Superintendent
- *H. W. Keiser, Operations Superintendent
- *G. H. Hein, Maintenance Superintendent
- *R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- G. H. Pettigrew, Senior Engineer
- H. J. Palmer, Senior Engineer
- F. G. Butler, I&C Engineer
- B. L. Harshe, Senior Engineer
- W. E. Adams, General Engineer
- J. A. Meincke, Reactor Engineer
- B. L. Shaner, Operations Supervisor
- E. I. Thompson, Shift Supervisor
- S. Ghidotti, Shift Supervisor
- A. F. Brookhouse, Shift Supervisor
- R. K. Nelson, Shift Supervisor - Training
- D. D. Bowman, General Engineer (Chemistry)

The inspectors contacted several other licensee employees, including members of the technical, engineering, operations and clerical staff.

*Denotes those attending the management exits on August 3 and 18, 1978.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Identified Items

- a. (Open) IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-08 - Unresolved Item: Qualification of containment connector seal washers (Paragraph 11.a).
- b. (Open) IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-01 - Unresolved Item: Safety Injection Tank Level (Paragraph 11.b).

3. Plant Operations

The inspectors reviewed selected facility records and general plant operating conditions to determine plant operation in accordance with requirements. The following were reviewed:

- a. Control Room Logbook, July-August 1978
- b. Daily Orders Logbook, July-August 1978
- c. Reactor Logbook, July-August 1978
- d. Caution Tag Log and Equipment Status
- e. Auxiliary Operator Surveillance Checksheets, July-August 1978

The following were reviewed with findings as stated:

- f. Plant lockout and jumper controls

These controls were examined by review of the Jumper/Bypass Log and the Bypass Control Checklists, along with associated administrative procedures. The Bypass Control Checksheets were apparently derived to provide control operators and shift supervisors with plant control system status information during minor maintenance involving temporary bypass installations. The following questionable items were identified by the inspector during the review of the records and discussions with a shift supervisor and control operators.

- (1) There were apparent discrepancies in the Bypass Control Checklists maintained in the plant control room.
- (2) Certain operations staff members were not specifically aware that certain bypasses were in place.
- (3) Certain "temporary" bypasses had been installed as long as five months.

The questionable items reviewed by the inspectors did not appear to compromise any safety related systems; but the items require specific licensee review and evaluation. Licensee utilization of the Bypass Control Checklists to more adequately control the activity and to provide operations staff with information on plant or system status will remain open and be reviewed further during a future inspection. (This matter was discussed at the management exit interview).

- g. Shift Supervisor's Logbook, July-August 1978

Flooding of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump room to a depth of about six inches on August 5, 1978 was noted in this record. The AFW pump room was specifically examined during a plant tour and the flooding was discussed with licensee personnel. The cause of the August 5 flooding apparently could not be positively established, though normal leakoff from an operating pump, combined with a plugged drain contributed to the incident.

The inspectors noted the following concerning the AFW pump room:

- (1) The single entrance is secured with a watertight door - thus, flooding inside the room could immerse both AFW pumps.
- (2) The installed drain appeared inadequate to discharge releases from certain pipe breaks or actuation of relief valves located inside the AFW pump room.
- (3) No apparent positive control exists to provide frequent AFW pump room monitoring as assurance against flooding and to assure proper pump operation when required.

Flooding of certain equipment and areas at Palisades is presently under review by NRR and is scheduled for completion in December 1978. This review will include the auxiliary feed pump room.

- h. The shield wall cooling was lost on July 23, 1978. The licensee evaluation determined that the shield panels did not exceed the 165°F maximum allowed by the Technical Specification. This matter will be reviewed further at a subsequent inspection.

- i. Primary and Secondary Coolant Chemistry

The inspectors reviewed selected records from July and August 1978, documenting chemical and radiological analyses of primary and secondary coolant. The data were evaluated against the requirements of the Technical Specifications concerning frequency and type of analyses, action levels, and chemical or radiological concentration limits. No problems were identified.

- j. Corrective Action System Reports
- k. Safety related system status
- l. Radiation monitors
- m. Selected plant recorders and indicators
- n. Facility Tour

The inspectors conducted a facility tour and noted that an extensive cleanup effort was in progress.

Areas specifically observed included the service water house including the fire protection pumps and fuel oil tanks, the

fire hydrant stations, the auxiliary feed pump room, the emergency diesel generator rooms, and the electrical switch gear rooms.

A review of the plant annunciators and equipment status was conducted in the control room. (Certain items observed during the plant tour and system review were discussed at the management exit interview).

- o. Control room manning
- p. Shift relief and turnover

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Reportable Events

The inspector reviewed licensee actions concerning the following nonroutine event reports to verify the events were reviewed and evaluated, corrections taken, and plant limits not exceeded. The review included selected PRC minutes, records, and personnel interviews.

- a. LER 78-16, ^{1/2/} Control rod would not move with the normal operator.

The investigation by the licensee revealed that mechanical binding had occurred due to damage during control rod shaft connection activities during the previous refueling outage. The licensee replaced the rod buffer piston, locking pawl, and guide tube. The control rod drive mechanism connecting tool is being evaluated to determine the cause of the damage to the castellations and control rod shaft.

- b. LER 78-18, Failure of 2400 volt bus 1E to transfer from station power to startup power.

The 2400 volt incoming-supply breakers are provided with closing circuit, tripping circuit, and charged condition indicators.

No audible alarms are provided to warn the licensee that the breakers are inoperable; but during routine operations and observation the breaker condition as indicated by position indication lights and a control power light is available to the operators. The failure to note the 1E supply breaker to be in the "charged" condition appears to be an oversight by the plant staff following the failure within the charging control circuit.

- 1/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 5/22/78.
- 2/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 7/14/78.

A review of the event with the licensee representative revealed only a limited number of failures of the 2400 volt feeder breakers (and other breakers) at the plant.

Further review of all installed plant breakers inclusive of the 4160/2400 volt "stored energy" feeder breakers, the 2400 volt "solenoid operated" breakers, the 2400 volt "stored energy" breakers, and the 480 volt motor control center breakers revealed that a number of unmonitored breaker failures are possible at the plant. It was noted by the licensee representative and the inspector that failures of this type had apparently not occurred.

The significance of certain unmonitored failures of electrical breakers on safety related equipment appears to warrant further review. This item will remain open pending review by RIII. (This matter was discussed at the management exit interview).

- c. LER 78-19,^{3/} Control rod number 3 would not move with the normal operator during routine testing.
- d. LER 78-20,^{4/} Axial power distribution limit exceeded by 3 percent due to an error in the INCA code input.
- e. LER 78-21, Fire main break resulting in loss of 2 hose reels and 1 hose rack.

The review revealed that the fire header failed at a point of contact with a support piling, apparently due to header settling. The system was repaired and returned to service. (This item was discussed at the management exit interview).

- f. LER 78-22, Leak in the suction piping for charging pump (P-55A).
- g. LER 78-23, Steam generator tube differential pressure of 1380 psig exceeded during plant startup. The licensee completed a stress analysis and determined that the transient yield stress for tube plugging was not exceeded assuming 64 percent tube degradation. Additionally, no change in the primary to secondary leakage has occurred. This matter will be reviewed further by RIII and will remain open.

The licensee had also revised the heatup and cooldown curve to provide a specific operational window considering primary plant pressure versus temperature (secondary system pressure)

3/ LER 50-255/78-10.
4/ LER 50-255/78-08.

to assure operation of the plant within the requirements. The operational curve is included in the general operating procedures for plant heatup and cooldown. (This item was discussed at the management exit interview).

- h. LER 78-24, Steam generator pH reduced from approximately 9.0 to 8.02 over a short period of time.

The licensee determined that approximately 75 pails (lot 8089) of powdex resins were not adequately ammoniated, which drove the pH down when placing the condensate polishers in service. The licensee attempted to ammoniate the resins in the preslurry condition but the attempt was not fully successful. The pH of the steam generators was again cycled between 9.0 and 8.5 when the polishing system was placed into service. (This matter was discussed at the management exit interview).

- i. LER 78-25, One of two heaters for concentrated boric acid tank (T-53B) failed requiring the tank to be removed from service for heater replacement.
- j. LER 78-26, Equipment discovered missing from firehose station No. 3. (This item was discussed at the management exit interview).
- k. LER 78-27, Four incore alarms due to a Xenon transient.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Records

The inspector reviewed selected records to assure adequate storage and retrieval in accordance with the administrative procedures and requirements. The review included:

- a. Plant Review Committee (PRC) minutes
- b. Facility Changes and Specification Field Changes
- c. Maintenance Orders
- d. Temporary Procedure Changes
- e. Special Operating Procedures

- f. Selected Operating Records
 - (1) Log books
 - (2) Plant charts and graphs
- g. Deviation Reports
- h. Event Reports
- i. Plant Q-list
- j. As-built prints for selected station electrical equipment

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Review and Audit

The inspector reviewed the status of completed nonconformance reports to determine that action had been taken or was planned. The review revealed that certain items were not completed. This matter will remain open pending further review. (This item was discussed at the management exit interview).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Procedures

The inspector reviewed selected plant procedures, procedure changes, and special procedures to assure proper review and approval in accordance with the requirements. The selected review included:

- a. General Operating Procedures, A Section.
- b. System Operating Procedures, B Section.
- c. Emergency Procedures, D Section.
- d. Offnormal Procedures, B and D. Section.
- e. Administrative Procedures.
- f. Annunciator Procedures, D Section.
- g. Fixed Maintenance Procedures, FM Section.
- h. Chemistry Group Administration, FI Section.

1. Specific items were reviewed and discussed with the plant staff and at the management exit including:
 - (1) Formal periodic review of the operating procedures.
 - (2) Completion of the operating procedure rewrite program to fully address the quality assurance program requirements.
 - (3) The use of checklists and/or signoffs during procedures containing numerous detailed steps.
 - (4) Addressing the termination of feedwater to the steam generators during the "steam line break" incident, the hazards of cutting lines and cables to allow closure of the containment access hatches during a fuel handling accident, and the total loss of the auxiliary feedwater system.

The above items will remain open pending further review and followup.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Reporting

The inspector reviewed selected licensee procedures and actions concerning the requirements for reporting under 10 CFR Part 21. The review included:

- a. Quality Assurance Procedures
- b. Administrative Procedures
- c. Department Procedures
- d. Procurement Procedures
- e. 10 CFR Part 21 posting requirements

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Safety Injection System

The inspector reviewed the safety injection initiation and block features to assure written procedures were available, as necessary, to restart the safety related equipment following a loss of power

at anytime during a Loss of Coolant Accident. The review included the appropriate logic diagrams, systems drawings, electrical drawings, and the system and emergency procedures.

- a. The plant SIS logic contains no "RESET" function. During the "injection" phase of operation following a LOCA, the concurrent "loss of power" and "safety injection" signals strip the safeguards buses and then sequence all safeguards loads onto the ESF buses (1C and 1D) after being reenergized from the appropriate emergency diesel generator. During the "recirculation" phase of the safety injection following a LOCA, the concurrent "loss of power" and "safety injection" signals strip the safeguards buses and then sequence the safeguards loads onto the ESF buses (1C and 1D) after being reenergized from the appropriate emergency diesel generator, with the exception of the low pressure safety injection pumps which have been automatically tripped on low SIRW tank level.
- b. The safety injection system initiation from low pressurizer pressure can be "BLOCKED" by procedure during a normal plant shutdown evolution to prevent an inadvertent safety injection as a result of the normal cooldown and depressurization of the primary system. Prior to the plant cooldown the coolant system has been borated to the cold shutdown concentration, satisfying the boron requirements during the main steam line break incident.

Subsequent to the manual "BLOCK" action during normal plant cooldown, the operator is required by procedure to manually initiate safety injection and/or verify the initiation of safety injection "immediately" if the conditions occur which require the system to be actuated (main feedwater line break, main steam line break, or loss of coolant accidents).
- c. The safety injection system initiation from containment high pressure or manual operator action cannot be blocked.
- d. The initiation of safety injection with standby (offsite) power available results in the immediate starting of all the required safeguards equipment, and the "loss of power" event subsequent to a SIS initiation results in the sequence described in "a" above.
- e. The safety injection initiation logic provides two types of signals to the safeguards equipment:

- (1) maintained - continuously energized
- (2) momentary - maintained for approximately 15 seconds

It was noted by the inspector that the equipment which is operated from the momentary signals (15 seconds) can be operated by the staff after the elapsed time delay; but after the particular equipment (pump or valve) condition has been changed by the operator, the "loss of power" event will result in the total required safeguards equipment being reinitiated by the sequencer. The exception occurs during the "recirculation" phase after automatic tripping of the low pressure safety injection pumps and transfer of the ECCS suction to the containment sump (see "a" above).

No apparent discrepancies were noted during this review and no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. IE Bulletins and Circulars

The inspector reviewed the following IE Bulletins and Circulars to verify the licensee actions taken were appropriate.

- a. IE Bulletin 78-06,^{5/} Defective Cutler-Hammer Type M Relays with DC Coils.
- b. IE Circular 78-07, Damaged Components on a Bergen-Paterson Series 24000 Hydraulic Test Stand.
- c. IE Circular 78-08, Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment.
 - (1) The licensee corporate Systematic Program Evaluation (SEP) group reviewed the circular subject matter during the course of the overall SEP review. The list of safety related equipment was developed from the FSAR and related documents followed by an in-house review to assure adequate coverage. The safety related equipment and DBA conditions have been identified and submitted for review under the SEP.^{6/17}
 - (2) The review by the licensee revealed certain equipment inadequacies including:
 - (a) Unqualified ASCO solenoid valves on the containment fan coil cooler service water supply valves^{8/} were deemed acceptable by the licensee under modified conditions; (1) the valves fail open and (2) the service water headers can be manually isolated from outside the containment if necessary.

- 5/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 7/17/78.
- 6/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 2/12/78.
- 7/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 4/12/78.
- 8/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 2/12/78.

- (b) Questionable terminal blocks inside the containment on certain safety related circuits.^{9/} The terminal boards were replaced with qualified components.
- (3) The licensee corporate SEP group has reviewed the following electrical equipment environmental qualifications and compared the findings with IE Circular No. 78-08.
- (a) Connectors, IEB 77-05 and 77-05A. The licensee submittal^{10/} is being reviewed by IE HQ. Deficient connectors were revealed during a subsequent potting activity^{11/12/} and this deficiency and activity has been reviewed by RIII.^{13/}
- (b) Containment Penetrations, IEB 77-06. The licensee submittal^{14/15/} is being reviewed by IE HQ. The plant penetrations are considered to be identical to the Oconee penetrations built by Viking Industries and are considered by the licensee to be qualified.
- (c) Terminal Blocks, IEB 78-02. The licensee submittal^{16/} stated that no unrestricted terminal blocks were present in the DBA environment. Subsequently, a review and evaluation resulted in the replacement of certain terminal blocks in the containment.^{17/18/} RIII reviewed this modification.^{19/}
- (d) Limit Switches, IEB 78-04,^{20/21/} The valve position switches subject to the DBA at the facility were included in the valve testing programs and were certified.
- (e) Cable Splices

No cable splices are utilized at the plant in safety related systems.

- 9/ Ibid.
- 10/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 12/8/77.
- 11/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 4/6/78.
- 12/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 50-255/77-18.
- 13/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 50-255/78-08.
- 14/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 12/2/77.
- 15/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 50-255/77-18.
- 16/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 2/13/78.
- 17/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 4/12/78.
- 18/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 4/21/78.
- 19/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-08.
- 20/ Ltr, CP to RIII, dtd 3/13/78.
- 21/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-08.

(f) Cables

The cable qualifications have been reviewed by the licensee and have been submitted ^{22/23/} to NRR for review; including type Z62 cable, which was qualified by evaluation based on similar construction/materials to a certified type cable.

(g) Electrical Transmitters

The electrical pressure transmitter qualifications have been reviewed by the licensee and have been submitted to NRR for review. ^{24/25/} The review by the inspector revealed that the licensee qualified the transmitters based on the purchase specification and the FSAR testing requirements for the Foxboro Co. Model No. 611 GM type transmitter.

(h) Containment Fan Coil Motors

The motor unit testing included environmental testing conditions with the exception of radiation, and ^{26/27/} chemistry. The information has been submitted to NRR by the licensee for review.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Previous Unresolved Items

An unresolved item is a matter in which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item.

- a. The licensee ^{28/} has completed the review of the silicone rubber seal washers used on the containment penetration connectors and considers the washers acceptable. This matter will remain open and be reviewed at a subsequent inspection.
- b. The apparent discrepancy between ^{29/} the maximum and minimum level in the safety injection tanks as required by the Technical Specification and the basis is being reviewed by IE Headquarters. This item remains open.

- 22/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 2/12/78.
- 23/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 4/12/78.
- 24/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 2/12/78.
- 25/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 4/12/78.
- 26/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 2/12/78.
- 27/ Ltr, CP to NRR, dtd 4/12/78.
- 28/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-08.
- 29/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-01.

12. Outstanding Inspection Items

The inspector reviewed the following items to insure appropriate action taken and completed by the licensee.

- a. The licensee has terminated the leakage of sodium hydroxide into the suction headers of the engineered safeguards equipment by closing manual valves in the caustic tank discharge lines.^{30/} An evaluation by the licensee determined that an operator opening the manual valves during a loss of coolant incident, long-term cooling phase, would receive approximately one (1) Rem external exposure - fifteen (15) minutes in a four (4) Rem per hour field.

The sodium level in the auxiliary systems is being reduced gradually as the demineralizer beds are made available. The sodium level in the safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) tank is being slowly reduced from approximately 100 ppm.

The licensee is continuing to review the use of a solid chemical method to control pH during post-LOCA conditions.

No further questions are required of this matter at this time and this item is considered closed.

- b. The administrative procedure revision concerning control room manning^{31/} (ADM 4.1.1.I) requires a licensed person to maintain the RPS and PCS control panels in view anytime there is fuel in the core.

No further questions are required of this matter at this time and this item is considered closed.

- c. The review of the item^{32/} concerning the simultaneous withdrawal of two control rod groups revealed there is no available programming space to alter the method of performing the rod overlap program short of a major program change. The administrative controls established by the licensee appear to be adequate to prevent recurrence.

No further questions are required of this matter at this time and this item is considered closed.

- d. The licensee completed preparation of procedures and was performing the specific testing of the containment ventilation valves during the inspection. The testing included the

30/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-13.

31/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-13.

32/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-13.

establishment of the holding pressure (T-FC-402-2, Rev. 0, July 28, 1978) and the valve T-ring seismic air system leak test (T-FC-402-3, Rev. 0, July 28, 1978).

- (1) The testing revealed that five valve air systems successfully passed the newly established acceptance criteria and two valve air systems failed the new acceptance criteria. The operable valves maintained containment integrity as required by Technical Specifications (the licensee will report the degraded condition as required).
- (2) The repairs to the valve air systems and the retesting are being scheduled by the licensee to provide normal operation of the containment purge isolation valves.

This item will remain open pending review of the completed activity at a subsequent inspection.

e. Temporary Setpoint Changes^{33/}

A continuing evaluation of the use of temporary setpoint changes revealed that the licensee needs to specifically review the use of the change mechanism and the established procedural controls. The inspectors review of the procedures (ADM 9) and the outstanding setpoint changes revealed certain problems, including:

- (1) Inadequate setpoint change status to provide the shift supervisor with current system conditions.
- (2) Setpoint changes were made to a non-safety related piece of equipment (computer) which was being utilized to maintain the plant within the Technical Specifications - control rod deviation alarms, control rod insertion limits, control rod overlap program, INCORE alarm setpoints, etc.
- (3) Certain operations personnel were not aware of the changes being made.

These items were discussed at the management exit interview and this matter will remain open pending review at a subsequent inspection.

^{33/} IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-13.

- f. The preparation of a procedure to verify operability and flow testing of the fire water supply to the auxiliary feed pumps was being prepared by the licensee. This item will remain open pending completion by the licensee and review by the inspector.

(This item was discussed at the management exit interview).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

13. Management Exit

The inspectors conducted management exits with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on August 3 and 18, 1978. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and the licensee made the following comments and statements concerning the items discussed by the inspectors.

- a. The licensee stated that the bypass control checklists would be reviewed and improved controls instituted to assure their function in providing plant and system status information to the operations staff. (Paragraph 3.f)
- b. The licensee stated that positive controls to assure frequent routine monitoring of the auxiliary feedwater pump room would be instituted (Paragraph 3.g) and would consider the check of the turbine overspeed trip mechanism to assure operability and no room flooding. (Paragraph 3.n)
- c. The licensee stated that the flow testing of the fire protection water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps was being evaluated and procedures written to test the path on a routine basis. (Paragraph 3.n)
- d. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's statements concerning the unmonitored failure modes within certain plant electrical breakers, the break in the fire main header, leak in the suction header of the charging pump (P-55A), the delay in performing a stress analysis for the steam generator tube high differential pressure, the reduction of the steam generator pH three times while attempting to trouble shoot the full flow demineralizer system, and the missing equipment from the fire hose station. (Paragraph 4)
- e. The licensee stated that the items relating to plant procedures would be reviewed including the formal review program, the completion of the rewrite of the operating procedures, the use of checklists and/or sign-offs with extensive procedures, and certain items concerning the emergency and abnormal procedures. (Paragraph 7.i)

- f. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors statements concerning the review of the environmental qualification of electrical equipment. The inspector indicated that the information would be forwarded to IE Headquarters for review. (Paragraph 10.c)
- g. The licensee stated that the procedure for performing temporary setpoint changes would be reviewed based on the requirements. (Paragraph 13)
- h. By telephone on August 24, 1978, the licensee stated that the stress analysis on the steam generator tubes (Paragraph 4.g) and results of the loss of shield cooling (Paragraph 3.h) were completed and revealed satisfactory results.