DCS NUMBERS

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Region I

Report No. 82-25

Docket No. 50-333

License No. DPR-59 Priority -- Category C

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York
P. O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093

Facility Name: J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station

Inspection at: Scriba, New York

Inspection conducted: November 1-30, 1982

Inspectors: James C Linville Jr. 12/9/82
J. C. Linville, Senior Resident Inspector date signed

James C Linville Jr. 12/9/82
for J. T. Doerflein, Resident Inspector date signed

date signed

Approved by: W. Baunack for 12/14/82
H. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed
Section 1C

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on November 1-30, 1982 (Report No. 50-333/82-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by two resident inspectors (86 hours) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee event report review; operational safety verification; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; review of plant operations; and review of periodic and special reports.

Results: No violations were observed in the areas inspected.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

R. Baker, Technical Services Superintendent
V. Childs, Senior Resident Engineer
*R. Converse, Superintendent of Power
M. Cosgrove, Quality Assurance Superintendent
M. Curling, Training Superintendent
*W. Fernandez, Maintenance Superintendent
J. Flaherty, Assistant Instrument and Control Superintendent
*N. Gannon, Radiation Protection and Radiochemistry Supervisor
*H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent
*R. Liseno, Operations Superintendent
A. McKeen, Assistant to Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent
*C. McNeill, Resident Manager
E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent
D. Simpson, Training Coordinator
T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent
V. Walz, Senior Plant Engineer

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operators, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personnel.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Review of Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) VIOLATION (333/82-19-08): The inspector has observed that the licensee had stopped venting the containment without using the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System and that the licensee is able to maintain the required containment differential pressure by venting periodically for short periods of time through the SBGT system.

(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-19-04): The inspector reviewed revised LER 82-35 which corrected the event date and the suppression chamber water level.

(Open) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-19-03): The inspector reviewed revised LER 82-34 regarding exceeding licensed thermal power because the feedwater flow transmitter calibration was out of procedural tolerance. The inspector noted that further drifting of the feedwater flow instruments occurred during a recent shutdown as reported in OR 82-181 although this most recent event was of a lesser magnitude than the earlier events. The licensee plans to evaluate this problem further before making a decision to replace the feedwater flow transmitters prior to the next refueling outage.

(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-15-10): The inspector reviewed licensee memo OPS-82-148, dated November 4, 1982 regarding the scram on low reactor vessel level caused by uncoupling of a reactor feedwater pump and Revision 5 to procedure F-02-2B, Feedwater Control System described therein. The inspector had no further questions on this matter.

(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-15-05): The inspector reviewed the as-found test data for F Safety Relief Valve performed by Wyle Laboratories on October 18, 1982. The valve failed the initial tests lifting at 1204 and 1164 psig. The required setpoint value was 1140 ± 11 psig. During subsequent tests, the valve lifted at 1141, 1141, and 1130 psig, which was within the required value. The pilot valve exhibited gross leakage before and after the test. The data was provided to NRR as requested.

(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/77-32-04): The inspector reviewed the February 12, 1982 temporary change to surveillance procedure F-ST-39B, Type B and C LLRT of Containment Penetrations, Revision 9, dated November 20, 1981 and determined that the main steam isolation valve penetration test results in SCFD are ratioed from the test pressure of 25.3 psig to the peak pressure of 45.3 psig. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

(Closed) VIOLATION (333/82-19-07): The licensee has implemented a system to track contractor personnel and provide them with Radiation Protection requalification training one year after their initial training. In addition, the licensee revised Indoctrination and Training Procedure No. 3, "General Employee Training," to include provisions for the written notification of retraining due and the voiding of security badges for those who fail to attend the retraining. The inspector reviewed the filing system on contractor personnel, a sampling of the notification letters, and the security badges already voided because of the failure to complete the required retraining and determined that the system is effective.

3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Review

The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.

LER's 82-45, 82-49*, 82-51, and 82-52 were reviewed.
*LER selected for onsite followup.

LER 82-49 reported that a required surveillance on the scram discharge volume vents and drain added to the Technical Specifications by Amendment No. 62 to the facility operating license was missed because of an inadequate review of the amendment caused by an omission of the revision bar on page 89a. The inspector noted that although the revision bar was omitted from page 89a, the cover letter to the amendment specifically called attention to the addition of the quarterly surveillance requirement on the SDV vent and drain valves. The licensee committed to an additional review of licensee amendments by the corporate licensing division to prevent such oversights in the future.

4. Operational Safety Verification

a. Control Room Observations

Daily, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specifications. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken. The inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspectors directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:

-- Routine Power Operation

-- Issuance of RWP's and Work Request/Event/Deficiency forms

No violations were observed.

b. Shift Logs and Operating Records

Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs.

No violations were observed.

c. Plant Tours

During the inspection period, the inspectors made observations and conducted tours of the plant. During the plant tours, the inspectors conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked. The inspectors also checked fire protection, housekeeping/cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.

No violations were observed.

d. Tagout Verification

The inspectors verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves.

-- PTR 820963 on Reactor Water Sample Isolation Valves 02-AOV-39 and 40

-- PTR 821092 on the "B" Standby Gas Treatment System

-- PTR 821074A on the "B" Residual Heat Removal Service Water System

-- PTR 821136 on the Diesel Fire Pump

No violations were observed.

e. Radioactive Waste Systems Controls

The inspector witnessed selected portions of a liquid radioactive release to verify that the required release approvals were obtained, the required samples were taken and analyzed, the radioactive waste system was operated in accordance with approved procedures, and the release control instrumentation was operable and in use.

The inspector observed the release of Batch 4616, A Laundry Drain Tank, on November 24, 1982.

The inspector observed the surveys of radioactive waste shipment number 300F on November 18, 1982. The inspector also reviewed the shipment records and observed that the shipment was properly labelled.

No violations were observed.

f. Emergency System Operability

The inspectors verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.

-- Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System

-- Standby Liquid Control System

-- Station 125V DC Power System

The inspectors also verified the operability of the following system by performing a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the system. During the system verification, the inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration; verified that valves were in the proper position, had power available and were locked (sealed) as required; verified that system instrumentation was properly valved in; and verified that there are no obvious deficiencies which might degrade system performance such as inoperable hangers or supports.

-- Residual Heat Removal Service Water System

During the verification of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System, the inspector noted the following discrepancies between the as-built condition, the valve lineup checklist in operating procedure F-OP-13, "Residual Heat Removal System," Revision 15, and drawings OP-13-2, FM-20C-14 and FM-20D-14:

-- The chemical cleaning connection valves RHR 750A and B are not included on the valve lineup checklist.

-- Drain valves RHR 754A and B are not on any drawings or included on the valve lineup checklist.

-- The steam trap on the "B" RHR heat exchanger is not shown on drawing OP-13-2. The isolation and drain valves, RHR 227, RHR 768, and RHR 769, on the steam trap are not included on the valve lineup checklist.

-- Three unnumbered drain valves, one each in the "A" and "B" RHR Service Water supply lines and one in the RHR Service Water return from "A" RHR heat exchanger are not on any drawing or on the valve lineup checklist.

-- RHR Service Water discharge header full pressure switches, PS 124A and B, are not shown on any drawing.

-- Valve RHR 747A is incorrectly shown as a chemical cleaning connection downstream of the "A" RHR heat exchanger on drawing OP-13-2 when it's actually upstream of the heat exchanger.

-- The "A" and "B" RHR Service Water Strainer Differential Pressure Indicating Switches, DPIS 277A and B, are incorrectly labelled on drawing OP-13-2 as DPIS 227A and B.

The inspector will review licensee action to correct these discrepancies in a subsequent inspection. (333/82-25-01)

5. Surveillance Observations

The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing:

-- F-ST-12E, Turbine Building Exhaust Monitor Logic System Functional Test, Revision 6, dated May 19, 1982, performed on November 17, 1982.

-- F-ST-5B, APRM Instrument Functional Test (Run Mode), Revision 8, dated June 16, 1982, performed on November 3, 1982.

-- F-ISP-17, Refueling Area Exhaust Monitor Instrument Calibration, Revision 7, dated April 21, 1981, performed on November 4, 1982.

Prior to the performance of F-ST-12E, licensee personnel noted that a verification step to check gravity dampers had been omitted when the procedure was last revised to change the format. To correct this omission, a temporary change to the procedure was initiated and subsequently reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee at meeting 82-092 on November 23, 1982. While performing the test, licensee personnel observed that insertion of a trip signal into the A Turbine Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor failed to produce the required building isolation. The licensee immediately tested the B Turbine Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor to demonstrate that the minimum requirements of Technical Specification Table 3.2-1 were met. During a review of the technical specification requirements, the licensee and the inspector noted two typographical errors in the Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 4.2.D.3 incorrectly refers to nonexistent Table 4.3-4 for logic functional testing of Radiation Monitoring Systems. The correct reference is Table 4.2-4 which is correctly referenced for calibration and functional testing in the same paragraph. In addition, action statement C of note 2 in Table 3.2-4 refers to Environmental Technical Specification 2.3.B.4 instead of 2.3.B.9. The licensee initiated corrections regarding these two errors. Also, work request 17/19330 and occurrence report (OR) 82-201 were initiated to identify and correct the problem with the A logic train. The licensee replaced a blown fuse restoring the A logic train to service and performed F-ST-12E again satisfactorily.

The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test.

-- F-ST-76C, Diesel Fire Pump Operational Check, Revision 3, dated October 13, 1982, performed on November 23, 1982.

During the performance of F-ST-76C, the inspector noted the diesel engine boiled over and lost coolant shortly after it was secured following the twenty minute run. This has been a recurring problem and a previous unresolved item (333/82-15-03) which was closed after a licensee representative informed the inspector that the boil over problem had been resolved by use of a pressure cap on the cooling system and the inspector witnessed a post repair run of the diesel fire pump after which the coolant did not boil over. Based on discussions with maintenance and operations personnel, the inspector subsequently determined that a pressure cap had not been installed on the coolant system and that no action had been taken on work

request no. 76/12422, dated June 17, 1981, which identified the diesel engine boil over problem. The inspector expressed his concern over the lack of attention this problem has received and informed the licensee that the operability of the Diesel Fire Pump following the engine boil over was an unresolved item. (333/82-25-02) At the exit interview, the licensee agreed to review the problem with the diesel engine boil over and provide a schedule for resolution by December 10, 1982.

6. Maintenance Observations

The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade," appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, ignition/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.

During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:

-- WR 17/19330 on the repair of A Turbine Building Exhaust Monitor

-- WR 10/18883 on repacking the hand wheel shaft on B and D Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump strainer

-- WR 76/18131 on the replacement of the coolant heater on the Diesel Fire Pump

-- WR 08/324 on High Density Spent Fuel Racks

On several occasions the inspectors witnessed activities associated with WR 08/324 in preparation for reracking the north end of the spent fuel pool with high density spent fuel racks. On November 23, 1982 while watching diving operations, the inspectors noted that the diver located a hot spot reading offscale (>199 R/hr) on the R07. The RM16 probe on the divers chest was reading 10 millirem per hour at the time. The diver remained clear of the hot spot until a screwdriver on a long pipe was rigged for him to scrape the highly radioactive material off the top of the fuel rack. During this operation, the inspectors noted that the survey in the work area was not dated and that the highest readings on it were about 9 R/hr. Subsequent review indicated that the date had been eliminated when the survey was copied and that it was the survey taken that morning. Discussions with licensee personnel and the divers also indicated that the health physics technician and the diver were aware of the hot spot based on additional surveys which had been done at lunchtime. The inspectors stressed the importance of ensuring that current identifiable survey data is available in the work area and has noted no subsequent problems in this area. Diving activities were reviewed again during a subsequent inspection by a Region I Radiation Specialist, and no significant problems were identified (50-333/82-27).

On November 30, 1982, the inspectors determined that there had been no second verification of fuel movement in the spent fuel pool prior to diving operation as recommended in IE Information Notice (IN) 82-31 except for a visual check of the immediate work area by health physics technicians and diving personnel prior to dives. When the inspectors informed licensee management, the Reactor Analyst verified the number of fuel bundles located in the spent fuel pool. During an earlier review of diving procedures, the inspectors determined that the other recommendations of IEIN 82-31 were incorporated.

Later the same day, the inspectors saw a maintenance engineer responsible for supervising the reracking inside an area on the refuel floor posted "Neutron Area 2.0 mrem/hr at the Rope/Stay Clear." The licensee health physics technician responsible for monitoring work on the refuel floor was standing outside the area watching him. The maintenance engineer had no neutron dosimeter or radiation work permit (RWP) for being in the area and the health physics technician said he had not noticed the nature of the posting and had not authorized the entry. A subsequent survey number 52966 performed by the licensee indicated that no dosimeter or RWP was required except within three feet of the source cask where levels were 5 mrem/hr. The area had been posted within 10 feet of the source cask and the maintenance engineer had not been within three feet of the cask. The licensee acknowledged that the posting should have been adhered to and counseled the individuals involved. To prevent the above type of oversight which could contribute to an overexposure like that discussed in IEIN 82-31, the licensee stated that higher level management will become more involved in monitoring this activity by attending predive briefings and periodic observations in the work area.

7. Review of Plant Operations

Review and Audit

On November 23, 1982, the inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting 82-92. The inspector verified that the Technical Specification membership and frequency requirements were met. The inspector also reviewed the minutes from this PORC meeting and determined that they accurately reflected the decisions and recommendations made by the PORC members in the meeting.

No violations were observed.

8. Review of Periodic and Special Reports

Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: Inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of reported information. The following periodic report was reviewed:

-- Operating Status Report for the month of October 1982, dated November 4, 1982.

No violations were observed.

9. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.

10. Exit Interview

At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On December 1, 1982, the inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.