

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY  
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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December 22, 1982  
MP-4518

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator, Region 1  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

Reference: Provisional License DPR-21  
Docket No. 50-245  
Reportable Occurrence RO 82-28/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO 82-28/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'E. J. Mroczka'.

E. J. Mroczka

Station Superintendent  
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:mo

Attachment: LER RO 82-28/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)  
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,  
Washington, D. C. (3)  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT TO 82-28/3L  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY  
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1  
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21  
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation occurred when a missing fire barrier was discovered in the cable vault area.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to occurrence the unit was operating at a steady state power level of 100 percent.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On November 29, 1982, at 1430 hours, while performing a fire protection surveillance, a missing fire barrier was discovered in the cable vault area where plumbing and storm drains pass through. A continuous fire watch was immediately established. Technical Specification 3.12.F.1 requires all penetration fire barriers to be functional when safety-related equipment in the area is operable.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

During the initial fire penetration survey the above mentioned penetration, a pipe chase, was evaluated and dispositioned as not requiring a fire barrier at the cable vault ceiling elevation for the following reasons:

1. It was enclosed on all sides by a minimum of four inch concrete block.
2. There were no cables or combustible materials within the chase.
3. The chase appeared to be dead ended at the control room roof.

During a recent fire protection inspection, however, it was determined that the chase was in fact open to above the suspended ceiling in the control room. In the event of a fire in the cable vault, this opening would provide a flow path for smoke and hot gases from the cable vault to the control room.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment.

In the case of a fire in the cable vault area, smoke detectors located in the area would alarm in the control room. This allows operators to take immediate remedial action. Additionally, ejector fans would be initiated in the cable vault area, thus reducing the amount of smoke and hot gases that could pass up the pipe chase into the control room.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The opening was sealed with one inch of mineral fiber insulating board (as a damming material) and covered with nine inches of silicone room temperature vulcanizer (RTV) foam.