

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-010/78-26; 50-237/78-23; 50-249/78-25

Docket No. 50-010; 50-237; 50-249 License No. DPR-02; DPR-19; DPR-25

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3

Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL

Inspection Conducted: September 5-8, 12-14, 20-22, and 26-28, 1978

Inspectors:

RC Knop for
J. L. Barker

10-24-78

N. J. Chrissotimos
N. J. Chrissotimos

10-23-78

R. D. Spessard
for J. Hughes

10/23/78

Approved By: *RC Knop*
R. C. Knop, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 1

10-24-78

Inspection on September 5-8, 12-14, 20-22 and 26-28, 1978

(Report No. 50-010/78-26; 50-237/78-23; 50-249/78-25

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite review of licensee event reports, review of plant maintenance, self-fired water heaters - safety considerations, review of plant operation, followup on IE Bulletins/Circulars, and followup on previously unresolved items. The inspection involved 131 inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the six areas inspected, there were no items of noncompliance or deviations noted in five areas; one apparent item of noncompliance (deficiency - failure to report a 30-day reportable event in 30 days - Section I, Paragraph 2) was identified in one area.

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DETAILS

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Section I

1. Persons Contacted

- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- A. Roberts, Assistant Station Superintendent
- *B. Shelton, Assistant to Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Lead Operating Engineer
- *D. Farrar, Supervising Engineer
- E. Budzichowski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
- J. Kolonowski, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- C. Sargent, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
- *G. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Coordinator
- *F. Petrurich, Quality Control
- *R. Greir, Quality Assurance

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and maintenance personnel.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

Unit 1

- LER 77-41, "Update," Unit 1 Leakage from Waste Collector
- LER 78-08, "Update," 200 Gallon Release of Fuelpool Water
- LER 78-19, Leaking Pilot Air Regulatory Valve on Air Start System
- LER 78-20, Temporary Diesel Generator Failed to Start
- LER 78-22, Incore Monitor Amplifier Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-23, Incore Monitor Amplifier Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-26, Core Spray Pump Area Not Functionally Checked
- LER 78-27, Unit 1 Cableway Fire Detector Shorted
- LER 78-28, RPS Functional Surveillance Not Performed in Accordance with Technical Specifications

Regarding LER 78-26, the inspector determined that the heat detectors were not functional during May 1978 in accordance with Technical Specifications Section 4.12.A.2 because of inadequate procedural implementation of the Technical Specifications surveillance requirement and installation of a high and low range temperature rather than two high range detectors. The inspector verified licensee procedure DOS 4100-6, "Monthly Fire Inspection," had been revised to implement the surveillance requirement and an additional high range detector had been installed. This is considered a licensee identified item.

Regarding LER 78-28, the inspector determined that the RPS functional surveillance, DOS 500-6, "Reactor Protection System Functional Operability Test," was not performed on August 15, 1978, as is required by Interim License Condition 2.C.5.9. The surveillance was delayed but not properly rescheduled and was, therefore, not performing during the required periodicity. The licensee has taken corrective action to ensure Technical Specification required surveillances are rescheduled when they are delayed. This is considered a licensee identified item.

Unit 2

- LER 77-55, "Update," Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator Declared Operable Without Functional Testing
- LER 77-56, "Update," 2A CCHX Tube Leak
- LER 78-30, "Update," Loss of 2 LPCI and One Core Spray Pump
- LER 78-31, Core Spray Pressure Switch (PS 2-1430-1466C)
- LER 78-32, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breakers Inoperable
- LER 78-34, Main Steam Line Temperature Isolation Switch (2-261-18A) Initiated Group I Isolation Signal on Channel "A"
- LER 78-36, "A" SBTG Failed to Start Upon Auto Initiation
- LER 78-38, Main Steam Line Temperature Isolation Switch (2-261-18C) Initiated Group I Isolation Signal on Channel "A"
- LER 78-40, APRM Channel #4 Rod Block Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-41, Thermal Overload for 2/3 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Tripped
- LER 78-42, Turbine Control Valve Failed to Fast Close at 10% Valve Position
- LER 78-43, RWM Malfunctioned During Unit Startup
- LER 78-44, Flow Biased Scram Setpoint Below Technical Specification Limit
- LER 78-46, Cracked Socket Welds Found on 2/3 Recirculation Pump
- LER 78-47, Concentration Parameters of SBLC Tank Found Outside Technical Specification Limits
- LER 78-50, Unit 2 Diesel Generator Failed Surveillance Start after 2/3 Diesel Generator Was Taken Out-of-Service for six-month inspection

Regarding LER 78-47, the licensee determined the SBLC tank volume/concentration on August 8, 1978, was found not to be as specified in Technical Specifications Section 3.4.C, Figure 3.4.1. The cause of the event was an apparent operator error in the tank level was improperly read during the month of July 1978 coupled with normal pump packing leakage during July 1978 surveillance, resulting in volume/concentration level not to be correctly calculated. Corrective action to prevent recurrence has been completed. This is considered a licensee identified item.

Unit 3

- LER 77-59, "Update," Diesel Generator Feedbreaker to 34-1 Pulled-to-Lock
- LER 78-09, Cracks on Safe End-to-Pipe Weld on CRD Line
- LER 78-22, Main Steam Line High Flow Isolation Switches (DPIS 261-2C, 261-2N, and 261-2S) Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-23, Minimum Number of Channels Operable on SRM Detectors During Unit Startup
- LER 78-24, Pressure Switch (PS3-263-53A) Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-25, Spike Found on Liquid Process Radiation Monitor
- LER 78-26, Failure of LPCI Valve M03-1501-28B
- LER 78-27, MSL High Flow Isolation Switch (3-261-2C) Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-28, MSL High Flow Isolation Switch (3-261-2C) Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-29, APRM No. 6 Rod Block Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-30, Pinhole Leak Found on Minimum Flow Line from 3A Reactor Feed Pump
- LER 78-31, Drywell Equipment Drain Line Isolation Valve (3-2001-6) Failed to Shut
- LER 78-32, CCSW Room Fans Failed to Start
- LER 78-33, MSL High Flow Isolation Switch (3-261-2C) Tripped in Excess of Technical Specifications
- LER 78-35, Steam Leak on Vent Line from RWCS Heat Exchanger

Regarding LER 78-29, in accordance with Technical Specifications Section 6.6.B.2, the licensee is required to report to the NRC within 30 days when reactor protection system instrument settings are found to be less conservative than those established by Technical Specifications but which do not prevent fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems. On June 6, 1978, the licensee found APRM #6 Rod Block tripped at 12.5% rather than less than 12% rated power. This event was not reported to the NRC until July 26, 1978. This is considered an

item of noncompliance but without significant safety concern. The licensee has revised its program to better follow and to better delineate responsibilities in the tracking of event reporting. The inspector has no further concerns on this matter.

Regarding LER's 78-22, 27, 28, and 33, the inspector determined the ultimate cause of the setpoint drift was a damaged indicator pointer which dragged across the face plate, prohibiting proper operation. The dpis 3-261-2C had been cleaned on several other occasions and the indicator pointer was straightened during July 1978, but binding continued to occur. The licensee replaced the pointer and retested to verify satisfactory operation.

3. Review of Plant Maintenance (Units 1, 2, and 3)

The inspector reviewed safety related work requests to verify that safety related work was being properly identified, approved procedures were being used where applicable, maintenance activities were being properly inspected. Functional testing and calibration prior to returning components or systems to an operating status was being accomplished, quality control records were adequate, personnel assigned maintenance work were properly qualified, and that all safety related maintenance work requiring reporting to the NRC was reported as identified in the Technical Specifications.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Self-fired Water Heaters - Safety Considerations

The inspector verified that there are two domestic water heaters in proximity to the control room.

The first electric water heater is located in the southwest corner of the Unit 3 control panels, one floor elevation above the control room. Separation is approximately 10 feet behind the containment system panel, a 6" concrete wall and 15 feet vertically to the next floor level and another 6" concrete wall.

The water heater is separated from the battery room by approximately 20 feet with a 6" concrete wall and door between them. The specifications are as follows:

Electric
Manufacturer RHEEM Imperial Model
UL Listed
300 psi Test Pressure
127.5 psi Working Pressure
120 U.S. Gallons
5000 watts

Pressure Relief Valve set at 125 psi located 2" above the heater and relief piping of 25 feet to a drain. AGA was used in construction listing.

The second water heater is located approximately 25 feet behind and 5 feet below the Unit 1 condensate and feed panels with a 6" concrete wall in between them. It is separated from the Unit 1 cable tunnel by approximately 10 feet and a 6" concrete wall. The water heater has the following specifications:

Manufacture: Dayton
Model: Number 3E120B
52 U.S. Gallons
240 volts/4500 watts
Test pressure: 300 psi
Working pressure: 150 psi
UL Listed

McDonald Relief Valve set at 75 psi located 2" above heater with 15 feet of piping relieving to a drain. Installation is ASME.

No concerns were identified.

5. Review of Plant Operations

The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, routine patrol sheers, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs for the period of September 2-28, 1978. The inspector also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during the period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for this period was conducted to verify that no violations of the licensee's Technical Specifications were made. The inspector conducted a tour of Units 1, 2, and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation control was properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, and equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 29, 1978, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the item of noncompliance identified (Paragraph 2).

DETAILS

Section II

Prepared by J. Hughes

Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief
Engineering Support Section 1

1. Persons Contacted

- *B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- *B. Shelton, Assistant to Station Superintendent
- *D. Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
 - J. Brunner, Technical Staff
- *R. Yungk, Technical Staff
- *D. Santanna, Technical Staff
- *D. Schiedgen, Quality Control

The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs and maintenance personnel.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Unresolved Item (Report No. 50-010/78-14; 50-237/78-12; 50-249/78-14) - Certification test results for containment penetration assemblies associated with the ACAD/CAM System modification were not available at the site. The RIII inspector reviewed Conax Corporation's stress report IPS-310 and certificate of conformance dated December 22, 1977, for materials and determined that these reports were acceptable. However, the licensee informed the inspector that the prototype test for environmental conditions of the electrical penetrations would not be conducted until mid-December 1978 by Conax Corporation. This item remains open, and it is redesignated as unresolved item (237/78-23-01; 240/78-25-01).

3. Licensee Action on IE Bulletins

The RIII inspector reviewed the licensee's action on IE Bulletin 78-04 and verified that licensee management forwarded copies of the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representatives;

that information in the licensee's response was accurate, and that corrective action taken, if any, was done as described in the licensee's response. A systematic review of the plant was made to determine if any of the limit switches were the types identified in the IE Bulletin.

Regarding Unit 1, the RIII inspector reviewed electrical schematic drawing 12E-389 for the Poison Injection System valves AO 300, 301, 302 and 304 and determined that these valves were the only ones with the types of limit switches identified in the IE Bulletin. The limit switches are used for indication only; therefore, the licensee deemed that no corrective action was required.

Regarding Units 2 and 3, it was determined that the types of limit switches identified in the IE Bulletin were not used in the plants. The RIII inspector reviewed the manufacturer's drawings for the following valves that were identified by the licensee as having limit switches: Isolation valve for the process sampling line (0220-044), Blaw-Knox Company drawing S-135367 indicates that the limit switch used is a National Acme D-1200G series; Reactor Vent Head Steam leak-off valves (0220-046 and 022-047), Blaw-Knox Company drawings S-135369 and S-135370 indicate the limit switches used are also National Acme D-1200G series; Reactor Vent Head Steam leak-off valves (0220-051 and 0220-052), Skinner Uniflow Valve Division drawings D25-0625 and D25-0816 indicate that the limit switches used on these valves are a Namco SA5-A type.

4. Licensee Action on IE Circular 78-08

- a. The RIII inspector determined that the licensee had reviewed qualification requirements and other areas of concern identified in IE Circular No. 78-08, as pertains to appropriate documentation for safety-related electrical components for this station.
- b. The RIII inspector determined that the licensee had assigned the responsibility for review of references listed in the circular and that the licensee has compared his plant with the lessons identified in the references.
- c. Dresden Station Units 1, 2, and 3
 - (1) Connectors (IE Bulletins 77-05 and 77-05A) were previously inspected, and the results are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-010/78-14; 50-237/78-12 and 50-249/78-14 dated May 22, 1978.

- (2) Penetrations (IE Bulletin 77-06) were previously inspected, and the results are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-010/78-14; 50-237/78-12 and 50-249/78-14 dated May 22, 1978.
- (3) Cable splices were previously inspected, and the results are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-010/78-14; 50-237/78-12 and 50-249/78-14 dated May 22, 1978.
- (4) Terminal blocks (IE Bulletin 78-02) were previously inspected, and the results are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-010/78-10; 50-237/78-09 and 50-249/78-09 dated April 12, 1978.

d. Dresden Station Unit 1

- (1) BIW instrument cable located in the drywell requires environmental qualification for the DBE. The licensee was unable to provide documentary evidence that the cable is qualified.
- (2) Multiconductor power and control cable supplied by various manufacturers and located in the drywell requires environmental qualification for the DBE. The licensee was unable to provide documentary evidence that the cable is qualified.
- (3) Motor operators (Limatorque type SMB-1 (AC)) for core spray system valves CS 11, CS 12, CS 13 and CS 14 located in the drywell require environmental qualification for the DBE. The licensee was unable to provide documentary evidence that the motor operators are qualified.
- (4) Pressure switches (Barton type 288A) for determining the differential between reactor pressure and core spray header pressure located in the drywell require environmental qualification for the DBE. The licensee was unable to provide documentary evidence that the switches are qualified.
- (5) Pressure switches (Static "O" Ring type 26R2-YY-45-C5X) for determining reactor low pressure (CS 128 A&B) located in the drywell require environmental qualification for the DBE. The licensee was unable to provide documentary evidence that the switches are qualified.

With respect to items (1)-(5) above, the licensee stated that by September 25, 1978, he would provide, for RIII's review, the necessary documentation for the above equipment/components. (Refer to subparagraph (9) below.)

- (6) Okonite electrical cable located in the drywell requires environmental qualification for the DBE. The RIII inspector reviewed Okonite's Engineering Report No. 127 for Radiation-Steam Environmental Testing of Cables and Splices for Nuclear Stations. The review included test results concerning radiation, temperature, pressure and steam. The inspector determined that these results were satisfactory.
- (7) Magnetrol level switches (TF 201) for determining sphere water level located in the containment sphere require environmental qualification for the DBE. The RIII inspector reviewed Magnetrol letter dated May 9, 1972, to the licensee's mechanical contractor which indicated that the environmental situation was 31 psig (46 psia) steam environment at 275^oF. The test was run for four hours with no detrimental effect to the operation of the switches or to the integrity of the housing. There is no documentary evidence that a radiation test was performed for the level switches. This matter is unresolved (10/78-26-01).
- (8) Solenoid valves located in the containment sphere. The inspector noted that there were two manufacturers (Versa and ASCO). Commonwealth Edison letter dated February 27, 1978, to Director Division of Operating Reactors references an attachment letter dated June 25, 1975, which states, in the results of investigation section, "the solenoid valves were evaluated to be qualified because they will fail in the safe direction. If the solenoid coil is damaged such that they become open or shorted, the valve will then operate in the safe direction. The inspector has no further questions.
- (9) Subsequent to this inspection, the licensee submitted the documentation for the aforementioned equipment/ components (items (1)-(5) above) to RIII for inoffice review. The inspector's findings are as follows:
 - (a) Regarding item (1) above, the inspector reviewed BIW instrument cable reports No. B912 and B913 (undated) which indicated that crosslinked polyethylene and ETFE fluoropolymer cable insulation types were tested. The summary sections indicated that the tests were conducted in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 383-1974. There was no link between the cables tested and those installed in the drywell or documentary evidence of the pressure, temperature, steam and radiation tests. This matter is unresolved (10/78-26-02).

- (b) Regarding item (2) above, no documentary evidence was provided to show the cable is qualified. This matter is unresolved (10/78-26-03).
- (c) Regarding item (3) above, review of Limitorque Corporation letter dated March 26, 1975, to Dresden Unit 1 indicated that environmental tests were conducted by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, as described in Final Report F-C2232-01, dated November 1968. Tests included temperature, pressure, humidity, steam, radiation, and aging. The inspector determined that the results were satisfactory.
- (d) Regarding item (4) above, the inspector reviewed ITT Barton letter to Commonwealth Edison Company dated April 30, 1975, ITT Barton letter to Westinghouse Electric Corporation dated March 26, 1971, and Franklin Institute Research Laboratories (FIRL) Final Report F-C2667, entitled "Performance Test of three Differential Pressure Transmitters in a Simulated Reactor Containment Post Accident Steam Environment" dated November 1969.

The following environmental tests were conducted: pressure, temperature, humidity and steam conditions. However, there was no documentary evidence to indicate that a radiation test was performed on the pressure switches. This matter is unresolved (10/78-26-04).

- (e) Regarding item (5) above, Mechanical and Electrical Automation letter dated November 10, 1972, states "replacement switches 26R2-YY45-GM4X5 are being sent to your attention to replace the two in the field labeled tag CS-128A and CS-128B. The two (2) switches in the field, model 26R2-YY45-C5X are to be returned to Static "O" ring Pressure Switch Company." Test Report 7201-105 for Environmental Test for Pressure Switches was applicable to type 26R2-YY45-GM4X5, and test conditions were 260°F and 20 psig. The inspector could not determine which type of switch is installed in the plant and if it is environmentally qualified. This matter is unresolved (10/78-26-05).

e. Dresden Units 2 and 3

- (1) Okonite electrical cable: The RIII inspector reviewed Okonite's Engineering Report No. 137 dated November 5, 1971, revision 1. The review included test results concerning pressure, temperature, steam and radiation. The inspector determined that the results were satisfactory.

- (2) Yarway Corporation instrument cable: The licensee, after a re-review of the installation of these cables, determined the cables are located external to the containment. The RIII inspector has no further questions.
- (3) Simplex Wire and Cable Company power, control and instrument cable requiring environmental qualification for the DBE: The licensee's documentation is based on reference to the Quad Cities FSAR, Section 5, Amendment 13 which states, "all cabling to valve operators is high temperature rated to 347^oF." Dresden Units 2 and 3 are similar to the Quad Cities Units 1 and 2, and purchase orders for these units were issued simultaneously. The licensee was unable to provide any documentary evidence that the cable is qualified. This matter is unresolved (237/78-23-02; 249/78-25-02).
- (4) Ray Chem instrument cable: The licensee after a re-review of the installation of these cables determined the cables were located external to the containment. The inspector has no further questions.
- (5) General Electric power and control cable requiring environmental qualification for the DBE: The licensee's documentation is based on reference to the Quad Cities FSAR, Section 5, Amendment 13 which states, "all cabling to valve operators is high temperature rated to 347^oF." Dresden Units 2 and 3 are similar to the Quad Cities Units 1 and 2, and purchase orders for these units were issued simultaneously. The licensee was unable to provide any documentary evidence that the cable is qualified. This matter is unresolved (237/78-23-03; 249/78-25-03).
- (6) Samuel Moore thermocouple cable: The licensee, after a re-review of the installation determined the cable is used for pressure vessel temperature which is not required to mitigate an accident. The inspector has no further questions.
- (7) Bay Associates, Inc. instrument cable: The licensee, after a re-review of the installation of the cables, determined the cables are located external to the containment. The inspector has no further questions.
- (8) Electrical transmitters: The RIII inspector reviewed equipment location drawings and by observation determined that the electrical transmitters required to be operable during and after a postulated accident are located external to the containment. The inspector has no further questions.

- (9) Motor operated valves (Limitorque): The inspector reviewed Franklin Institute Research Laboratories (FIRL) test report F-L3441 dated September 1972 which included, pressure, temperature, steam and radiation test results. The inspector determined that the results were satisfactory.
- (10) Electromatic Relief Valve (General Electric Model CR9503-213) located in the drywell: The RIII inspector reviewed Millstone Unit No. 1 amendment #18 to Project Engineering Program (PEP) No. 42963 and determined that the test results met the objective of the test program, i.e., the actuator must operate in saturated steam under accident conditions in the drywell. Note: Both Millstone and Dresden have Model CR9503-213 electromatic relief valves. Test results were as follows: the actuator performed satisfactorily and will produce the required lift in 62 psi (approximately 300°F) saturated steam for a 10-hour duration; the Unimax switches performed satisfactorily. The inspector has no further questions.
- (11) Air and solenoid valves for the main steam isolation valves: The RIII inspector reviewed Rockwell Manufacturing Company Report No. 2792 03-02 Revision 1 dated December 1, 1970. The report states "the testing reported herein verifies that the two air valve sets and the associated solenoid valves tested are capable of operation during exposure to the 340°F steam environment expected during the accident situation." The inspector evaluated the test results for steam environment only, and he has no further questions.
- (12) Target Rock Solenoid Valves located in containment: The RIII inspector reviewed General Electric (GE) letter GEBD-8-141 dated May 17, 1978, to the licensee with an attachment memo No. 126-62 for environmental testing by GE of the AVC model C5450 solenoid valve which is similar to that used for Dresden. The memo included test results for pressure, temperature and radiation, and it indicated that Parker Super O Lube maintains its lubricant quality with no apparent bad effects at temperatures up to 350°F. The inspector determined that the results were satisfactory.
5. During a telephone conversation between the licensee and the RIII inspector on September 29, 1978, the licensee stated that the installation and use of certain cables had been re-reviewed since the inspector's visit on September 8, 1978. These cables are identified in Paragraphs 4e(2), 4e(4), 4e(6) and 4e(7) above.

6. Unresolved Matters

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2, 4d(7), 4d(9)(a), 4d(9)(b), 4d(9)(d), 4d(9)(e), 4e(3), and 4e(5) above.

The unresolved items (except item 237/78-23-01; 249/78-25-01) were brought to the attention of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR) Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Plant Reviewers for the Dresden site during and subsequent to the inspection and were also referred to IE for further evaluation. Note: SEP Plant Reviewers were at the Dresden site during this inspection.

7. Exit Interview

The inspector met with site staff representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 8, 1978. The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspection.