NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N J O C P 1 ② LICENSEE CODE | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 ③ LICENSE NUMBER | 4 1 1 1 1 ④ LICENSE TYPE | ⑤ CAT

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L ⑥ | 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9 ⑦ DOCKET NUMBER | 0 9 1 4 7 8 ⑧ EVENT DATE | 1 0 1 2 7 8 ⑨ REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

0 2 During a routine isolation condenser isolation test on September 14,

0 3 1978, the circuit breaker for motor operated valve V-14-37 tripped when

0 4 the valve was closed by an isolation signal. This condition prevented

0 5 the valve from opening when the isolation signal was removed. The

0 6 tripped breaker was reset at the motor control center and the valve was

0 7 opened. An investigation indicated the circuit breaker had tripped on

0 8 overload when the torque switch on the motor operator failed to trip.

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S F ⑪	E ⑫	B ⑬	V A L V O P ⑭	A ⑮	Z ⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 8	—	0 1 7	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS ㉒	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B ⑱	X ⑲	Z ⑳	Z ㉑	0 0 0 0	Y ㉓	Y ㉔	N ㉕	P 1 9 5 ㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

1 0 The apparent cause of the occurrence was component failure. The set

1 1 screw on the limitorque torque switch had loosened allowing the switch

1 2 setting to shift to a higher value. The torque switch setting was cor-

1 3 rected and the set screw was tightened. An inspection of the set screws

1 4 on the limitorque torque switches shall be included in the P.M. Program.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS ㉚	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉜
1 5	E ㉘	0 6 6 ㉙	NA	B ㉛	Operator Observation

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟	LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱
1 6	Z ㉝	Z ㉞	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION ㊴
1 7	0 0 0 ㊲	Z ㊳	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION ㊶
1 8	0 0 0 ㊵	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z ㊷	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION ㊺	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	Y ㊹	Weekly press release - October 17, 1978	

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JCP&L GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
(201) 455-8200

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/78-17/3L-0

Report Date

October 12, 1978

Occurrence Date

September 14, 1978

Identification of Occurrence

Failure of isolation condenser valve V-14-37 to open during performance of a routine surveillance test. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were:

Power: Reactor, 1277 MWt
Electric, 429 MWe
Flow: Recirculation, 61.0×10^6 lb/hr
Feedwater, 4.63×10^6 lb/hr
Reactor Pressure: 1020 psig
Stack Gas Activity: 49.0×10^3 μCi/sec

Description of Occurrence

During routine performance of the isolation condenser isolation test on September 14, 1978, the circuit breaker for motor operated valve V-14-37 tripped when the valve was closed by an isolation signal. This condition prevented the valve from opening when the isolation signal was reset. The tripped breaker was reset at the motor control center and the valve was opened. Subsequent investigation indicated the circuit breaker had tripped on overload when the torque switch on the limitorque motor operator failed to trip.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of the occurrence was component failure. The set screw on the limitorque torque switch had loosened allowing the switch setting to shift to a higher value.

Analysis of Occurrence

The purpose of the isolation condenser is to depressurize the reactor and to remove reactor decay heat in the event that the turbine generator and main condenser are unavailable as a heat sink. Either of the two isolation condensers can accomplish the purpose of the system. If one isolation condenser becomes inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the heat removal capability for the reactor. The safety significance for this incident is considered minimal based on the availability of the second isolation condenser loop and the short time valve V-14-37 was closed.

Corrective Action

The torque switch setting was corrected and the set screw was tightened. An inspection of the set screws on the limitorque torque switches shall be incorporated into the preventative maintenance program for safety system related valves.

Failure Data

Philadelphia Gear Corporation
Limitorque Division
King of Prussia, PA
Limitorque Type SMB 2