

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

License/Docket/Report Nos. DPR-16/50-219/94-02

Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation  
P.O. Box 388  
Forked River, New Jersey

Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station,  
Forked River, New Jersey

Inspection Conducted: January 18-21, 1994

Type of Inspection: Physical Security (Announced)

Inspectors: Edward S. King 2/16/94  
E. B. King, Physical Security Inspector date  
Arthur Della Ratta 2/17/94  
A. Della Ratta, Physical Security Inspector date  
Approved by: E. C. McCabe 2/22/94  
E. C. McCabe, Chief, Safeguards Section date  
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

**SCOPE**

Management Support, Program Plans and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting; Protected Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; and Training and Qualification.

**RESULTS**

Overall, the licensee's physical security program was directed toward assuring public health and safety. Management support for the program was evident through the implementation of several program enhancements to increase its effectiveness.

Two apparent violations were identified for (1) failures to perform required glucoma tests of armed security officers and to requalify security officers on assigned crucial security tasks, and (2) for failure to meet applicable Protected Area (PA) lighting requirements in two areas.

## DETAILS

### 1.0 Key Persons Contacted

#### 1.1 Licensee

- \*S. Levin, Director, Operations and Maintenance
- \*R. Stintcum, Security Manager
- \*R. Ewart, Senior Security Supervisor
- \*T. Sensue, Licensing Engineer
- \*L. Defibaugh, Security Training Instructor
- \*R. Pezzella, Administrative Security Specialist
- \*G. Boyle, Operations Quality Assurance Monitor
- \*J. Frew, Site Services
- \*P. Thompson, Site Audit Manager
- \*G. Busel, Licensing Manager

#### 1.2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- \*L. Briggs, Senior Resident Inspector

\* Present at the exit interview on January 21, 1994

### 2.0 Management Support, Program Plans and Audits

#### 2.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be consistent with program needs. This determination was based upon review of the licensee's program during this inspection as documented in this report. Since the previous physical security inspection in November 1993, the licensee has completed a systems upgrade in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) to enhance assessment capabilities and has purchased new tactical response equipment.

#### 2.2 Plans

The inspectors discussed proposed changes to the NRC-approved Training and Qualification Plan (T&Q) with the licensee. These changes were tentatively planned to be submitted to the NRC in the near future under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).

### 2.3 Audits

The inspectors reviewed the report of the licensee's annual Quality Assurance Audit (S-OC-93-13) of the security program. That audit was conducted from September 3 - November 1, 1993. It appeared to be generally comprehensive in scope, and no findings or minor deficiencies were noted. However, the inspectors questioned the auditors' review of security medical records, in that three of the records reviewed by the auditors were records of security officers who had not received glaucoma testing within the time specified in the T&Q Plan. On January 20, 1994, the inspectors met with the auditors and were informed that the auditors only reviewed 1993 medical records and failed to compare the 1993 records with the 1992 records to insure that testing was performed as required. The program weakness indicated by this circumstance will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (IFI 50-219/94-02-01)

### 3.0 Protected Area (PA) Physical Barrier, Detection and Assessment Aids

#### 3.1 Protected Area Barrier

By physical inspection of the PA barrier on January 19 and 20, 1994, the inspectors determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the NRC-approved physical security plan (the Plan).

#### 3.2 Protected Area Detection Aids

The inspectors observed the PA perimeter intrusion detection systems (IDS) on January 19, 1994, and determined that they were installed and maintained as committed to in the Plan. A review of licensee-conducted perimeter intrusion detection aids testing and records indicated that the detection aids operated as committed to in the Plan.

#### 3.3 Assessment Aids

On January 19 and 20, 1994, the inspectors observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during day and night periods. The inspectors determined that the assessment aids were as described in the Plan.

#### 3.4 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

On January 20, 1994, the inspectors conducted a PA and isolation zone lighting survey from about 6:00-7:30 p.m., accompanied by a licensee security supervisor. It was thereby determined, through use of a calibrated light meter provided by the licensee, that two areas were not illuminated to the 0.2 foot candles required by the Plan. These deficiencies had apparently not been

recognized by security patrols or during the 15 lighting surveys conducted per week by the licensee. The location of the deficient areas were at two separate trailers that did not have skirting or temporary lighting.

The Oyster Creek Generating Station Security Plan, dated June 14, 1993, Revision 31, Section 3.1.3.1.1, requires in part that the outdoor lighting system provide an illumination level of not less than 0.2 foot candles along the entire isolation zone, perimeter barrier, and all exterior areas within the protected area.

Failure to maintain lighting in the above two areas at the level required by the Plan violated NRC requirements (VIO 50-219/94-02-02).

Except as noted in Section 3.4 above, the licensee's PA physical barriers, detection, and assessment aids satisfied NRC requirements.

#### 4.0 Protected and Vital Area (VA) Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

##### 4.1 Personnel Access Control

Based on the following, the inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs.

4.1.1 The inspectors observed that personnel were properly identified and that access authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards.

4.1.2 Plant and visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic periods were observed on January 20 and 21, 1994. Also, members of the security force and licensee security staff were interviewed about personnel access procedures. Based on these observations and discussions, and on review of applicable post orders and procedures, the inspectors determined that the licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as required by the Plan.

4.1.3 The inspectors determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required.

##### 4.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that were brought into the PA through the main access portal. This determination was based on inspector review of package and

material control procedures, showing that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures.

#### 4.3 Vehicle Access Control

The inspectors determined that the licensee was properly controlling vehicle access to and within the PA. It was verified that vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA, with identification verified by a security force member (SFM) at the main access portal. This was consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. At least two SFMs controlled vehicle access at the main vehicle access portal. On January 20, 1994, from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., the inspectors observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures. These SFMs were knowledgeable of the requirements.

In summary, the licensee had effective programs which satisfied NRC requirements for PA and VAs access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles.

#### 5.0 Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures

The inspectors determined that the licensee was testing and maintaining security systems and equipment as required by the Plan. This determination was based upon a review of the test records for security equipment. That review indicated that repairs were normally made within 24 to 72 hours after a repair request was generated. The inspectors also reviewed the use of compensatory measures and security force overtime and found them to be minimal, largely due to the efforts and prompt response of the maintenance group. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 6.0 Security Training and Qualification

On January 20 and 21, 1994, the inspectors met with the licensee's security training specialist and discussed present training activities and proposed training enhancements. The inspectors randomly selected and reviewed training and qualification records for six SFMs. Additionally, on January 19 and 20, 1994, physical qualification and requalifications records were inspected for armed SFMs and security supervisors.

The inspectors determined by a review of security medical records that 42 of 69 security officers were not tested for glaucoma within the 13-month time interval specified in the licensee's T&Q Plan. Additionally, the inspectors determined, by review of six licensee security training records, that two security officers were not requalified to perform their

assigned crucial security tasks within the 13-month time interval specified in the T&Q Plan.

The Oyster Creek Security Training and Qualification Plan, Dated February 27, 1992, Revision 0, Section 1.2.1.3, states in part that glaucoma shall be disqualifying, unless controlled by acceptable medical or survival means, provided such medications as may be used for controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which adversely affect the individual's ability to perform assigned security duties. Additionally, T&Q Plan Section 1.5 (c) states in part that all armed security personnel are required to meet the vision requirement identified in Section 1.2.1.3, at a time interval no greater than every 13 months and Section 1.5 (a), states in part, that security personnel will be requalified to perform their assigned crucial security tasks and duties at a time interval no greater than every 13 months.

Failure to accomplish the required annual (13 month) requirement for glaucoma testing of armed security officers and for requalification training on assigned crucial security tasks violates NRC requirements (VIO 50-219/94-02-03).

The inspectors interviewed 10 SFMs to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. These interviews indicated that the SFMs were professional and knowledgeable of their job requirements.

#### 7.0 Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee's representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on January 21, 1994. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were discussed with licensee management, and the findings were presented. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.