

DEC 07 1982

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Alabama Power Company
ATTN: Mr. R. P. McDonald
Vice President-Nuclear Generation
P. O. Box 2641
Birmingham, AL 35291

Gentlemen:

Subject: Meeting Summary

This letter refers to the meeting conducted at our request in the NRC Region II office on November 19, 1982. The meeting related to the finding by APCO that two valves in the containment spray headers were locked closed rendering the containment spray system inoperable.

The subjects discussed at this meeting is described in the enclosed meeting summary, Enclosure 1, and those in attendance at this meeting are listed in Enclosure 2.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided for a better understanding of the corrective actions being taken and the inspection and enforcement issues. In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's "Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in NRC's Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them.

Sincerely,

R. C. Lewis, Director
Division of Project and
Resident Programs

Enclosure:
Meeting Summary

cc w/encl:
W. O. Whitt, Executive Vice President
F. L. Clayton, Jr., Senior Vice President
H. O. Thrash, General Manager-Nuclear Generation
O. D. Kingsley, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Engineering
and Technical Services
J. W. McGowan, Manager-Safety Audit
and Engineering Review
W. G. Ware, Supervisor-Safety Audit
and Engineering Review
W. G. Hairston, III, Plant Manager

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bcc w/encl:
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DVerrelli
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RCLewis
12/6/82

ENCLOSURE 1

Meeting Summary

November 19, 1982

On November 19, 1982 members of APCO management met with the NRC to discuss their findings regarding the inoperability of containment spray systems and to describe the actions taken to prevent its recurrence. Those attending the meeting are listed in enclosure 2.

Mr. Lewis stated that NRC was aware of the facts regarding finding the containment spray valves closed, and requested APCO discuss the results of their investigation. Mr. R. P. McDonald, then explained that the root causes of the incident were an inadequate procedure for checking valve position, and valves that were different from the valve drawings in that in the closed position, six inches of stem was still exposed. APCO's immediate corrective actions were to verify all similar valves and all accessible locked valves in both Units 1 and 2, to be in the correct position.

Mr. McDonald explained that numerous aspects of the valve position problem are being examined but the primary corrective action was to revise their procedure for checking valve position to specify that all locked valves will be moved in the shut direction to verify their position; then returned (if applicable) to the original position. The previous method of verifying valve position by the rising stem height is considered one of the primary causes of the incident.

As an aid in determining the actual severity potential of losing both containment spray systems, APCO agreed to conduct a study on the pressure-temperature effects of a design based accident with only three containment coolers operational. This information will be submitted prior to December 1, 1982.

D. M. Verrelli, Chief
Project Branch 1
Division of Project and
Resident Programs

Attachment: Attendance List