

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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December 27, 1982
Docket No. 50-245
BI0627

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

References: (1) W. G. Council letter to D. M. Crutchfield, dated
September 22, 1982.

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1
Systematic Evaluation Program Integrated Assessment
Supplemental Information

In Reference (1), Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) documented its intended actions for addressing the open issues identified during the review of the 86 SEP Topics applicable to Millstone Unit No. 1. Since the docketing of Reference (1), NNECO representatives have been working with the Staff to ensure a mutually acceptable approach for resolution of those issues where the information provided in Reference (1) was not entirely adequate to address the specific concern. Consequently, NNECO is providing this submittal as a supplement to Reference (1).

Topic II-3.B, Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements

The Staff identified a concern related to flooding of the gas turbine building as a result of a Probable Maximum Precipitation at the site and subsequent ponding in the area of the gas turbine. Although NNECO believes that the topography in the area would divert ponded water into the Long Island Sound, we agree to keep the large flood door (across the roll-up door entrance) normally closed. The position of this flood door will be verified monthly in accordance with the monthly flood gate check (OPS Form 682.1-1).

Topic II-3.C, Safety Related Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink)

NNECO's evaluation of surging inside the intake structure was provided to the Staff by letter dated November 29, 1982. This evaluation indicated that no modifications were required and NNECO considers this issue resolved.

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Topic III-2, Wind and Tornado Loadings

In addition to the Reference (1) commitments, NNECO will evaluate the effects of winds and tornados upon safety related components not located inside structures previously addressed. This will be incorporated into the scope of the Topic III-7.B analyses.

NNECO's evaluation of the consequences of failure of the stack was forwarded to the Staff by letter dated December 3, 1982. The results of this evaluation indicated that the consequences of failure are acceptable and, therefore, no modifications are required. NNECO considers this issue to be resolved.

Topic III-4.A, Tornado Missiles

NNECO is presently evaluating a number of alternatives which would resolve the Staff's concern, and will provide one method not vulnerable to the appropriate spectrum of missiles for achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown.

Topic III-6, Seismic Design Considerations

o Motor Operated Valves

NNECO will demonstrate that the structural integrity of a representative sample group of motor operated valves is acceptable under seismic loadings.

o Reactor Vessel Internals

NNECO will provide the Staff with an evaluation of reactor vessel internals under safe shutdown earthquake loading.

Topic V-5, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection

NNECO will evaluate the existing leakage detection capabilities and sensitivity in conjunction with SEP Topic III-5.A, Effects of Pipe Breaks on Structures, Systems, and Components Inside Containment. Should this evaluation conclude that the existing leakage detection capability is not adequate, NNECO will provide the required detection capability.

Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System

NNECO agrees to lock closed and administratively control the manual test, vent, drain, or sample line valves identified in Section 4.20.1 of the Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report for Millstone Unit No. 1. NNECO also agrees to provide a second valve, and lock closed and administratively control these valves, on the penetrations identified in Section 4.20.2 of the IPSAR.

For the valves and penetrations identified in Section 4.20.3 of the IPSAR, NNECO will demonstrate that adequate leakage detection exists and that the operating station for the remote-manual valves is located in an accessible area. Also, NNECO will review the isolation capabilities for the penetrations identified in Section 4.20.7 of the IPSAR to determine whether adequate isolation capability exists.

Topic VIII-2, Onsite Emergency Power Systems

In light of the Staff's recommendation in the Millstone I IPSAR, NNECO will review the preventative maintenance program for the gas turbine generator and identify any changes or corrective actions by April, 1983.

Topic VIII-3.B, DC Power System Bus Voltage Monitoring and Annunciation

The Staff's position on this topic was that at a minimum, battery current and charger output current have local indication and be alarmed in the control room. Also, breaker status should be monitored in the control room or be administratively controlled.

By letter dated September 23, 1982, NNECO provided the Staff with information on DC system monitoring at Millstone Unit I. That letter stated that alarms currently exist in the control room for "Battery Charger Trouble" and "Battery Breaker Open". Charger output current and battery current have local indication. NNECO has concluded that the Charger Trouble Alarm in the control room and the presence of local current indication satisfies the intent of the Staff's criterion for charger status monitoring.

Battery current has only local indication, however this indication is checked by the operator at least once per shift during the plant tour. It is NNECO's position that local indication of battery current is sufficient for the operator to detect current problems between the chargers and batteries or between the batteries and the DC buses. Additionally, any fault which would prevent current from flowing either from the charger to the battery or from the battery to the DC bus would be noticed by fluctuations in battery voltage, which is indicated in the control room. This would prompt the operator to investigate the problem locally. Also, since opening of the battery breaker would be the most likely cause of an open circuit, and breaker status is already monitored in the control room, NNECO concludes that sufficient DC system monitoring already exists and no modifications are planned.

The Millstone I IPSAR also recommended that the Technical Specifications be revised to reduce the allowable outage time for one battery. This issue is a direct result of the Staff's review of the as yet unpublished IREP report for Millstone Unit I. Therefore, since this issue was not within the scope or review guidelines of Topic VIII-3.B, NNECO has not had significant time to evaluate the Staff's recommendation. NNECO is presently reevaluating the current Technical Specifications for battery outages and will inform the Staff of any proposed changes by May 31, 1983.

Topic IX-5, Ventilation Systems

Information to demonstrate that the reactor building space coolers are not essential was forwarded to the Staff by letter dated December 3, 1982.

We trust the Staff will find the above information sufficient to ensure that acceptable resolution will be reached for each outstanding SEP issue.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

W. G. Council
W. G. Council
Senior Vice President

J. F. Opeka
By: J. F. Opeka
Vice President
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