



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-424/82-19 and 50-425/82-19

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
 P. O. Box 4545
 Atlanta, GA 30302

Facility Name: Alvin Vogtle 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

License Nos. CPPR-108 and CPPR-109

Inspection at Vogtle Nuclear Station site near Waynesboro, Georgia

Inspector: John F. Rogge 9/4/82
 W. F. Sanders Date Signed

Approved by: Vingeth Brownlee 9/9/82
 V. L. Brownlee, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed
 Projects and Resident Programs

SUMMARY

Inspection on July 11- August 10, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 132 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of primary containment fabrication, equipment handling and protection, structural steel installation, steam generator modifications, concrete forms and placements, and pipe installation.

Results

Of the 6 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *H. G. Baker, Executive Vice President
- *F. F. Stacy, General Manager, Oglethorpe Power Corporation
- H. H. Gregory, III, Construction Project Manager
- *M. H. Googe, Assistant Construction Project Manager
- J. A. Bailey, Licensing Project Manager
- W. R. Evans, Project Section Supervisor
- E. D. Groover, QA Site Supervisor
- *R. E. Folker, Senior QA Engineer
- C. W. Hayes, Project QA Manager
- *R. W. McManua, Manager of Quality Control
- C. R. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor
- *R. Newman, Manager of Field Operations
- P. Rice, Manager of QA and Radiation Health and Safety
- C. Sarver, Senior QA Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, inspectors and office personnel.

Other Organizations

- H. R. Reuter, Lead Resident Engineer, Bechtel Power Company
- W. G. Uheuse, Resident Engineer, Bechtel Power Company
- J. R. Runyan, Quality Assurance Manager, Pullman Power Piping
- L. Fields, Site Quality Control Supervisor, Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.

(Open) Violation 50-424, 425/82-11-02 "Scope of Inspection procedures - Paragraph 3."

(Open) Inspector Followup Item 50-424, 425/82-19-01 "Protection for valves - Paragraph 6d."

3. Licensee Action on Inspection Findings

(Open) Violations 50-424, 425/82-11-02 - A procedure SU-T-01, Survey Control, was written to establish guidelines, methods and responsibilities as they would apply to survey section personnel in the layout of Unit 1

and Unit 2 construction. The inspector was informed that this procedure was written in response to the Violations-"Failure to have procedures for final inspections." After a review of the procedure the inspector noted that the procedure did not address all of the inspection characteristics such as; linear dimensional inspections, circularity, radial measuring, alignments, etc. The inspector was informed that this would be reviewed with required personnel and a response given. The violations will remain open until response is evaluated.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort.

Periodic inspections were made throughout this reporting period in the form of general type inspections for different areas of both facilities. The different areas were selected on the basis of the ongoing activities scheduled and varied daily to provide wide coverage. Observations were made of the activities in progress to note obvious defective items or items of noncompliance with the required codes and regulatory requirements. On these inspections, particular note is made of the presence of quality control inspectors, supervisors, and quality control evidence such as available process sheets, drawings, material identification, material protection performance of tests, housekeeping, etc.

Interviews were also made with craft personnel, supervisors, coordinators, quality control inspectors, and others as they were available in the work areas. Inspections were made in the following areas: primary containments; auxiliary building; control building; fuel handling building; fabrication of containment dome; field modifications of steam generators; material storage and pipe laydown areas; river intake structures; and nuclear service cooling water structures; and employee terminations.

With regard to these areas, specific inspections were made of the items listed below.

- a. Primary Containment Dome Fabrication - During the inspection of ground roof assemblies 466A to 479A, it was noted that eight (8) assemblies had been welded with, X-ray and vacuum box testing complete. The inspector reviewed weld procedure G.W. P.S.- SMAWX Rev. 1 relative to specific provisions for welding wide gap weld seam. Chapter 13.0 provides instructions and limitations for spacing up to 3/4" maximum. Beyond 3/4" gap, a special repair procedure is written. A review was made of Special Repair Procedure SR3 which provided criteria for wide gap welding on reactor cavity and thickened imbedment plate 54-DR and between sump 45A and bottom plate 79-5L. Additional reviews were made of Special Repair Procedures SR-4, SR-5, SR-6, SR-7, SR-8 and SR-9. An inspection was made of the work activities on the center head assembly "Dollar Plate" of the fitting, welding, and grinding.

- b. Steam Generator Modifications - A meeting was held between the inspector and personnel from Westinghouse Manufacturing facility in Pensacola, Florida regarding the addition of auxiliary feed water nozzles to be installed in the field on the steam generators for Unit 1. The 4 steam generators for Unit 1 would be modified in the field. The steam generators for Unit 2 will be modified at the vendor plant. The work will be under the jurisdiction, supervised, and performed by personnel from Pensacola with the following exceptions:

- (1) The welders will be local with the tests and qualifications by Westinghouse.
- (2) Radiography and N.D.E will be performed by contract with Law Engineering, Atlanta using Pensacola procedures and final radiograph read and approved by Westinghouse.
- (3) The stress relieving will be performed by Heat Engineering Inc.
- (4) ANI Code inspector will be involved and Code papers will be revised to reflect the additional nozzles.

Additional inspections will be performed periodically throughout the activity.

- c. Employee Terminations - The inspector was informed by the licensee representative that the contractor responsible for the installation of structural steel had terminated 6 craft and 2 supervisors for "unsatisfactory work." The contractor stated that the term "unsatisfactory work" was intended to mean quantity of work and refusal to follow orders and had no reference to product quality. This was subsequently confirmed by a licensee Quality Assurance special audit SP01-82/93 performed between 7-28-82 through 8-2-82. The audit included; review of cause for discharge, field inspection of the welding and bolting, and review of applicable documentation of the activities covered during the tenure of employment of the identified employees. There were no deficiencies relevant to the quality of the work identified. This is also confirmed by the inspector based on periodic inspections made in the primary containment and observations made of the torquing operations performed to the requirements of X2AP01 C.5.1. The inspector also attended the critique meeting when the audit report was presented and discussed with the contractor.
- d. During a walk through inspection in a high traffic area the inspector observed air operated valves with Fisher controls without protection. The valves operating parts were unprotected and had accumulated a covering of grit and dirt and concrete spatter on one. In reviewing these conditions with the licensee Quality Assurance section the inspector was informed that a QA Audit MO-04-82/70 had identified other stored valves and equipment without adequate protection. This item is considered an Inspector Followup Item 50-424, 425/82-19-01.

6. Millet Fault

An NRC/licensee meeting was held to discuss subject matters, on July 14, 1982. The licensee was represented by J. Bailey and G. Grainger of Southern Company Services and T. Crosby of Bechtel Civil and Minerals. The NRC was represented by I. Alterman, Geosciences Branch, J. Grant LPM, NRR, J. Harris, Region II and the Resident Inspector. The meeting was held to discuss the licensee progress, examine core samples and related data and tour the drilling sites.