



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

AUG 24 1978

Report Nos.: 50-250/78-17 and 50-251/78-17

Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Category: C

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company  
P. O. Box 013100  
9250 West Flagler Street  
Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4

Inspection at: Homestead, Florida

Inspection conducted: July 18-19, 1978

Inspector: D. E. Moore

Reviewed by: F. P. Gillespie, Chief  
Security and Investigation Section  
Safeguards Branch

8/23/78  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection July 18-19, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-250/78-17 and 50-251/78-17)  
Areas Inspected: Special security inspection concerning the discovery of a hoax bomb device at Turkey Point 3 and 4. The inspection involved 6 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.  
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

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DETAILS

Prepared by:

D. E. Moore  
D. E. Moore, Physical Security Specialist  
Security and Investigation Section  
Safeguards Branch

8/23/78  
Date

Dates of Inspection: July 18-19, 1978

Reviewed by:

F. P. Gillespie  
F. P. Gillespie, Chief  
Security and Investigation Section  
Safeguards Branch

8/23/78  
Date

1. Persons Contacted

H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager, FP&L  
\*J. M. McCabe, Senior Nuclear Security Technician, FP&L  
\*R. E. Garrett, Plant Security Supervisor, FP&L  
\*D. T. Hunt, Assistant Plant Security Supervisor, FP&L  
W. Jones, SSG, EOD, 66th Ord. Det., U.S. Army  
D. Sheppard, Lt, Metro Public Safety Dept., Miami, Fla.  
D. C. Fraley, Chief of Uniform Security

\*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Summary of Incident

On July 18, 1978, at 6:20 a.m., an apparent explosive device was discovered in the Auxiliary Building Hot Machine Shop at Turkey Point by a Florida Power and Light employee. The device was found in a small cardboard box located on the floor under a small lathe. The top of the box was open leaving the device visible. After notifying the Plant Manager and the Plant Security Supervisor, an examination of the device was made by two explosive detection dogs which are currently being trained to search vehicles entering the protected area.

The dogs independently alerted on the device. In addition, two U.S. Army Explosive Ordnance Detachment instructors who were onsite to give the security force training on the recognition of explosives, examined the device. They felt every possible precaution should be taken and recommended that the Metro Bomb Disposal Unit be notified.

At 9:17 a.m. the device was determined to be safe by the Metro Bomb Disposal Unit. The areas surrounding the Hot Machine Shop were evacuated, and searched for additional devices but none were found.

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The device consisted of three polyvinyl chloride (PVC) tubes, approximately six inches in length and one inch in diameter, filled with lead shots (No. 6 chilled shot) and plugged on each end with rubber stoppers; a small box measuring 4"x3"x 3/4" covered with electrical tape simulating a battery pack; three strands of black heat-shrinkable insulation (nonconductive) simulating wiring; and electrical tape to hold the device together.

All materials used to construct the device are available inside the protected area.

3. Actions Taken By USNRC Inspection and Enforcement

The plant manager of Turkey Point notified Region II of the incident at 8:05 a.m. Operation centers were immediately established in both Director of Safeguards IE:HQ and RII Director's Offices. Continuous communication was maintained between the RII communication center and the site.

A RII Operations inspector was on site for a routine inspection when the incident occurred. A charter aircraft was on standby in RII in the event it became necessary to fly NRC personnel to Turkey Point.

Prior to the device being established as a hoax, the possibility of lowering power was under discussion since both units were operating at 100% power.

A security inspector was dispatched to Turkey Point to followup on the incident. The inspector arrived onsite at 5:15 p.m.. At this time, pictures were taken of the location where the device was discovered and interviews were conducted with the plant manager and security force members concerning the discovery of the device.

The inspection also consisted of a trip to the Metro Crime Lab where pictures of the actual device were taken. Discussions with Laboratory personnel revealed that partial fingerprints had been obtained from the outside of the box.

4. Description of the Hot Machine Shop

The Hot Machine Shop is located in the Auxiliary Building, a Radiation Controlled Area (RCA), and is used by maintenance personnel to machine tools, parts, and plant components that are possibly contaminated. The room is approximately 12'x18' and contains several pieces of maintenance related equipment. A roll-up door is located on the south end of the room. This door was opened to vent the explosive forces outward in the event a detonation occurred.

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The nearest vital area to the Hot Machine Shop is the Unit 4 containment structure. This structure is located south of the shop approximately 20' from where the device was discovered. On the north side of the machine shop is an eleven foot hallway, across from which is the Instrument Shop (Cold Lab). A 9'6" hallway separates the Shop from the Health Physic Office on the east side. A tool crib and Decontamination room (laundry room) is located on the west side of the shop. The Hot Machine Shop is not a vital area. An actual explosion would not have caused a radioactive release, damage would have been limited to the machine shop area.

5. Access Control

Currently, there are 137 maintenance employees authorized to use the Hot Machine Shop. Access to the Shop is gained by obtaining a key from the Maintenance Supervisor. While the shop is being used, the door may be unsecured and any of the 359 FP&L and 134 contract employees who are authorized access to the RCA could gain access to the Shop.

6. Exit Interview and Subsequent Telephone Call

A meeting was held at the conclusion of the inspection with those members of the security staff denoted in paragraph 1. The licensee was informed that no items of noncompliance were identified during the course of the inspection. The licensee will make available to RII copies of investigative reports submitted to them by the Organized Crime Bureau of the Dade County Public Safety Department.

Based on conversations with the licensee on August 21, 1978, the investigation is still pending.



October 24, 1978  
L-78-339

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II  
Office Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:DEM  
50-250/78-17  
50-251/78-17

Upon further evaluation of the above referenced inspection reports, Florida Power and Light Company hereby rescinds its request of September 18, 1978, that the reports be exempted from public disclosure.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "R. Uhrig".

Robert E. Uhrig  
Vice President

REU:JRP:cf

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire