

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-82-06

DATE OF EVENT: September 16, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Monthly Surveillance Test Section 6.2 exceeded its technical specification late date

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2051 and Load (Gross MWE) = 700.

Description of Occurrence: On September 16, 1982, ST 5031.14, the SFRCS Monthly Test, Section 6.2 was found uncompleted in the Instrument and Control (I&C) Shop. It was originally sent to the shop to be performed on September 2, 1982. After an extensive review of all available files and records to verify that in fact it had not been done, and was beyond its technical specification late date of September 12, 1982, the main steam pressure low functions in all SFRCS channels, were declared inoperable at 1416 hours. This exceeded the limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3.3.2.2 for SFRCS instrumentation.

This placed the unit under Technical Specification 3.0.3, whereby the limiting condition for operation cannot be satisfied because of circumstances in excess of those addressed in the specification requiring that the facility be placed in at least Hot Standby within one hour unless corrective measures are completed that permit operation under permissible action statements for the specified time interval as measured from initial discovery.

An emergency Technical Specification change was requested and received at 1520 hours on September 16, 1982 to extend the late date of the surveillance test until 2400 hours on September 16, 1982.

This occurrence is being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.b, operation of the unit or affected systems when any parameter or operation subject to a limiting condition for operation is less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the technical specifications.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was personnel error. The surveillance test was sent to the I&C Shop to be performed on September 2, 1982. When the surveillance test could not be performed because of other maintenance still in progress in the SFRCS, the foreman set the surveillance test aside to be completed the following day. The surveillance test was forgotten, and the I&C intradepartmental list which tells the I&C Shop Foreman which surveillance tests to perform was not issued that week.

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Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. All SFRCS main steam pressure low functions did operate normally during the performance of the surveillance test and would have performed their design safety function. They were declared inoperable due to administrative requirements versus actual operational deficiencies.

Corrective Action: Surveillance Test ST 5013.14, Section 6.2 was immediately begun when it was suspected that it was beyond its late date. It was satisfactorily completed at 1930 hours on September 16, 1982.

This event and its implications were discussed with the foreman and the supervisor. To prevent recurrence, the routine for tracking surveillance testing was modified. A separate scheduled surveillance test list is now maintained by the I&C Supervisor and the I&C Foremen, and a daily status of all scheduled surveillance tests is made to the supervisor by the foremen. The I&C Supervisor has been given the specific responsibility of insuring the scheduled surveillance test list is given to the I&C Shop.

Failure Data: Although there have been previous occurrences of missed surveillance tests due to personnel errors, no previous events involved any incident in excess of the limiting condition for operation.

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