

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report of Construction Inspection

Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45201

Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station
Moscow, Ohio


License No. CPPR-88
Category: A

Type of Licensee: BWR (GE) 807 MWe

Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced


Dates of Inspection: September 23-24, 1975

Principal Inspector: T. E. Vandell




10-14-75
(Date)

Accompanying Inspector: W. J. Key



10-14-75
(Date)

Other Accompany Personnel: None

Reviewed By: 
D. W. Hayes, Senior Inspector
Construction and Engineering
Support Branch

10/14/75
(Date)

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Summary

Inspection on September 23-24 (75-05): Reviewed corrective actions established in response letter to enforcement matters identified in a previous report (050-358/75-03). Routine inspection of safety related piping procedures, work practices and records. One deficiency matter was identified by the inspector and was discussed with the licensee relative to lack of procedure compliance for weld rod storage.

Enforcement Items

Deficiencies

Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, approved procedures were not being compiled with relative to weld rod storage. (Report Details, Paragraph 5.d)

This deficiency was identified by the inspector.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

The infractions identified in IE Inspection Report No. 050-358/75-03 and the corrective action outlined in the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CG&E) letter of response dated June 19, 1975 were reviewed during the inspection. The inspector determined that the corrective action outlined in the letter had been completed. (Report Details, Paragraph 4)

Other Significant Items

A. Systems and Components

1. The inspector was informed that the Aycock Company, contracted to provide the installation of the reactor pressure vessel, has experienced damage to its erections equipment at another site and presently the licensee said that it is doubtful whether the previously established schedule can be maintained. Other alternatives are under consideration by the licensee management including consideration of other companies.
2. A utility representative stated that they wished to inform the NRC that a reactor pressure vessel feedwater nozzle safe end is to be replaced before vessel installation. They added that this is a generic problem that has previously been reported to

the Commission by General Electric Co. and that they planned to submit a report relevant for Zimmer in compliance with the requirements of part 50.55(e) at the appropriate time. The inspector indicated that this notification would be considered responsive for the prompt notification requirement.

- B. Facility Items (Plans and Procedures)
None.
- C. Managerial Items
None.
- D. Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by the Licensee
None.
- E. Deviations
None.
- F. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
None.

Management Interview

- A. The following persons attended a management interview held at the conclusion of the inspection at the Zimmer site.

Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (CG&E)

E. C. Pandorf, Principal Quality Assurance and Standards Engineer
W. W. Schiviers, Field Project Engineer
J. H. Hoffman, Field Quality Assurance Engineer
R. L. Wood, Quality Assurance Engineer

Kaiser Engineers Incorporated (KEI)

W. J. Friedrich, Quality Assurance Manager - Site
H. R. Good, Inspection Supervisor

B. Matters discussed and comments, on the part of management, were as follows:

1. The inspector commented that the previously identified infractions of the Inland-Ryerson quality assurance program appear to have been satisfactorily resolved. He added that the licensee letter of response outlining the corrective action to be under taken was determined to have been complied with and now appears complete.
2. Review of a nonconformance report (NCR number E-262) relative to unconsolidated areas of a concrete wall pour in the diesel generator rooms appears to be adequately controlled and the inspector stated that he had no further questions.
3. The inspector stated that he had completed a review of the reactor pressure vessel handling, storage, storage inspections and records and that he had no adverse comment or further questions.
4. The inspector said that his understanding was that the vessel handling contract for installation of the vessel was under study by the utility and that future developments and scheduling information would be made available to the NRC. A utility representative said that they would keep the inspectors informed and that they would provide as much notice time as possible. Additionally he stated that CG&E wants to adhere to the installation completion date of December 1, 1975, however, it is unclear at this time if this is possible.
5. The inspector stated that as a result of review of: (1) procedures for safety related piping, (2) observations of completed welding work, and (3) records review, he wished to identify two problem areas.
 - a. first it appears that a Peabody Testing Laboratory nondestructive testing technician (Level II) appears to be unqualified for the radiographic inspection of the welds, and that,
 - b. secondly, an example was observed where stainless and low hydrogen carbon weld rod were being stored in the same rod heating oven, contrary to an approved procedure requirement.

The utility representatives stated that for the first comment they are sure that adequate documentation exists of the technician qualifications and that they would obtain from the testing company the latest valid certification information which should establish the technicians qualifications. (Subsequent to the inspections, a valid certification was made available to the inspection, resolving the concern). They stated also that action would be taken to correct the conditions identified by the second comment. The inspector said that this item will be noted as a deficiency in the report of inspection and that the utility would be requested to respond in writing as to the disposition of the item.

REPORT DETAILS

Persons Contacted

The following persons in addition to the individuals listed under the Management Interview section of this report, were contacted during the inspection.

Kaiser Engineers, Incorporated (KEI)

V. P. McMahon, Corporate QA Manager
C. L. Whitford, Corporate Quality Assurance
C. M. Makowsky, Quality Assurance Documentation Review Engineer
C. Cech, NDE-Welding Quality Assurance Engineer
M. G. Franchuk, Mechanical Quality Assurance Engineer
M. R. Gandert, Civil Quality Assurance Engineer

Inland-Ryerson, Incorporated (IR)

R. DeCheske, Supervisor Quality Assurance Corporate Office

Peabody Testing Laboratory

K. Bronder, Supervisor

Results of Inspection

1. Project Status

The August monthly progress report showed a project construction completion figure in excess of 35%. Additionally, it was reported that the AE design effort was approximately 88% complete. Priority is being placed on construction activities that must be completed prior to the reactor vessel installation.

2. Reactor Vessel Storage

The QA/QC procedure for the reactor pressure vessel storage (QACINI No. M-1 Rev. 3) reviewed by the inspector for adequate handling, protection, and storage activities and for record keeping requirements. The stored vessel was observed to be stored in accordance with the approved procedure, internal atmospheric conditions were observed being measured, the external protection and dunnage supports appeared adequate.

Records were reviewed of the QC inspections performed covering reactor vessel storage and it was determined that the frequency of inspections as well as the assurance of maintenance of protection requirements were adequate.

Records reviewed included:

- a. access control logs
- b. daily inspection logs
- c. recorder strip charts for three temperature locations inside the vessel and for outside ambient temperature, as well as wet and dry bulb.
- d. audit report No. 196 covering an internal inspections of the vessel.

It was noted that colored indication lights were arranged to be visible from the guard house and offices that provided an instant visual signal in the event of any problem such as loss of reactor pressure vessel heat or loss of building pressurization.

No problem areas were identified.

3. Nonconformance Report

As a result of information provided to the inspector, a review was conducted of a concrete pour nonconformance identified by NCR number E-262 dated July 25, 1975. Three unconsolidated areas and a void area were identified in the report for an essential concrete pour number BW3-8DG. (An interior wall pour from the Diesel Generator rooms located in the auxiliary building). The NCR was submitted to Sargent and Lundy (S&L) the design engineer for review and disposition. Review had been conducted and disposition established and approved by S&L on September 11, 1975 with concurrent approvals by CG&E and KEI personnel completed September 16, 1975. Corrective repair was in progress during this inspection in accordance with the NRC disposition but not yet complete. In addition, the inspector was informed that a work order, No. 2127, had been issued for performing a core boring through the worse unconsolidated area to be tested for further assurance of adequate compressive strength of the remaining concrete. The inspector concluded that adequate control was being exercised and that no degradation of quality was involved.

4. Inland-Ryerson QA Program

Review was conducted of the revised Inland-Ryerson (IR) QA manual to determine the corrective action completion relative to the commitments outlined in the CG&E letter of response dated June 19, 1975. The reviewed program was approved by CG&E on September 19, 1975, and revisions consisted of: (1) Organization charts, (2) modified non-conformance and corrective action control, and (3) a training and qualification program addition.

In addition, the auditing question is resolved by addition of the management audits requirement to the manual. Also, previously unavailable audits reports have been made available at the site locations and these reports have been reviewed by utility personnel. These two infractions, originally identified in IE report No. 050-358/75-03, are considered to be resolved.

5. Safety Related Piping

A review was conducted of safety related piping covering QA/QC procedures, qualification, nondestructive examinations, and records. The results of the review is as follows:

a. Procedures Review

The following Kaiser Welding and nondestructive test procedures were reviewed with no problem areas identified.

- (1) SPPM #3.1.37 - Rev. 0 dated July 21, 1975, Welding procedure specification for austenitic stainless steel piping.
- (2) SPPM #3.1.38 - Rev. 1 dated July 21, 1975, Welding procedure specification for carbon steel pipe.
- (3) SPPM #4.0 - General NDE procedure.
- (4) SPPM #4.1 - Rev. 1 dated June 10, 1974, Radiographic examination procedure.
- (5) SPPM #4.2 - Rev. 1 dated June 10, 1974, Liquid penetrant examination procedure.
- (6) SPPM #4.3 - Rev. 1 dated June 10, 1974, Ultrasonic examination procedure.

(7) SPPM #4.4 - Rev. 1 dated June 10, 1974, Magnetic particle examination procedure.

(8) SPPM #4.5 - Rev. 1 dated March 18, 1975, Personnel qualification procedure.

b. Qualification of NDE & Welding Personnel

A review, by the inspector, of NDE personnel qualification documentation for Kaiser & Peabody Test Lab. indicated conformance to the requirements of SNT-TC-1A, it's supplements and appendices. Site records were considered to be in order.

A review of the qualification for three welders who performed the safety related work completed to date indicated that they were qualified for the procedures used.

c. Inspection of Completed Work

The inspector visually inspected the welds of the elbows to the isolation valves, reviewed the radiographs and documentation records of this work. All records appeared to be in order, and no problem areas were identified.

d. Observation - Weld Rod Storage Control

During review of weld rod storage control it was noted that low hydrogen carbon weld rod (7018) was being stored in the same rod heating oven with stainless steel rod. This practice is contrary to requirements of Kaiser Engineers Incorporated Weld Filler Metal Control Procedure No. SPPM 3.3, Rev. 4, and in noncompliance with Criterion V, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

IE III A-31
75-05

Nov. 11, 1975

LOCAL PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOMS

Enclosed are copies of documents listed below relating to
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, Docket
No(s). 50-358.

Letter to Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company from D. M. Hunnicutt
dtd October 16, 1975, with IE Inspection Report No. 050-358/75-05.

Reply from Mr. Earl A. Borgmann, dated October 29, 1975.

Letter to Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company from D. M. Hunnicutt
dated November 11, 1975.

This correspondence is submitted pursuant to arrangements made by
the Public Proceedings Branch, Office of the Secretary, for use by
the public.

Where possible, these materials should be punched and filed in a
folder labeled as follows:

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