UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-348/94-02 and 50-364/94-02

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility Name: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: January 22 - February 14, 1994

Inspectors: For R. W. Wright — 3/2/94
T. M. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector — Date Signed

For R. W. Wright — 3/2/94
M. J. Morgan, Resident Inspector — Date Signed

For R. W. Wright — 3/2/94
M. A. Scott, Resident Inspector — Date Signed

Approved by: Floyd S. Cantrell Jr — 3/2/94
Floyd S. Cantrell, Chief — Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 1B
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the principal areas of plant operations, maintenance, surveillance, safety system verification, review of nonroutine events, and follow-up of previous inspection findings; and to a lesser degree, health physics, physical security, fire protection, engineering attributes, and technical support. Deep backshift inspections were conducted on January 23, 24, 29 and 31, and February 12, 1994.

Results: (Summarized by SALP functional area)

Operations

Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel were generally very knowledgeable and conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable plant procedures and in compliance with technical specifications. Licensed operators were consistently aware of plant conditions and attentive to any changes in those conditions. No violations or deviations were identified.

Maintenance and Surveillance

Inspection results indicate that licensee personnel conducted assigned maintenance and surveillance activities in accordance with applicable procedures. Furthermore, responsible personnel demonstrated a high degree of knowledge and craft skill in their activities. No violations or deviations were identified in this area; however, an unresolved issue was raised regarding technical specification compliance during the conduct of Nuclear Instrumentation System power range instrument surveillance testing.

Engineering and Technical Support

Technical support of new fuel receipt and inspection was adequate. Mechanical engineering support was prompt and effective. No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

Plant Support

Health physics personnel provided good support of operational and maintenance related activities; however, some concerns were expressed regarding the use of radiological "catch bags" and updating of plant surveys. Security personnel were alert and appeared to be implementing the plant's security plan appropriately. No violations and no deviations were identified in the areas of radiation protection, security, and fire protection.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*W. Bayne, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Site Supervisor
C. Buck, Technical Manager
*S. Casey, Systems Performance Supervisor
*R. Coleman, PMD Manager
*P. Crone, Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent
L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
*H. Garland, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
*J. Kale, Chemistry/Environment Superintendent
*M. Mitchell, Health Physics Superintendent
C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager
*J. Odom, Superintendent Unit Operations
J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
*J. Powell, Superintendent Unit Operations
*L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
*W. Warren, Technical Training Supervisor
B. Yance, Systems Performance Manager

NRC Personnel

*M. Morgan, Resident Inspector
*T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Scott, Resident Inspector

*Attended the exit interview

Other licensee employees contacted included, health physics, operators, technical staff, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel.

Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. Plant Status and Activities

a. Unit 1 operated at full power during the entire inspection period. This unit is scheduled to shutdown on March 4, 1994 for its twelfth refueling outage.

b. Unit 2 operated at slightly less than full power during the entire inspection period due to administrative limits on Tavg (i.e., 575 degrees Fahrenheit for the average Tavg).

c. NRC/Licensee Meetings and Inspections

The licensee and NRC met on February 2 for the presentation of reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses

to SNC personnel that had recently passed their NRC administered initial license examinations.

Seven SNC personnel, three ROs and four SROs, were recognized for successfully completing the extensive training required to achieve licensure. NRC staff on hand for the presentation were Johns Jaudon, Deputy Director, DRS, RII; Byron Siegel, Project Manager, NRR; and David Verrelli, Chief Branch 1, DRP, RII. This group was on site February 2-3, 1994 to review resident inspector activities, tour the site and discussions with licensee representatives. The resident inspectors were also present for the presentation of operator certificates.

3. Review of Plant Operations (71707) and Refueling (60710)

a. Plant Tours

Routine plant tours, particularly of the control room and the auxiliary building, were performed to verify that operating license and regulatory requirements were being met. In general, inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger/seismic restraint settings, valve and breaker positions, equipment caution/danger tags, material and equipment conditions, overall housekeeping, fire protection features, and instrument calibration dates. Tours were conducted both on dayshift and backshifts.

1) Walkdowns of Safety-Related Equipment/Areas

Limited walkdowns of accessible portions of the following safety-related systems and surrounding areas were performed, in particular:

- Unit 1 and 2 Piping Penetration Rooms
- Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and Hot Machine Shop
- Unit 1 RHR Pump and Heat Exchanger rooms
- Unit 1 and 2 Plant Vent Stacks
- Unit 1 and 2 Containments (outside)
- Unit 1 and 2 Charging Pumps (1A/1B/1C and 2A/2B/2C)
- Unit 1 and 2 Gas Decay Tank Valve and Tank Rooms

Proper breaker/switch positions and valve line-ups were examined both locally and in the control room. Safety system integrity and alignment were verified to be in accordance with operability requirements. Safety-related

equipment material conditions and area housekeeping were considered good.

2) During the inspection period, the following tagouts/clearances were inspected and found to be properly implemented:

a. 94-0461-2 1B EDG "B" Air Compressor unloader repair

b. 94-0381-2 2A Charging Pump preventive maintenance (PM)

c. 94-0490-1 Control Room Train A Air Conditioning (A/C) Package Unit PM

b. Routine Plant Operations Review

The inspection staff periodically reviewed FNP shift logs and plant operating records including instrument traces, chemistry reports, auxiliary logs, operating/standing orders, night order entries, and equipment tagout records. Inspectors routinely monitored operator alertness/demeanor, control room staffing and access, shift turnovers, and operator performance during routine operations. Random off-hours inspections were conducted to ensure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels. Control room annunciator status and alarms were verified.

1) Technical Specifications Compliance

FNP compliance with selected TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) were verified throughout the inspection report period by the inspection staff. In particular, the licensee's use of LCO status sheets for Unit 1 and 2 were examined to confirm that entries into TS LCO Action statements were recognized, tracked, and followed. During the review of these documents, the following findings were identified:

a. During surveillance testing of Unit 2 Nuclear Instrument System (NIS) Power Range (PR) Channel N44 the LCO Status Sheet was not filled out until several hours following entry into the Action statement for TS LCO 3.3.1.

b. During PM of the Train A Control Room A/C Package Unit the LCO Status Sheet was not filled until about two hours after entry into the Action statement for TS LCO 3.7.7.

In both cases, shift operators and supervisors were aware that authorizing the initiation of the above surveillance and PM activities had constituted entry into associated TS

LCO Action statements. However, until the Shift Foreman Operating (SFO) filled out the LCO Status Sheet there was no documented evidence to identify or track the TS LCO Action statement requirements. Neither the ROs or Shift Supervisors routinely log TS LCO status. Although, no TS LCO Action statement was violated (see paragraph 5.D for possible exception), the inspector discussed with Operations management the effectiveness of the LCO Status Sheet process being implemented by shift personnel. The inspector will continue to follow FNP Operations management's review of their TS LCO tracking process.

2) Unit 1 New Fuel Receipt and Storage (60705)

In preparations for the twelfth Unit 1 refueling outage (U1-RF12), SNC received additional shipments of new fuel for cycle 13 operation.

A total of six (6) shipments of new fuel from the vendor are expected prior to U1-RF12. Inspectors monitored activities of SNC personnel (i.e., operations, health physics, nuclear engineering, maintenance, and security) and vendor representatives during receipt inspection and transfer of new fuel assemblies to the SFP. The evolution was conducted in accordance with FHP-3.0, "Receipt and Storage of New Fuel," and FHP-4.0, "Transfer of New Fuel to Spent Fuel Pit."

The inspectors observed disassembly of shipment casks and subsequent unloading, inspection, and transfer of new fuel assemblies to the SFP. Site personnel performed these activities in a deliberate and controlled manner pursuant to procedural instructions. Radiological surveys and swipes were made of each cask and fuel assembly. Thorough visual inspections confirmed that the material condition of each assembly was acceptable. All assemblies were transferred to the SFP without incident. Foreign material exclusion and personnel safety controls were evident during the entire process. These controls included the use of lanyards, and other means of captivation, on tools and loose material above the SFP and open fuel assemblies. Lanyards were also noted on the pins that locked fuel handling equipment and fuel assembly shipping casks.

3) Units 1 and 2 Plant Vent Stacks and Containment Structures

The inspectors conducted visual examinations of the Units 1 and 2 plant vent stacks and outside (including top) containment structures. Accompanied by a plant health physics technician, the inspectors climbed the stacks' enclosed ladders to the top of both containment structures. During the climbs and tours of the top of both containments,

no major adverse conditions were noted. External containment and stack conditions and integrity were verified. Some amount of debris and excess material were observed on the top surface of each containment structure. The inspectors also observed that temporary high voltage electrical cables were tied to the stack ladders and ran from the auxiliary building roof to the top of both containments. This electrical cabling had been abandoned in place for an extended period, but did not appear to be an immediate threat to plant equipment or personnel. However, continued deterioration of the roping used to suspend the cabling could become hazardous in a high wind environment. The Maintenance Manager was notified of the inspectors' findings. Whereupon, the debris, material, and cabling were promptly removed.

No active cracks were noted in the concrete surface of the Unit 1 and 2 containments. However, on Unit 2 it was evident that plant personnel had been scraping away some of the protective coating atop the containment to examine and/or repair underlying cracks. The cracks looked superficial and did not appear to be propagating. Plant maintenance is investigating the need to recoat the surface.

No cited violations or deviations were identified. Results of inspections in this area indicate that operations personnel were very knowledgeable and conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable plant procedures and in compliance with TS. Licensed operators were consistently aware of plant conditions and attentive to any changes in those conditions.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed/reviewed portions of various FNP preventative and corrective maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements. Work requests and instructions were also evaluated to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that proper priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.

a. MWR 276644; Investigate 2D inverter bypass source available light flickering out

After investigating the problem, it was determined that the light bulb had burned out. The bypass source of power was not interrupted and remained available through out the bulb replacement. This maintenance activity was well controlled.

b. MWR 2281031; 1B 125 VDC bus ground

Indication of a ground on the 1B 125 VDC bus annunciated in the control room after a period of heavy rain while the resident

inspector was present. This electrical ground was a "soft" ground that did not degrade the voltage of the bus or the operability of the bus. Ground detection equipment measured the ground at 82 millivolts, and right at the alarm setpoint of 0.30 milliamperes.

Trouble shooting such a small ground proved to be difficult, in part because the sensitivity of the detection gear used by the electricians begins at 0.30 milliamperes. The source of this ground was not located during the inspection period. At its present level, a ground of this magnitude poses no operational threat and can be a common occurrence in power plants during periods of high moisture.

c. MWR 279208; Breaker #3 600 VAC turbine building distribution cabinet lug tightening

Breaker #3 (2VN2R19L530) for the turbine building chill water pump had been identified, by thermography, as having an electrically induced hot spot at one threaded lug terminal. After the lug was retightened, an inspector observed plant personnel from the Maintenance and Engineering Support Group (MESG) reperform previous temperature measurements on the breaker. Under controlled conditions, plant personnel were able to demonstrate that the repair was effective (i.e., lug joint temperature had dropped approximately 10 degrees C and lug temperature was on par with adjacent cabinet and component temperatures). Thermography at FNP has proven to be a very effective predictive maintenance technique and, if uniformly and consistently applied, should reduce equipment failure. Thermographic survey of electrical cabinets is an ongoing program throughout the plant. MESG staff performing the survey were well trained on the details of the process and methodical in their documentation.

d. MWR-275298; 2C Charging pump - replace local temperature indicator

The original temperature indicator gauge glass on the west end of the charging pump had a broken face plate. A new temperature indicator was obtained, calibrated and installed in accordance with IMP-429.1, Temperature Indicator Calibration. Functional testing of the indicator was performed by facility operations personnel and all work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR and the approved plant procedure.

e. MWR-282973; Modification of 2C charging pump gear box breather

Due to continuing oil misting problems, the charging pump gear box breather assemblies were modified (see NRC Inspection Reports 50-348,364/93-21, paragraph 3.b.; 50-348,364/93-22, paragraph 4.a (MWR-224741); and URI 50-348/93-21-01, Oil mist in charging pump room). A new gasket for the modified assembly/breather was obtained, the modified assembly was painted and then installed in accordance with approved modification drawings. Functional

testing of the modified breather was performed by operations personnel. All work was accomplished in accordance with the MWR and approved modification procedures. The modified breather assembly performed satisfactorily. This area will be reviewed periodically to determine whether the oil misting problem has been completely resolved.

f. WA-W00403525 and W00403526; PM of 2A charging pump temperature transmitters/indicators

An inspector observed plant I&C technicians perform calibration and PM activities on the 2A charging pump reducing gear and lube oil Rosemont temperature transmitters and associated indicators. Work was appropriately authorized, and adequate instructions were available at the job site. The responsible I&C technicians were knowledgeable and skilled. As-found data for the lube oil cooler discharge temperature transmitter were found to be low and out of tolerance. This condition had been previously identified as a deficiency, and was properly adjusted to correct the problem.

g. WA-W004044336; Inspection and PM of train A control room A/C package unit

An inspector observed electrical maintenance (EM) workers perform routine PM activities on the train A control room A/C package unit in accordance with plant procedures (i.e., EMP-1210.01, 1530.01, and 1701.01.). The system was tagged out and the work was appropriately authorized. EM workers demonstrated a high level of familiarity with the control room A/C equipment involved, and followed established work instructions.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the maintenance area indicate that maintenance personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures. Mechanics demonstrated familiarity with administrative and radiological controls, and good craft skills.

5. Surveillance Observation (61726)

Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory and licensee technical specification requirements. Portions of the following surveillance tests were observed:

a. FNP 1-STP-14, Containment Integrity Verification Test

The inspector accompanied a non-licensed operator and a health physics technician during performance of STP-14 to verify the proper position of all Unit 1 valves between containment and the outside containment isolation valve, (i.e., vent, drain, relief valves). These valves are located in the Unit 1 piping

penetration rooms of the auxiliary building. Appropriate dressout requirements and radiological surveys were followed. All valves were found to be in their appropriate positions, or in the case of relief valves were intact, without gags, and not leaking. This walkdown of containment integrity also constituted partial completion of NRC inspection module 71710, ECCS System Walkdown.

During the conduct of STP-14, several of the valves were difficult to identify due to poor lighting, inaccessibility, and had hard to read metal tags that have existed since plant construction. The licensee has an on-going valve tagging upgrade program, but this program has not yet reached most of these valves. In addition, several of the valves were hard to locate because STP-14 is not organized in a logical manner and does not contain informational notes on valve locations. The operations department is considering a revision to STP-14 that would aid in locating these valves.

b. FNP-1-STP-11.6, Residual Heat Removal Valve Inservice Test

An inspector observed the performance of STP-11.6 for stroke testing the Unit 1 "A" train RHR valves. System operators were positioned at the valves to confirm proper motion while licensed operators cycled them from the control room. Appropriate operational considerations were made prior to, and during the performance of this surveillance by halting parallel activities on the RHR system and by responding to anticipated reactor power downturn excursions due to the injection of small quantities of highly borated water from the RHR system. All RHR valves stroked as required with only one exception. The RHR pump miniflow valve (1-FCV-602A) had properly stroked close within allowed time constraints, but while the valve was being cycled back open its thermal protection devices unexpectedly actuated thereby deenergizing the valve actuator. Operations staff promptly entered the LCO Action statement for RHR train "A" inoperability and initiated MWR 500324 to the correct the problem.

FNP technical staff (MESG) investigated the problem and determined that the cause was due to the way operators manipulated the handswitch for FCV-602A. When this MOV was operated in a manner recommended by MESG, it operated properly. Operations has agreed to modify their test procedure to reflect MESG's recommended method for switch manipulation. Subsequent stroke testing of FCV-602A demonstrated the valve's satisfactory performance. Under normal operation, the RHR miniflow valve operates automatically and had performed satisfactorily in the past.

c. FNP-0-STP-26.4, Control Room Train A Ventilation Quarterly Operability Test

Following the completion of PM activities on the train A control room A/C package unit (see paragraph 4.G), shift operators performed FNP-0-STP-26.4, Control Room Train A Ventilation Quarterly Operability Test. Conduct of this test satisfied both post-maintenance and routine surveillance testing requirements. As allowed by STP-26.4, the 1A control room pressurization filter unit, 1A control room recirculation filter unit and 1A control room filter unit were all run at the same time, along with the train A control room A/C package unit. An inspector observed the start-up and operation of all ventilation units. Operator actions were conducted in a step-by-step manner pursuant to STP-26.4 instructions. All Train A ventilation equipment operated satisfactorily during the test and met established surveillance acceptance criteria.

d. FNP-2-STP-228.8, NIS Power Range Channel N44 Calibration and Functional Test

An inspector monitored the quarterly surveillance testing of NIS PR channel N44 in accordance with STP-228.8. The two responsible I&C technicians were observed following the test procedure's instructions in a deliberate step-by-step manner. They demonstrated a strong familiarity with the procedure and plant equipment involved. All as-found test data were within required tolerances, no adjustments were necessary. Furthermore, Data Sheet 1 of STP-228.8 was verified to conform with Unit 2 Volume 1 Curve 71, NIS Channel Current Settings.

However, during the conduct of this, and previous NIS PR channel surveillance tests, the inspector questioned whether the licensee was in compliance with the associated TS LCO Action statement of Note 2 in Table 3.3-1. This note allows for continued power operation, when the number of operable NIS PR channels is one less than the total number of channels, provided that "The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour." It has been SNC's standard practice to disconnect the upper and lower NIS PR detectors while performing routine quarterly surveillance testing required by TS Table 4.3-1. Although disconnecting these detectors renders the affected channel inoperable for the duration of the test (which normally takes an entire 8-hour shift to complete), SNC does not place the channel in a tripped condition. To place the affected channel in a tripped condition would preclude I&C technicians from performing the STP as it is currently written.

The inspector is concerned that the STP-228 procedures used for the calibration and functional testing of all eight Unit 1 and 2 NIS PR channels reduces the availability of these critical reactor protection system channels well beyond that prescribed by TS Table

4.3-1. It would appear that the quarterly NIS PR surveillance testing conducted by SNC is considerably more comprehensive than actually required by TS. Furthermore, according to Section 7.2 of the FNP Final Safety Analysis Report, NIS PR channels have been specifically designed to accommodate quarterly TS surveillance testing without making the channels inoperable. The licensee and NRC are currently evaluating the implications of SNC's testing practices upon channel reliability and TS compliance. The next quarterly NIS PR surveillance test is due April 5, 1994. This concern is identified as an Unresolved Issue (URI) 94-02-01, NIS PR Channel Inoperability, and will be pursued in a future inspection.

e. FNP-2-STP-62.0, Main Turbine Valves Operability Test

On February 12, an inspector watched shift operators ramp down Unit 2 from full power to less than 90% main steam flow in preparation to perform STP-62.0. The purpose of this test is to demonstrate proper operation of the main turbine governor, throttle, reheat stop, and reheat intercept valves of which there are four of each. During STP-62.0, each of the 16 main turbine valves are individually stroked fully closed then reopened to verify operability of the turbine overspeed protection system.

The inspector observed shift operators stroke close, and reopen the high pressure turbine governor valves. Valve operation was observed both remotely from the control room at the digital electro-hydraulic (DEH) control panel and locally in the high pressure turbine dog-house. Plant operators conducted this evolution in a deliberate and controlled manner per procedural instructions. Each of the governor valves observed by the inspector seemed to demonstrate satisfactory performance. However, both the inspector and a non-licensed system operator (stationed in the dog-house to confirm valve closure) noticed that the local position pointers attached to governor valves #1 and #4 had vibrated loose and were incapable of verifying valve closure as required by procedure steps 5.12.4.3 and 5.13.4.3. To address the problem of dysfunctional position pointers, the shift supervisor decided to recycle the governor valves in the presence of experienced mechanical maintenance (MM) personnel who measured valve stem position and travel. In each instance, the licensee concluded that governor valve operation met the acceptance criteria for visual observation. Furthermore, governor valve position was independently verified at the DEH control panel.

No violations and no deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in this surveillance area indicate that personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures. Responsible personnel were knowledgeable and skilled in their surveillance activities. However, an unresolved issue (URI 94-02-01) was identified regarding TS compliance during the conduct of NIS PR surveillance testing.

6. Engineered Safety System Inspection - Control Room Ventilation System, Units 1 and 2 (71710)

An inspector conducted a detailed walkdown of the accessible portions of both trains of the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS). This system is common to FNP, Units 1 and 2, and includes the following major subsystems:

- Control room filter units 1A and 1B
- Control room pressurization units 1A and 1B
- Control room recirculation filter units 1A and 1B
- Chlorine detectors and process radiation monitors (RE-35)
- Control room A/C package units 1A and 1B
- Computer room A/C unit

Portions of plant drawings (D-175012 and D-205012) and the system checklist (FNP-0-SOP-56.0A) for these subsystems were reviewed, compared, and walked down. A large number of minor discrepancies with equipment identification numbers and descriptions between the checklist and actual component labels were identified. However, these had already been identified by the licensee and corrected in the latest revision to the CRVS checklist. System configuration, and valve and damper positions, were consistent with the checklist and drawings. Electrical breaker and BOP control board switch alignments, and indicators in the control room and local CRVS panels, were verified. General housekeeping, equipment material conditions, and system integrity were inspected and found to be in good order.

7. Engineering and Technical Support

New Fuel Receipt and Inspection

The inspectors observed the receipt and inspection of new fuel for Unit 1, Cycle 13 operation (see paragraph 3.b.2). Technical support by the onsite engineering staff during the inspection of new fuel assemblies was adequate. Procedural inspection criteria were applied in accordance with FHP-3.0.

8. Plant Support

a. Fire Protection Review (64704)

During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examined aspects of the Fire Protection Program such as transient fire loads, flammable materials storage, fire brigade readiness, ignition source/fire risk reduction efforts, and fire protection features. In particular, the inspectors verified that appropriate fire watches were established to compensate for the immobilization of several fire doors during Unit 1 auxiliary building painting.

b. Physical Protection (81054)

The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by: proper display of picture badges; tours and stationing of security personnel; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed. Guards were alert and particularly attentive to open doors. Their posted positions were well manned and good relief practices were followed.

c. Health Physics

1) Extended Use of Radiological "Catch Bags"

During the inspection period, the inspectors inspected the SFP heat exchanger areas and observed that radiological liquid "catch bags" were mounted near the end bell of the 1A heat exchanger and on associated piping in the 1B heat exchanger area. In the case of the 1A heat exchanger, the bag had been in place since March 1992; as for the 1B heat exchanger, it had been there since July 1993. The practice of leaving catch bags in place for extended periods of time was brought to the attention of health physics management personnel. Upon investigation, it was learned that modifications to the 1A heat exchanger end bell area was being considered and repairs to the 1B heat exchanger were to be performed which would eliminate the use of these bags. The inspectors will continue to monitor these activities.

2) Radiological Surveys

During the inspection period, the inspectors noted that areas around the Unit 1 RHR heat exchanger, 1A hydrogen recombiner and 1B hydrogen recombiner had not been surveyed since January 1993.

While this amount of time since the last survey - over one (1) year - was acceptable by approved FNP plant procedures, improved plant housekeeping, different modes of Unit 1 plant operation, etc... may have markedly changed radiological conditions, and thus the accuracy of such surveys may be called into question. This concern was brought to the attention of health physics management personnel and upon their investigation, it was learned that more recent surveys of these areas had been performed. However, the radiological area placards were not updated. The licensee is currently addressing this problem. The inspectors will followup on the licensee's activities.

Licensee activities observed during the inspection period appeared sufficient to ensure adequate implementation of the Fire Protection

Program and Security Plan of the plant. Furthermore, health physics technicians demonstrated a consistent vigilance for changing radiological conditions. Their support and coverage of ongoing activities provided a positive contribution to the safety of plant personnel during the inspection period.

9. Exit Interview

Inspection scope/findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on February 16, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. Inspection findings were discussed in detail and the licensee acknowledged these findings. SNC did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

ITEM NUMBER	DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE
50-364/94-02-01 (URI)	NIS PR Channel Inoperability

10. Acronyms and Abbreviations

A/C	-	Air Conditioning
AFW	-	Auxiliary Feedwater
AP	-	Administrative Procedure
ASME	-	American Society of Mechanical Engineers (construction Code)
CCW	-	Component Cooling Water
CR	-	Control Room
CRT	-	Cathode Ray Tube
EDG	-	Emergency Diesel Generator
DEH	-	Digital-Electro-Hydraulic System (main turbine control)
DRP	-	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	-	Division of Reactor Safety
DRSS	-	Division of Reactor Safeguards and Security
ECCS	-	Emergency Core Cooling System
EHC	-	Electro-hydraulic Control System
EM	-	Electrical Maintenance
ESF	-	Engineered Safety Features
FHP	-	Fuel Handling Procedure
FNP	-	Farley Nuclear Plant
FP	-	Fire Protection
FW	-	Feedwater
GMP	-	General Maintenance Procedure
HP	-	Health Physics
ISI	-	In-service Inspection
I&C	-	Instrumentation and Control
KW	-	Kilowatt
LCO	-	Limiting Condition for Operation
LER	-	Licensee Event Report
L/D	-	Letdown
LOSP	-	Loss of Offsite Power
MCC	-	Motor Control Center
MOV	-	Motor-Operated Valve

MSIV	-	Main Steam Isolation Valve
MTC	-	Moderator Temperature Coefficient
MW	-	Megawatt
MWR	-	Maintenance Work Request
NDE	-	Non-Destructive Examination
NCV	-	Non-cited violation
NI	-	Nuclear Instrument or NIS (system)
NRR	-	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
OOS	-	Out Of Service
PCN	-	Plant Change Notice
PM	-	Preventive Maintenance
PRF	-	Penetration Room Filtration System
psig	-	pounds per square inch
RCS	-	Reactor Coolant System
RHR	-	Residual Heat Removal
RII	-	Region 2
RO	-	Reactor Operator
RWT	-	Reactor Water Storage Tank
SBO	-	Station Blackout
SFI	-	Shift Foreman Inspecting
SFO	-	Shift Foreman Operating
SFP	-	Spent Fuel Pool
S/G	-	Steam Generator
SGFP	-	Steam Generator Feedwater Pump
SNC	-	Southern Nuclear Operating Company
SO	-	Systems Operator
SOP	-	System Operating Procedure
SRO	-	Senior Reactor Operator
SS	-	Shift Supervisor
STAR	-	"Stop", "Think", "Act", "Review"
STP	-	Surveillance Test Procedure
SW	-	Service Water System
Tavg	-	Temperature (average) in the RCS
TCN	-	Temporary Change Notice
UOP	-	Unit Operating Procedure
URI	-	Unresolved Issue
VAC	-	Volts Alternating Current
VDC	-	Voltage Direct Current