



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 29, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-097/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-097/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

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CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
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The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-097/03L
Report Date: 09-29-82
Occurrence Date: 09-10-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Missed Surveillance - Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-272.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 80% - Unit Load 850 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 10, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator observed that Surveillance Procedure SP(0)4.4.7.2.d, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Water Inventory, had not been performed within the time interval of 72 hours plus 25% as required by the Technical Specifications. Steady state conditions, which are required for satisfactory performance of the surveillance procedure, could not be obtained due to changes in Xenon reactivity following routine power escalation. The previous RCS water inventory had been performed at 0418 hours, September 7, 1982; at 2218 hours, September 10, 1982, the surveillance interval, including the 25% allowance, elapsed and Action Statement 3.4.7.2.a was entered. Operator surveillance of the containment sump pump and containment radioactivity monitors was increased, and RCS leakage was demonstrated to be within specification limits.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the occurrence was that Surveillance Requirement 4.4.7.2.d does not make allowance for routine, unavoidable fuel poison transients which preclude performance of the surveillance.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The reactor coolant leakage detection systems are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

The boundary is one of several design features (others include the fuel cladding and primary containment) which prevent the release of radioactive fission products to the environment in the event of core damage. As noted, RCS leakage was demonstrated to be within limits indicating the integrity of the pressure boundary was maintained. Furthermore, no degradation of redundant design features occurred. Therefore, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.4.7.2 requires:

With any pressure boundary leakage, be in at least hot standby within 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. With any RCS leakage greater than Technical Specification limits, isolate or reduce the leakage within limits within 4 hours, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, RCS leakage was within specification, in compliance with the action statement. Operating conditions stabilized and the RCS water inventory was immediately performed. The results confirmed that RCS leakage was within specification, and at 1650 hours, September 11, 1982, Action Statement 3.4.7.2 was terminated. License Change Request 82-14 has been submitted to change Technical Specification 3.4.7.2 to eliminate the water inventory requirement during non-steady state operation.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-87