(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) . CONTROL BLOCK: A N A S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 57 CAT 58 5 CON'T

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<th 0 1 During steady state, 97% power operation, it was discovered that only one seal or 0 2 barrier exists for the spare pipe penetrations. FSAR Section 6.2.4.3, page 6.2-125 03 requires double barriers or seals between the containment atmosphere and the environ-0 4 ment for all spare pipe penetrations. 0 5 0 6 0 7 COMP VALVE CAUSE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE N E T R 14 SA E X (15) Z (16) B (12 A (13) 18 13 REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL CODE TYPE NO. EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. LER RO 81 21 0 1 T | 0 REPORT 11 2 NUMBER 28 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 COMPONENT PRIME COMP. EFFECT N PLANT METHOD ACTION FUTURE HOURS (22) FORM SUB. MANUFACTURER SUPPLIER 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 0 26 Z (21) N 24 A (25) (18) X 12 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) |During the design stages of North Anna Unit 1, design personnel overlooked the double 1 0 barrier requirement and only incorporated one barrier or seal in the engineering drawings. Engineering is presently analyzing the problem for a viable solution. 1 3 1 4 80 9 METHOD OF OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER DISCOVERY 7 29 Notification by Sister Licensee NA D (31) 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT 80 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE NA NA 10 80 44 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE NUMBER 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 10 0 40 NA 2 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION TYPE Z (42) NA 9 10 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION 45 68 69 280320 80 5 W. R. Cartwright (703) 894-5151 alimite.

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-338 Report No. LER 78-122/01T-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

Surry Power Station personnel notified us that a possible discrepancy may exist between our FSAR commitment and the as-built plant condition with regard to the spare pipe penetrations. A review of the FSAR revealed that all concainment spare pipe penetrations are to be sealed at both ends by means of a welded pipe cap. A review of the engineering drawings and actual penetrations revealed that only one welded pipe cap existed for each spare pipe. This affects all twenty-six spare penetrations in Unit No. 1.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The welded pipe caps function as a leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The present spare pipe penetration seals were demonstrated to be leak tight by the Type A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test conducted during Unit 1 pre-operational testing. Hence, this occurrence resulted in no danger to the operating personnel or public.

Cause

The second welded cap requirement was inadvertently overlooked during the design stages.

Immediate Corrective Action

No immediate action was taken.

Scheduled Corrective Action

An engineering evaluation of this problem is being undertaken to determine what corrective action is required.

Actions to Prevent Recurrence

No further action required.