



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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OCT 4 1978
OFFICE OF THE
D.C.

Docket No: 50-368

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Stolz, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Project Management

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FROM: Leon B. Engle, Project Manager, Light Water Reactors
Branch No. 1 Division of Project Management

SUBJECT: FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT
2 REGARDING THE INADVERTENT INITIATION OF UNIT 2
EMERGENCY SAFETY FEATURES ACTIVATION SYSTEM

DATE & TIME: Friday, October 6, 1978
9:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
1:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.

LOCATION: Room P-422, Phillips Building
Bethesda, Maryland

PURPOSE: Morning Session: I&E, (Region IV)
will update the staff on the sequence
of events which led to the inadvertent
initiation of the Unit 2 ESFAS and
the subsequent introduction of about
50,000 gallons of borated water into
the containment. Also, I&E will
address DSS/DOR questions and indicate
status of the I&E inspection regarding
these matters.

Afternoon Session: The licensee,
Arkansas Power and Light Company will
address staff questions regarding
the event.

PARTICIPANTS: NRC: L. Engle, G. Klingler, T. Westerman,
et al

AP&LCo.: T. Enos, D. Williams, et al.

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Leon B Engle

Leon B. Engle, Project Manager
Light Water Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Project Management

Enclosure: Agenda

cc: See next page

Arkansas Power & Light Company

OCT 4 1978

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ENCLOSURE

AGENDA FOR MEETING OCTOBER 6, 1978

WITH THE ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 2

Morning Session (9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.)

1. I&E (Region IV) Update on Scenario of Events
2. Staff questions regarding Scenario of Events
3. I&E will respond to Staff Questions (DSS/DOR) regarding event
4. I&E will update staff on I&E inspection and further action required by licensee
5. Staff discussion

Afternoon Session (1:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.)

1. Licensee will respond to staff questions regarding event
2. Licensee will address actions being taken to preclude repetition of similar event.

DOR/DSS Questions for
ANO-1/2, Resulting
from the 16 Sept. 1978 incident

The following question should be responded to by the applicant and licensee:

- 1) Provide a detailed description of the sequence of events that occurred (i.e. before, during and after) in the recent event of September 16, 1978, for both units. Include a description of the interactions and interconnections between units 1&2 in all applicable portions of the offsite power system.
- 2) Identify the power sources that were immediately available to achieve shutdown of both units.
- 3) Discuss the errors in operation (i.e. pre-operation check out errors, operator errors etc.) to cause loss of offsite power and engineered safety features actuation to Unit #2, and identify the specific causes of the failures.
- 4) Describe in detail the failures that occurred in the offsite power and in the uninterruptable power supply system which lead to multiple degradation of the vital power supplies, and loss of the bus tie transformer. Specify the member of relay or systems that were improperly set.
- 5) Discuss plans to investigate the effects of the actuation of the containment spray (boric acid and sodium hydroxide) on the materials of the reactor system and on the equipment inside containment, and justify the adequacy of the clean-up operations for Unit No. 2.

- 6) Discuss any damage to the safety equipment (i.e. valves pumps, motors, cable, sensors etc.) of each unit, and provide justification for concluding that there was no damage and/or degradation to electrical, mechanical and piping components.
- 7) Describe how the event was terminated, and identify the instrumentation that was available to the operator to follow the course of the event and allow him to conclude that in fact there was no LOCA.
- 8) Provide the plans that will prevent reoccurrence of the event, and identify any design deficiencies (and modifications) that have been identified as a result of the incident.
- 9) Justify the adequacy of the design for pre-selecting both units to start-up transformer (SU) #2 simultaneously, since the capacity of (SU) #2 is not designed to carry all the loads of both Units, and discuss the adequacy of the sizing of the transformer shared by both units.
- 10) Provide justification and specific basis for allowing Unit 1 to return to power.
- 11) Discuss the applicability of this event to DOR letter dated June 3, 1977 regarding degraded grid voltage.