

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I | L | D | R | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | C | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | \_\_\_\_\_ | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 8 | 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | Following spurious reactor scram during normal shutdown, Operator discovered cooldown |  
0 3 | rate to be 35 degrees F. greater than limit in Tech. Spec. 3.6.A.1 of 100 degrees/hr, |  
0 4 | averaged over one hour period. Safety significance minimized since vessel to flange |  
0 5 | temp. diff. never exceeded 140 degrees F. Event is not repetitive. |

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | C | E | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | B | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | V | A | L | V | O | P | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | B | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16 |  
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 7 | 8 | 21 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 3 | 2 | 24 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 1 | 28 29 | REPORT TYPE | T | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32 |  
ACTION TAKEN | X | 13 | FUTURE ACTION | C | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | G | 0 | 8 | 0 | 44 47 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | After Emergency Cond. thermal test, condensate return vlvs. MO-101 and -109 did not |  
1 1 | seat when closed electrically. Following later scram, Unit Operator did not isolate |  
1 2 | SJAE in time to prevent excessive cooldown. Cause identified and vlvs shut locally. |  
1 3 | Operator instructed to quickly reduce stm. demand when necessary. Valve motor oper- |  
1 4 | ators will be replaced this outage. |

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | D | 23 | % POWER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator Observation | 32 |  
1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASER OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36 |  
1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39 |  
1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41 |  
1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43 |  
2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45 |

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-032/01T-0  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT-1 (ILDRS-1)  
DOCKET #050-010

On October 31, 1978, an Emergency Condenser thermal capability test (DOS 1300-1) had been completed prior to Unit shutdown for refueling and modification. During the routine shutdown operation, the reactor scrambled from a spurious spike on Channel #2. In the following hour, reactor coolant temperature dropped from 535°F to about 400°F, which exceeded the allowable cooldown rate limit of 100°F/hour specified in Technical Specification 3.6.A.1. The safety significance of the event was minimized since the reactor vessel to vessel flange temperature differential never exceeded 140°F.

After the Emergency Condenser test, condensate return valves MO-101 and MO-109 had failed to seat completely when shut electrically. This, coupled with the normal steam demand of the air ejectors, resulted in higher than anticipated steam loads and an excessive cooldown rate. When the valve failure was identified, MO-101 and MO-109 were closed locally and the cooldown rate was reduced to less than the maximum permissible.

The unit Operator was admonished to take corrective action promptly, including isolating the air ejector steam loads if necessary, to maintain the cooldown rate within acceptable limits. The valve motor operators for MO-101 and MO-109 are scheduled for replacement during the current Unit outage.