PSE&G

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 3, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-062/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-062/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks 737

CC: Distribution

IE22

Report Number: 82-062/03L

Report Date: 09-03-82

Occurrence Date: 08-13-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Coolant System Chemistry - Missed Surveillance.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-233.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 97% - Unit Load 1050 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1015 hours, August 17, 1982, it was reported to the operating shift, that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Chemistry Surveillance due on August 13, 1982, at 1805 hours, had not been completed until 0001 hours, August 14, 1982. The Chemistry Analyst had performed the other tests, but failed to perform the oxygen analysis on time. Therefore, between 1810 hours, August 13, 1982, and 0001 hours, August 14, 1982, the conditions of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.4.7a were applicable.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of this occurrence was oversight by the Chemistry Analyst.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The limitations on RCS chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized, and reduce the potential for RCS leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining chemistry within the steady state limit provides adequate corrosion protection of the RCS over the life of the plant.

As noted, the chloride and flouride analyses had been performed within the time specified by the surveillance requirement, only the oxygen analysis had been missed. The oxygen analysis performed prior to this occurrence and the analysis performed at 0001 hours, August 14, 1982, showed dissolved oxygen concentration to be less than 5 ppb.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

The steady state limit for dissolved oxygen is .1 ppm or less. The reactor coolant hydrogen concentration, which would have been depleted in the presence of dissolved oxygen, was shown to be within specification prior to and after this occurrence. Hence, it can be assumed that dissolved oxygen concentration was below the specified steady state limit for the duration of this occurrence. Therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

As noted, chemistry was shown to be within the Technical Specification Limits, however, the surveillance requirement was not performed within the time limit specified. Therefore, this occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.4.7a requires:

> With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its steady state limit, but within its transient limit, restore the parameter to within its steady state limit within 24 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, the surveillance was performed and dissolved oxygen concentration was shown to be below the specified limit. The Chemistry Supervisor counseled the analyst on the implications of this occurrence. Written guidance was given to all chemistry analysts stressing the importance of this surveillance and its frequency requirements.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller

General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-80