

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

2301 MARKET STREET

PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101

(215) 841-4000

November 20, 1978

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Greenman,
Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement on November 7,
1978.

Reference: Docket Number 50-273 **S**
Report No: LER 78-21/17
Report Date: November 20, 1978
Occurrence Date: November 6, 1978
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Unit 3
R.D. 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 3.5.C.1 requires that "the HPCI Subsystem shall be operable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor pressure is greater than 105 psig,..."

Description of the Event:

With the unit operating at approximately 100 percent power a feedwater control system failure resulted in a reactor low level transient and subsequent scram. Both the RCIC and HPCI were automatically initiated by the low level condition. The RCIC operated satisfactorily and delivered rated flow to the reactor vessel. The HPCI initiated out flow delivery was erratic. After a short period of time, the HPCI tripped, apparently on

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overspeed. Attempts to manually restart the HPCI were unsuccessful until the HPCI auxiliary oil pump was removed from service and then restarted. HPCI was then operated manually at rated flow until it tripped on a reactor high water level signal.

Consequences of Event:

The safety significance of this occurrence is minimal in that sufficient ECCS systems were available to maintain safe reactor water level during the transient. The use of the HPCI was not needed during this transient. The ADS, core spray, and LPCI systems were available to deliver water had the situation required additional capacity.

Cause of Event:

The flow instability was caused by the HPCI electronic governor being out of calibration. The difficulty experienced in attempting to manually restart HPCI was caused by a defective valve in the overspeed trip reset circuit which prevented reset of the suspected overspeed trip.


Corrective Action:

The electronic governor was tested and calibrated. Proper operation was verified. This verification included an instrumented quick start. The flow, speed and discharge pressure traces of the quick start were the same as traces obtained during the pre-operational test program. The defective valve in the overspeed trip reset circuit was repaired and the auto reset circuit functionally tested satisfactorily.

Action to Prevent Recurrence:

The HPCI governor alignment procedure will be revised to include dynamic stability testing following calibration.

Yours truly,



J. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division-Nuclear

Attachment

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Mr. Norman T. Heller, NRC - Office of Management &
Program Analysis