



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 49
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities Company (the licensee) dated March 21, 1989, and supplemented by letter dated August 3, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 49 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. GSU shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Christopher I. Grimes, Director
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 27, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 49

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 7-10
3/4 7-11
3/4 7-12
3/4 7-13
3/4 7-14
3/4 7-15
3/4 7-16
B 3/4 7-2
B 3/4 7-3

INSERT

3/4 7-10
3/4 7-11

3/4 7-16
B 3/4 7-2
B 3/4 7-3

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation and restart and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position. Actual injection of coolant into the reactor vessel may be excluded.
 2. Verifying that the system will develop a flow of greater than or equal to 600 gpm in the test flow path when steam is supplied to the turbine at a pressure of $150 + 15, - 0$ psig.*
 3. Verifying that the suction for the RCIC system is automatically transferred from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool on a condensate storage tank water level-low signal and on a suppression pool water level - high signal.

*The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the tests.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.4 All required snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3, and OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more required snubbers inoperable on a system, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.
- b. Perform engineering evaluations per the applicable section of the approved ISI Program.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.4 Each snubber shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE by implementing the examination and test requirements of the approved ISI Program and as indicated in Specification 4.0.5. Only a previously approved revision of the ISI Program may be implemented. Subsequent revisions to the program shall be submitted to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g).

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PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5 Each sealed source containing radioactive material in excess of either 100 microcuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 10 microcuries of alpha emitting material shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the above limit, withdraw the sealed source from use and either:
 1. Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or
 2. Dispose of the sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:

- a. The licensee, or
- b. Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State.

The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 microcuries per test sample.

4.7.5.2 Test Frequencies - Each category of sealed sources, excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux, shall be tested at the frequency described below.

- a. Sources in use - At least once per six months for all sealed sources containing radioactive material:
 1. With a half-life greater than 30 days, excluding Hydrogen 3, and
 2. In any form other than gas.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1 STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the service water system and ultimate heat sink ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent, within acceptable limits, with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.2 MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the main control room air conditioning system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design basis accident conditions. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours during each 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system, in conjunction with control room design provisions, is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM

The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling, in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel, without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment. The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig. This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system.

The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3, when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig, because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.

With the RCIC system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the HPCS system which justifies the specified 14 day out-of-service period.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that RCIC will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest possible moment.

3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event that initiates dynamic loads.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location, size and system affected shall be maintained in accordance with the ISI Program. The accessibility of each snubber shall be based upon the accessibility of the snubber during plant operations (e.g., radiation level, temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.) The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

When a snubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, including the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide further assurance of snubber reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested, during plant shutdowns, at 18 month intervals. Observed failures of these sample snubbers will require functional testing of additional units.

The service life of a snubber is evaluated in accordance with the Service Life Monitoring Plan in the ISI Program. The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. The requirements for the maintenance of records and of the snubber service life review are not intended to affect plant operation.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring devices, are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4 7.6 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression systems consist of the water system, spray and/or sprinkler systems, Halon system and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. When the inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.

The surveillance requirements provide assurance that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the fire suppression systems are met. An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of Halon in the Halon storage tanks by verifying the weight and pressure of the tanks.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.7 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES

The OPERABILITY of the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damage will be limited. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations for conduits, cable trays and piping, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected to verify their OPERABILITY.

3/4.7.8 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause loss of its OPERABILITY.

3/4.7.9 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM

The main turbine bypass system is required to be OPERABLE consistent with the assumptions of the feedwater controller failure analysis in FSAR Chapter 15.

3/4 7.10 STRUCTURAL SETTLEMENT

Structural settlement limitations are imposed and required to be verified so as to preserve the assumptions made in the static design of the major safety related structures.