

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W. ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-416/82-68

Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company Jackson, MS

Facility Name: Grand Gulf 1

Docket No. 50-416

License No. NPF-13

Inspection at Grand Gulf Site near Port Gibson, Mississippi

Inspectors: A. G. Wagner Butcher Kins Approved by: Cantrell, Section Chief, Division of

10/27/82 Date Signed

10/27/82. Date Signed

10/28 Date

SUMMARY

Inspection on September 20 - October 18, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 47 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Operational Safety, Maintenance Observation and Surveillance Testing Observation.

Results

Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Failure to make prompt reports, paragraphs 2c and 2e).

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Project and Resident Programs

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*C. K. McCoy, Plant Manager

*C. R. Hutchinson, Nuclear Support Manager

*R. A. Ambrosino, Assistant Plant Manager

- *R. G. Keaton, Operations
- *J. D. Bailey, Plant Quality
- *C. C. Hayes, Plant Quality Suupervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians and operators.

Other Organizations

Theoplilus Incorporated

*J. Groves, Consultant to J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 18, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Operational Safety

The inspectors were kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.

The inspector made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings; setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning. This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the Control Building, Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building and outside areas were visited. Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls; personnel badging, personnel search and escort; and vehicle search and escort. Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours. In addition a complete walkdown which included valve alignment, instrument alignment, switch positions were performed on the Suppression Pool Make-up system.

The following comments were noted:

- a. During a review of the testing for current startup plateau the inspector noted that there were a number of open exceptions to the test procedures. The inspector discussed the requirements of NPF-13, paragraph 2.c.40, Initial Test Program, with the licensee. This license condition requires the startup test program be conducted without modifications without prior NRC approval. The licensee was made aware of the necessity to obtain prior NRC approval before modifying their start up program.
- b. During a review of the procedures for control of non-nuclear heatup, the inspector noted that the controlling procedure 03-1-01-1 Temporary Non-Nuclear Heatup required in paragraph 4.8 that the temporary directive 04-1-01-B 33 temporary 7, Operation of Temporary Vessel Pressure Control Equipment, be approved by the PSRC. The procedure in use in the control room was not approved by the PSRC as required. The procedure review was sufficient for use in the field in accordance with the Plant Administrative Procedures except for the additional PSRC review requirement. The procedure for controlling non-nuclear heatup was revised to delete the PSRC approval requirements.
- c. On September 22, 1982, at approximately 6:45 a.m. the plant experienced a loss of power to Engineered Safeguard Feature (ESF) transformer 21. This resulted in a loss of power to two ESF busses and challenged the system. Two divisional diesel generators started automatically and closed in on the busses. These was no vessel injection and all safeguards equipment functioned properly. The NRC was not notified until approximately 9:00 a.m. 10 CFR 50.72(a)(7) requires a prompt notification of this type of event within one hour. The failure to make the required report is an example of a violation for failure to make a prompt report. This violation will be documented as violation 416/82-68-01.
- d. The inspector discussed with senior management the necessity to ensure that the LCO actions required by plant administrative procedure 02-S-01-17, paragraph 6.1, are accomplished. In addition, the shift supervisor should be informed on a regular basis and provided the

necessary documentation to ensure that actions have been completed, where required by supporting organizations.

e. During a review of the control room operator log for 9/29/82 the inspector noted that the reactor was manually scrammed following a report of a non-isolable air leak to the control rod drive scram valves. The air line separated as a result of maintenance being performed on a hydraulic control unit for one control rod. The scrams was initiated "to control the situation". The NRC was not notified until approximately 12:00 p.m. on 9/30/82 after inquiry by the inspector. 10 CFR 50.72(a)(7) requires a report to the NRC be made within one hour. This is a second example of a failure to make a prompt report. This violation will be documented as violation 416/82-68-01.

6. Maintenance

During the report period, the inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, and adherence to Quality Control hold points.

MWO 2B066 Recirculation Pump 'A' Troubleshooting MWO 2A625 Recirculation Pump 'A' Troubleshooting

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance Testing Observation

The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance procedures. The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and a review of test data.

 a. 06-IC-1E31-M-0003, Rev. 1, Main Steamline High Flow (PCIs) Functional test.

No comments.

b. 06-IC-1B21-M-1008, Rev. 3, Drywell High Pressure (ECCS actuation) Functional test.

No comments.

- c. 06-EL-1B21-M-0001, Rev. 1 ADS/SRV Timer Functional test.
- d. 06-EL-1B21-Q-0001, Rev 3 ADS/SRV Timer Calibration Procedure

During the performance of items c. and d. above, the instruction directed that the ADS relay timer be set at 115 ± 0.5 seconds. Table 3.3.3-2 of the Technical Specification require a trip setting greater

than or equal to 115 sec and less than or equal to 117 sec. This is an additional example of the violation identified in inspection report 50-416/82-67. This will be identified as an Inspector Follow-up Item 416/82-68-02.

e. 06-0P-1T48-R-0002, Rev. 11 Standby Gas Treatment Vacuum Test.

No comments.

f. 06-0P-K51-V-0003, Rev. 12 APRM Functional test.

No comments.