



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

A-7
Barrett

February 19, 1981

5-358

U.S. Department of Labor - OSHA
ATTN: Mr. William Murphy
Area Director
Federal Building - Room 4028
550 Main Street
Cincinnati, OH 45202

SUBJECT: Allegation received by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, concerning the use of Argon gas at the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Plant

Gentlemen:

This letter confirms the phone conversation of February 6, 1981 between Mr. John Phillips of your office and Mr. Paul A. Barrett of this office. Mr. Phillips was informed about an allegation received by the NRC, concerning the Zimmer Nuclear Plant activities, which stated:

Argon gas valves for flushing oxygen from pipes routinely are left open by the day crew, causing the night crew to be overcome by gas, a problem about which CG&E Safety Director Cummings expressed disinterest.

It is our understanding that your Department will take the necessary actions to resolve this allegation. We would appreciate receiving any documented report concerning the resolution.

If we can be of assistant, please contact us.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler
James G. Keppler
Director

cc: P. A. Barrett

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

Institute for Policy Studies

1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

7 A-8
(202) 204-9382

MEMORANDUM

To: Louis Clark

Fr: Tom Devine

Da: February 11, 1981

Re: Summary of February 1, 1981 conversation with Mr. Tom Martin

Copy of Affidavit
Control rods

On February 1, 1981 I spoke with Mr. Tom Martin to provide additional background for his April 18, 1979 affidavit. Mr. Martin has been a millwright for ten years. After being laid off from the Zimmer plant, he worked as a millwright for eleven months at Ford's Batavia transmission plant. His duties involved setting up 90% of the laser measurement quality control testing machines at the plant.

Mr. Martin is anxious to speak at length with NRC investigators. He testified at a 1979 NRC hearing but complains that due to successful objections from utility lawyers, he was unable to present his evidence or explanations of faulty control rods at Zimmer. He also informed me that he can refer NRC investigators to a series of additional witnesses, including a millwright with 50 years experience, and two other employees whose affidavits we sent to the NRC--Messrs. Gorman Reynolds and Robert Anderson.

Mr. Martin provided some background explanation for the charges in his 1979 affidavit. The control rods are the key to shutting down the reactor. If they are larger than specifications, the rods could expand during high temperatures in an accident and fuse with the reactor vessel. This development could cause a meltdown. He added that the wrong type of gauge was used to measure the rods.

Mr. Martin is especially concerned that the new millwrights who replaced those from his firm did not check the allegedly faulty control rods. Instead, in violation of the rules, Kaiser's own quality control employees inspected the suspect components.

Mr. Martin added some brief explanation for the significance of Reynolds' and Anderson's charges. The leaks in the door units at the pump house are significant because that room has the motor for the pumps that control the plant's cooling system. The leaking door units in the reactor building compromise the hub of the whole plant and could allow water to enter the control room.

The metal shavings in the control rods represent a different potential problem. The shavings could flow through the system, clogging valves and pumps.

Mr. Martin is anxiously awaiting the arrival of the NRC investigating team.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

Institute for Policy Studies
1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 204-9382

MEMORANDUM

To: Louis Clark, Director
Fr: Tom Devine, Associate Director
Da: February 11, 1981
Re: Summary of February 1, 1981 Telephone Interview
with Mr. Vic Griffin

I. INTRODUCTION

I called and spoke with Mr. Vic Griffin on February 1, 1981, the day after my return from Cincinnati. Mr. Griffin is the 61 year old Kaiser Quality Assurance Engineer who resigned in early 1976. He left immediately after he went public with his concerns over a phony quality control system and faulty essential components at Zimmer. Mr. Griffin emphasized three topics during our discussion-- circumvention of sound quality control techniques; damaged or potentially damaged essential components that may still be in place at Zimmer and possibly other plants; and a superficial NRC white-wash of his charges after a brief "investigation" by Region III's Gerald Phillips.

Mr. Griffin wants to speak with new NRC investigators who will thoroughly pursue the charges that worry him. He promised to do his best to help locate other employee witnesses. He said that employees speak freely at bars about the problems at Zimmer. For instance, one employee discussed an unreported blowout after an uncertified welder attempted to repair a heat exchanger. But due to fear of reprisal and past NRC breaches of confidentiality, employees are afraid that speaking to the Commission is like turning information over to the owner. I informed Mr. Griffin of the Commission's specific confidentiality pledges for this investigation.

II. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Griffin worked in quality control for 20 years before he resigned in October 1972 to take a job with Kaiser Engineering at Zimmer. He worked with Kaiser for 3.5 years. On February 22, 1976, the day after he spoke with NRC investigator Phillips, Griffin resigned. He quit because it was obvious the Commission would not pursue his charges seriously. He wanted to avoid the untenable situation of being a whistleblower at Zimmer when his

allegations were about to be brushed aside by the government. In short, his aim was to leave before the inevitable dismissal on pretextual grounds. Kaiser refused to accept his resignation for a week, and his supervisor informed Phillips that Griffin was a "damn good engineer." But Griffin's supervisor also alerted him that Kaiser couldn't back him indefinitely and the resignation was accepted.

Currently Mr. Griffin works as an independant quality control contractor. His current job is to inspect components for defense weapons manufactured by the Honeywell Corporation.

III. CIRCUMVENTION OF STANDARD QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES

The bulk of Mr. Griffin's concerns involved the quality control system for essential, or "critical," components at the plant. He defined critical components as those whose failure could interfere with the safe shutdown of the plant. These include parts such as pumps, valves and switchboxes. Non-essential components will not prevent a shutdown, but their failure could still be very dangerous.

Griffin first became aware of structural quality control problems about two to three weeks after he started work at Zimmer. John Jackson, Kaiser's corporate manager of quality control out of Oakland, California, reported disturbing news to Griffin. The utility, Cincinnati Gas and Electric ("CG&E"), had just announced that it would replace Kaiser in handling quality control for purchases of critical components from suppliers. The only exception was that Kaiser would be permitted to inspect for identification and transit damage. Mr. Jackson was upset, because General Electric ("GE") was the only supplier of critical components that had its own quality control program.

The problem was that CG&E did not perform independant inspections on those suppliers who lacked internal quality control. In fact, CG&E was satisfied with paperwork checks. Contrary to the standard quality control process, it flatly refused to inspect components itself or to allow Kaiser to conduct inspections at the manufacturing sites. The utility's excuse was that "we have to put our trust in the manufacturers." CG&E was satisfied to call up other utilities and obtain telephone references on the suppliers. Griffin explained to me that this practice of trusting the paperwork would turn the blood of any quality control engineer in the country to ice. He told CG&E officials, "I'm not worried about the paperwork blowing up." He noted that the "trust" approach violated the AEC requirements, but the Commission winked at the practice.

To add insult to injury, Mr. Griffin pointed out that frequently the paperwork was not even checked for up to 1.5 years. When CG&E did stumble across a faulty component, routinely the

utility would simply return the part to the vendor and fail to file a nonconformance report with the AEC.

Another quality control circumvention technique involved collusion with Kaiser. CG&E would order components as non-critical and then upgrade them to critical status at the site. Kaiser's then site manager for quality control, Mr. Bill Friedrig, routinely upgraded whatever parts CG&E requested.

Mr. Griffin emphasized that the defense industry does not engage in the same quality control shortcuts he observed at Zimmer. He explained that GE sends field inspectors right to the vendors' plants to inspect jet engines. He concluded that if the quality control for nuclear plants were 1/10th as effective as that for 120 millimeter cannon shells, he wouldn't be nearly so concerned.

Based on Mr. Griffin's observations, the NRC should conduct a thorough review of all components which have been returned to vendors or upgraded at the site, since construction began. Further, the utility should be ordered to contract with outside quality control experts to independantly inspect all critical components received from suppliers other than GE. I doubt that the citizens of Cincinnati would trust the manufacturers of essential safety systems which remain untested today.

IV. EXAMPLES OF SUSPECT COMPONENTS

To illustrate his critique, Mr. Griffin discussed two specific examples of dubious critical components. The control rod drive pump activites the control rods. These rods control the heat levels in the reactor. The pump is sensitive and is supposed to be stored in a temperature-controlled room. The temperature controls are necessary to prevent condensation which could damage the parts. At Brown's Ferry, the drive pump was the essential component that finally worked, preventing a bad fire from causing a meltdown.

Mr. Griffin was upset that the control rod drive pump at Zimmer was missing. He eventually found the pump outside in the mud under a trailer. CG&E consented to a superficial "pre-op" test to check whether the pump had broken down yet. But there was never any independent inspection to see whether its long-term reliability had been compromised. Mr. Griffin fears that the pump may not operate effectively in any Brown's Ferry-type emergency that occurs a few years down the road.

Similarly, CG&E kept other uninspected critical components in unheated rooms, in violation of safety requirements. Finally, in January or February 1973 the utility installed portable heaters. Again, however, there was no inspection for structural damage that might have occurred already.

Mr. Griffin's second major example involves the "Nash condensor," used with the terry turbine. These components are also essential to prevent a meltdown. Griffin opened the package to check for transit damage and saw that the motor had broken off. The problem was a "core-shift"--the component had cracked and fallen apart because the circular metal in the condensor was not even all around.

Although Mr. Griffin wrote up the incident, he charges that CG&E violated AEC requirements to report it as a "significant event." Mr. Griffin thinks it is significant for nuclear plants around the country if Nash condensers can't survive a truck ride.

V. EXPERIENCES WITH THE NRC

Mr. Griffin recalls that on February 21, 1976 he discussed the above problems for three hours with NRC investigator Gerald Phillips and two aides. Phillips was courteous and the aides took notes. But after Phillips explained he was a non-technical man and would require simplified explanations, Griffin became concerned that the NRC would not pursue his charges aggressively.

Mr. Griffin's fears soon were confirmed. Other plant employees told him that Phillips conducted no independent inspection. Instead, he merely reviewed the paperwork and obtained responses from CG&E and Kaiser officials. Mr. Griffin was not invited to point out the violations at the site. At a press conference after Phillips' review, an NRC spokesman said that Griffin's complaints were accurate, but no violation of NRC regulations had occurred. Griffin disagrees with this conclusion, since he was familiar with the regulations in question. At any rate, he contends that the problems were so serious in terms of potential safety defects that the surrounding population remains vulnerable to disaster.

VI. CONCLUSION

Mr. Griffin is an extremely credible witness. He had no axe to grind when he went public. Part of his continuing concern apparently stems from the location of his home. He lives two miles from Zimmer, overlooking the plant's cooling towers. His primary theme is that there is no margin for error in critical components at nuclear plants. In his opinion, CG&E is not close to meeting that standard.

Mr. Griffin was careful not to overstate his case. He told me that he never makes a statement he can't prove; because "you can be right 99 times and wrong once, and they'll kill you." He informed me that a GAO report on Zimmer backed his charges in 1977 and 1978. Pat Ruble should obtain a copy.

Mr. Griffin's experience is also valuable because it foreshadowed the experiences of Applegate and others. For example,

Kellogg's faulty prefabricated piping welds are more understandable in light of CG&E's refusal to conduct quality control inspections at the Kellogg plant. Similarly, Phillips' "paperwork-management chat" inspection mirrors his response to Applegate's allegations.

Finally, many of the suspect components exposed by Mr. Griffin still may be faulty. CG&E installed them without normal testing. The parts have just sat in the plant for five to eight years as dormant threats to the local population.

Based on Mr. Griffin's credibility, the fundamental nature of his charges and the scope of his allegations, his evidence could make a strong case for suspending CG&E's construction permit. If Griffin's charges are correct, Zimmer is packed with essential components which have never been adequately inspected. The NRC should perform or order a through, independent inspection of these components throughout the plant. In many cases, it will be the first time that CG&E's "trust" in the manufacturers will have been checked.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

APR 21 1981

A-9 Barrett

766 form

Attached

Docket No. 50-358

Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Earl A. Borgmann
Senior Vice President
Engineering Services and
Electric Production
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Gentlemen:

This refers to the Enforcement Conference conducted at our office in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, by Mr. J. G. Keppler and others of this office on April 10, 1981. The purpose of the conference was to discuss CG&E's proposed corrective action program for deficiencies identified to date in the current NRC investigations and the measures to be taken to assure acceptable quality of future activities of the Zimmer project. The enclosed copy of the report of the meeting identifies areas discussed.

Based on our understanding of the discussions held at our Region III office, you will provide a written program dealing with the corrective action program as discussed in Details Section 2, and you will review and revise, as necessary, your program in the event additional adverse conditions are found.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed Enforcement Conference report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room, except as follows. If this report contains information that you or your contractors believe to be proprietary, you must apply in writing to this office, within twenty days of your receipt of this letter, to withhold such information from public disclosure. The application must include a full statement of the reasons for which the information is considered proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in an enclosure to the application.

~~8106080452~~

Cincinnati Gas and Electric
Company

- 2 -

APR 21 1981

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this meeting.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler
Director

Enclosure: IE Inspection
Report No. 50-358/81-14

cc w/encl:
J. R. Schott, Plant
Superintendent
Central Files
Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
AEOD
Resident Inspector, RIII
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC
Harold W. Kohn, Power
Siting Commission
Citizens Against a Radioactive
Environment
Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio

RIII
JB
Barrett/jp
4/16/81

RIII
WJ
Williams

RIII
A
Spessard

RIII
RFW
Warnick

RIII
M
Moffett
4/20/81

RIII
S
Davis
4/20/81

RIII
S
Keppler
4/20/81

IF

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-358/81-14

Docket No. 50-358

Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Facility Name: Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station

Enforcement Conference At: Region III Office in Glen Ellyn, IL

Enforcement Conference Conducted: April 10, 1981

Prepared By: *P. A. Barrett*
P. A. Barrett

4/17/81

Approved By: *R.F. Warnick*
R. F. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2B

4/17/81

Enforcement Conference Summary

Enforcement Conference on April 10, 1981 (Report No. 50-358/81-14)

Conference Subject: Discussion of CG&E's proposed corrective action program for deficiencies identified to date in the current NRC investigation of the Zimmer project and the measures to be taken to assure acceptable quality of future activities.

8106080458

DETAILS

1. Attendees

Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company

E. A. Borgmann, Senior Vice President
W. D. Waymire, Manager of General Engineering
W. W. Schweirs, Manager of Quality Assurance
B. K. Culver, Manager of Generation Construction

H. J. Kaiser Company

J. P. Coyle, Vice President, Power Division

NRC

J. G. Keppler, Director, IE-RIII
J. H. Sniezek, Director, Division of Regional and Resident Inspection,
IE-HQ
A. B. Davis, Deputy Director, IE-RIII
R. F. Warnick, Chief of Reactor Projects Section 2B, IE-RIII
P. A. Barrett, Principal Inspector, IE-RIII
J. B. McCarten, Principal Investigator, IE-RIII
F. T. Daniels, Senior Resident Inspector, IE-RIII
J. F. Streeter, Director, Enforcement & Investigation Staff, IE-RIII
G. Fiorelli, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects, IE-RIII
J. Lieberman, Deputy Chief Counsel for Enforcement, OLED-HQ
J. B. Henderson, Project Section of Resident & Regional Reactor
Inspection, IE-HQ
R. L. Spessard, Branch Chief, DETI, IE-RIII
L. G. McGregor, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, IE-RIII
J. A. Hind, Director, Operation Support, IE-RIII
W. H. Schultz, Acting Enforcement Coordinator, IE-RIII

2. Enforcement Conference

The conference was held in the NRC Region III office in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, to discuss Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company's proposed corrective action program for the deficiencies identified to date in the current NRC investigations, and the additional measures to be taken to assure acceptable quality of future activities.

The deficiencies were identified in the following areas: Structural welds, contractor QA program, traceability of materials, cable and weld inspections, nonconformances, FSAR commitments, design control of cable systems, corrective actions, audits, and design change control.

The licensee presented a program which would require extensive and timely inspections of plant hardware and complete detailed reviews of quality documentation. The inspection and review efforts would be performed by qualified personnel and closely monitored by CG&E's upper management. The efforts would be explicitly documented to show the basic causes for the deficiencies; the extent and significance of the deficiencies considering the basic causes; and the corrective actions taken with regard to both the causes and the effects.

The licensee also presented additional measures to assure quality in all future activities (including rework, reinspections, and remaining original activities). The measures include increased staffing, inspections, comprehensive audits, and training; redefining of duties, responsibilities and authorities; and establishment of structure and effective communication channels.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT - STATISTICAL DATA

FACILITY NAME <u>Zimmer</u>		INSPECTOR(S) <u>J.G. Kojder</u>		PRINCIPAL INSPECTOR <u>FB</u>	
LICENSEE/VENDOR <u>C.G. 46</u>		<u>P. W. ...</u>		REVIEWER <u>RW</u>	
AE	TRANS-ACTION TYPE 1 (CHECK ONE)	DOCKET NUMBER (A)	REPORT NO. (B)	DATES INQ/INVEST/INSP FROM (C)	REGION CONDUCTING ACTIVITY (E)
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INSPECTION PERFORMED BY: 32					
F 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGIONAL OFFICE STAFF 2 <input type="checkbox"/> RESIDENT INSPECTOR					
3 <input type="checkbox"/> PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL TEAM					
TYPE OF ACTIVITY CONDUCTED (CHECK ONE BOX ONLY): 33-34					
G 02 <input type="checkbox"/> SAFETY 03 <input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT 04 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ENFORCEMENT		05 <input type="checkbox"/> MANAGEMENT AUDIT 06 <input type="checkbox"/> MANAGEMENT VISIT 07 <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL 08 <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR		09 <input type="checkbox"/> MATL ACCT. 10 <input type="checkbox"/> PLANT SEC. 11 <input type="checkbox"/> INVENT. VERIF. 12 <input type="checkbox"/> SHIPMENT/EXPORT	
				13 <input type="checkbox"/> IMPORT 14 <input type="checkbox"/> INQUIRY 15 <input type="checkbox"/> INVESTIGATION (IF INVEST. ALSO CHECK BLOCK S)	
H 35 INSPECTION OR INVESTIGATION WARNING: 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ANNOUNCED 2 <input type="checkbox"/> UNANNOUNCED					
I 36 INSPECTION SHIFT: 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DAY SHIFT 2 <input type="checkbox"/> OFF-SHIFT 3 <input type="checkbox"/> WEEKEND/HOLIDAY					
J 37 INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION NOTIFICATION (CHECK ONE BOX ONLY)					
1 <input type="checkbox"/> 591 2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGIONAL OFFICE LETTER 3 <input type="checkbox"/> REFERRED TO HQS FOR ACTION 4 <input type="checkbox"/> REGION LETTER & HQS FOR ACTION					
K 38 INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION FINDINGS (CHECK ONE BOX ONLY)					
1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLEAR 2 <input type="checkbox"/> NONCOMPLIANCE 3 <input type="checkbox"/> DEVIATION 4 <input type="checkbox"/> NONCOMPLIANCE & DEVIATION					
L 39 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE HELD: 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 39					
M 40 41 NUMBER OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMS IN LETTER TO LICENSEE:		42 43		NOTE: CHANGE MUST BE SUBMITTED ON 766 WHENEVER PREVIOUSLY CITED ITEM OF NONCOMPLIANCE IS OFFICIALLY DELETED FROM THE RECORD.	
N 42 43 NUMBER OF DEVIATION ITEMS IN LETTER TO LICENSEE:		44 45			
O 44 45 NUMBER OF LICENSEE EVENTS		46 47			
P 46 INSPECTION FEE: 1 <input type="checkbox"/> NON-ROUTINE/VENDOR (No Fee) 2 <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE (No Fee) 3 <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE (Fee) 4 <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE (Fee Reduced)					
Q 47 CONTENTS 2.790D INFORMATION: <input type="checkbox"/> YES					
R REGIONAL OFFICE LETTER OR REPORT TRANSMITTAL DATE FOR INSPECTION OR INVESTIGATION					
591 OR LETTER ISSUED TO LICENSEE (48 53)		REPORT SENT TO HQS FOR ACTION (54 59)		IMMEDIATE ACTION LETTER (60 65)	
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S SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION (CHECK ONE BOX ONLY) 66-67					
TYPE A 10 CFR 20.403		TYPE B 10 CFR 20.405		MISC.	
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T HEADQUARTERS ENTRIES					
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U DATE HQS ENFORCEMENT LETTER, NOTICE, ORDER ISSUED:		70 75			
V CIVIL PENALTY ISSUED: 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 76		77 80			
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT LICENSEE MEETING

Name of Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company

Name of Facility: Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station

Docket No.: 50-358

Date and Time of Meeting: May 18, 1981, 10:00 a.m.

Location of Meeting: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Purpose of Meeting: Discuss the NRC investigation and CG&E's proposed corrective action program for deficiencies identified to date.

IE Attendees:

J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III
A. B. Davis, Deputy Director, Region III
R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B
✓ P. A. Barrett, Reactor Inspector, Region III
F. T. Daniels, Senior Resident Inspector

Licensee Attendees:

E. A. Borgmann, Vice President, Engineering Services and Electrical Production and other members of CG&E management as designated by the licensee.

Note: Attendance by NRC personnel at the IE/licensee meeting should be made known by 3:00 p.m., May 15, 1981, via telephone call to R. F. Warnick, RIII, FTS 384-2541

Distribution:

J. H. Sniezek, Director, Division of Resident and Regional Reactor Inspection
E. L. Jordan, Deputy Director, Division of Resident and Regional Reactor Inspection, IE
D. Thompson, Director, Enforcement and Investigation, IE
R. L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing, NRR
A. Schwencer, Chief, Licensing Branch 2, NRR
I. A. Peltier, Project Manager, Licensing Branch 2, NRR
J. P. Murray, Director, Rulemaking and Enforcement Division, ELD



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

MAY 6 1981

Docket No. 50-358

Cincinnati Gas and Electric
Company
ATTN: Mr. Earl A. Borgmann
Senior Vice President
Engineering Services and
Electric Production
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Gentlemen:

This letter is to confirm the meeting with you and members of your staff at 10:00 a.m. and with Mr. Dickhoner at 1:00 p.m. on May 18, 1981, in your corporate office in Cincinnati.

The purpose of this enforcement meeting is to discuss the NRC investigation at Zimmer and Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company's proposed corrective action program.

Personnel from the NRC presently planning to attend include J. G. Keppler, A. B. Davis, R. F. Warnick, P. A. Barrett, and F. T. Daniels.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this meeting.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "A Bert Davis".

for James G. Keppler
Director

cc: Mr. J. R. Schott, Plant
Superintendent
Central Files
Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
AEOD
Resident Inspector, RIII
PDR
LPDR
NSIC
TIC
Harold W. Kohn, Power
Siting Commission
Citizens Against a Radioactive
Environment
Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio

~~8105120040~~



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

P Barrett
A-11

June 26, 1981

Docket No. 50-358

Cincinnati Gas and Electric
Company
ATTN: Mr. Earl A. Borgmann
Senior Vice President
Engineering Services and
Electric Production
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Gentlemen:

This refers to the meetings held on June 2, 1981, at the Zimmer site between Messrs. Warnick, Waymire and others and on June 3, 1981, at CG&E Corporate Headquarters between Messrs. Keppler, Dickhoner and others to discuss the proposed program to confirm the quality of completed construction work at the Zimmer site.

The subjects discussed during the meetings are included in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Meeting Report which is enclosed with this letter.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed meeting report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you or your contractors believe to be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by telephone within seven (7) days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withholding; and (b) submit within twenty-five (25) days from the date of this letter a written application to this office to withhold such information. Section 2.790(b)(1) requires that any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and which contains a full statement of the reasons on the basis which it is claimed that the information should be withheld from public disclosure. This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4). The information sought

~~8107100156~~

Cincinnati Gas and Electric
Company

- 2 -

June 26, 1981

to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit. If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this report.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler
Director

Enclosure: IE Meeting
Report No. 50-358/81-20

cc w/encl:
J. R. Schott, Plant
Superintendent
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII
Harold W. Kohn, Power
Siting Commission
Citizens Against a Radioactive
Environment
Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio

RIII *PLW*
Warnick/db
6/23/81

RIII *A*
Heishman
6/24/81

RIII
PB 6/24/81
B. ...

RIII
A
Davis
6/24

RIII
JK
Keppler
6/25/81

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-358/81-20

Docket No. 50-358

License No. CPPR-88

Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Facility Name: Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station

Meetings At: Wm. H. Zimmer site, Moscow, OH and
CG&E Corporate office, Cincinnati, OH

Meetings Conducted: June 2-3, 1981

Meeting Attendees: *P. A. Barrett*
P. A. Barrett
Reactor Inspector

6/24/81

R F Warnick
R. F. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2B

6/23/81

A B Davis
A. B. Davis
Deputy Director

6/24/81

J. G. Keppler
J. G. Keppler
Director

6/25/81

Approved By: *B. S. Weisman*
B. S. Weisman, Acting Director
Division of Resident and
Project Inspection

6/24/81

Meeting Summary

Meetings on June 2 and 3, 1981 (Report No. 50-358/81-20)

Meetings Subject: Meetings were held onsite on June 2 and at CG&E Corporate Headquarters on June 3, 1981, to discuss the proposed program to confirm the quality of completed construction work at the Zimmer site. A total of 20 NRC man-hours were involved in the two meetings.

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DETAILS

1. Persons In Attendance

a. Meeting June 2, 1981 at Zimmer Site

Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company

W. D. Waymire, Manager, General Engineering Department and
Acting Manager, Quality Assurance
J. R. Schott, Plant Manager
S. C. Swain, Manager, Site Construction
M. J. Rulli, Nuclear Engineer
J. F. Shaffer, Chief Draftsman
J. C. Buck, QA Engineer
R. J. Reiman, Senior Electric Power Plant Engineer
L. C. Albers, Electrical Engineer

Kaiser Engineers, Inc.

D. L. Howard, Director, QA Programs
P. Kyner, Site QA Manager
R. W. D'Arcy, Manager, Site QA Documentation

Sargent and Lundy

M. E. Schuster, Head, Quality Control Division
R. J. Pruski, Project Manager
A. K. Singh, Assistant Head, Structural Analytical Division

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B
P. A. Barrett, Principal Inspector, Zimmer
F. T. Daniels, Senior Resident Inspector

b. Meeting June 3, 1981 at CG&E Corporate Office

Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company

W. H. Dickhoner, President, CG&E
E. A. Borgmann, Senior Vice President, Engineering Services and
Electrical Production
W. D. Waymire, Manager, General Engineering Department, and
Acting Manager, Quality Assurance

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III
A. B. Davis, Deputy Director, Region III
R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B

2. Working Level Meeting - June 2, 1981

A working level meeting was held on June 2, 1981, at the Zimmer site to discuss the licensee's proposed quality confirmation program and the additional measures Region III will require to identify and correct construction deficiencies, to establish confidence in quality control records, and to verify the quality of existing construction.

The quality confirmation program includes the following:

- a. Structural Steel Construction
- b. Subcontractor QA Programs
- c. Material Traceability - Heat Numbers on Piping
- d. Nonconformance Reporting
- e. Inspection of Painted Welds
- f. Radiograph Technique - Shimmiing the Penetrometer
- g. Electrical Cable Separation
- h. Design Calculation and Verification
- i. Audits
- j. Deleted Weld Inspection Criteria
- k. Socket Weld Fit-Ups
- l. Weld Quality
- m. Design Document Changes

3. Management Meeting - June 3, 1981

The Region III Director, Deputy Director and Section Chief in charge of the NRC investigation at Zimmer met with CG&E's President, Senior Vice President of Engineering Services and Electrical Production, and the Manager of the General Engineering Department who is also the Acting Manager of Quality Assurance. The meeting was held on June 3, 1981, to discuss matters relating to the NRC's ongoing Zimmer investigation. Topics discussed included the originating allegations; NRC findings relative to the allegations; problems identified during the investigation; the NRC's Immediate Action Letter of April 8, 1981, establishing controls to assure the quality of ongoing and future work; the program to confirm the quality of completed work; the licensee's internal problem identification and resolution system; status of the NRC's investigation; the role of NRC's Office of Inspector and Auditor in the investigation; and public and congressional interest in the Zimmer project.

A-12 Barrett



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

MAY 28 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. F. Heishman, Acting Director, Division of Resident
and Project Inspection
J. F. Streeter, Acting Director, Enforcement and
Investigation Staff

FROM: A. Bert Davis, Deputy Director

SUBJECT: GAP LETTER REQUESTING WORK STOPPAGE AT ZIMMER

In your response to this request from GAP, please include the following thoughts. If you disagree with them, please discuss your disagreements with me.

1. State that the GAP submittal has been reviewed for any new information. If there is new information, identify it and state that the information will be pursued.
2. State that at this time we believe there is no basis for stopping work at Zimmer. Rather than stopping work, the important considerations are:
 - a. To assure future work is properly controlled,
 - b. to assure past quality problems are corrected,
 - c. to assure that any ongoing work will not compromise the correction of past quality problems.
3. State that actions have been taken or are in progress to assure these considerations are met. Should the licensee fail in either consideration 2.a. or 2.b. or if consideration 2.c. becomes a problem, the need for stopping work will be reconsidered.

If you have any questions on the information contained above, I will be pleased to discuss it with you. I suggest we plan to send our reply letter to GAP by June 12, 1981.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. Bert Davis".

A. Bert Davis
Deputy Director

cc: C. E. Norelius
R. F. Warnick
J. B. McCarten
LP. A. Barrett

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