



OFFICE OF THE  
COMMISSIONER

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

April 20, 1982

*Attachment 1  
Page 1 of 2*

MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks  
Executive Director of Operations

FROM: Commissioner Roberts *WR*

SUBJECT: SECY-82-142 -- REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCES FOR OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1981

Could you please arrange a briefing for me on Item No. 3 of Enclosure 3 to the subject report, "Overpressurization of the Reactor Coolant System" (Turkey Point, Unit 4).

cc: Chairman Palladino  
Commissioner Gilinsky  
Commissioner Ahearne  
SECY

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FROM: Commissioner Ahearne		ACTION CONTROL	CONTROL NO.
		COMPL DEADLINE	11760
		ACKNOWLEDGMENT	DATE OF DOCUMENT
		INTERIM REPLY	4/8/82
TO: Chilk		FINAL REPLY	PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF:
		FILE LOCATION	<input type="checkbox"/> CHAIRMAN
			<input type="checkbox"/> EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
			OTHER:
DESCRIPTION <input type="checkbox"/> LETTER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEMO <input type="checkbox"/> REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS	
Req explanation of staff reasoning whether #3 of enclosure 3 should be an abnormal occurrence (SECY-82-142)		<p><u>PRIORITY</u></p> <p>AEOD CHECK w/ B. D. Liaw &amp; see what is required. If meeting, get on his calender - maybe a phone call will suffice. TAREhm</p>	
CLASSIFIED DATA			
DOCUMENT/COPY NO.		CLASSIFICATION	
NUMBER OF PAGES		CATEGORY	
POSTAL REGISTRY NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> NSI <input type="checkbox"/> RD <input type="checkbox"/> FRD	
ASSIGNED TO:	DATE	INFORMATION ROUTING	LEGAL REVIEW <input type="checkbox"/> FINAL <input type="checkbox"/> COPY
Michelson, AEOD	4/12/82	Dircks	NO LEGAL OBJECTIONS NOTIFY:
		Cornell	<input type="checkbox"/> EDO ADMIN & CORPES BR
		Rehm	EXT.
		DeYoung	COMMENTS, NOTIFY:
		Denton	EXT.
		Cunningham, F. D.	JCAE NOTIFICATION RECOMMENDED: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

NRC FORM 232  
(12-75)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL

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All

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

May 10, 1982

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 82-13: FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE HFA RELAYS

Addressees:

All holders of a nuclear power reactor operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP).

Purpose:

This information notice is provided as an early notification of a potentially significant problem pertaining to General Electric type HFA relays with LEXAN or NYLON coil spools in safety related systems. It is expected that addressees will review the information for applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is required at this time.

Description of Circumstances:

NRC IE Information Notice 81-01, dated January 16, 1981, alerted licensees and holders of construction permits of LEXAN coil spool surface cracking. General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 44 Supplement 2 dated February 1981 directed to all boiling water reactor (BWR) owners and General Electric Service Advice PSM 152.1 dated April 28, 1976 directed to all General Electric (GE) customers advised them of the coil cracking problem and recommended replacing cracked LEXAN and NYLON coil spools with new Century Series "TEFZEL" coil spools or replacement of the entire relay with a HFA Century Series relay.

Recently, in addition to the previously identified cracking problem, there have been several instances of melting of LEXAN and NYLON coil spool material. The licensee reports listed below are some reported instances of melting in HFA relays:

1. Monticello - Northern States Power Company reported on November 6, 1981 that during cold shutdown, a GE type 12HFA 51A49F relay pertaining to primary containment isolation system logic circuit failed to open when deenergized.

Follow-up investigation indicated that partial melting of the NYLON coil spool prevented the relay from moving to the deenergized position for several minutes after the coil was deenergized. Several switches in series with the relay coil circuit were burned-out and had to be replaced.

2. Millstone 1 - Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported on February 24, 1982 that during a routine surveillance one GE type HFA relay associated with the containment isolation logic circuit stayed in the energized position when deenergized. As discussed below, melted LEXAN material

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was found to be the cause. The relay deenergizes to cause main steam isolation valve closure on main steamline high radiation. The logic requires one of two channels in each of two trip systems to deenergize and cause the isolation. The other three channels were operable, therefore, an actual high main steamline radiation level would have resulted in valve closure.

3. Brunswick 2 - Carolina Power & Light Company reported on February 4, 1982 that during the functional performance test of the primary containment isolation system main steamline high flow channel it was discovered that the main steamline high-flow channel "C" logic would not actuate. The details of this failure are somewhat different than the failures observed at Monticello and Millstone 1. In Brunswick 2, the armature apparently did move to the deenergized position. However, melted insulation from the relay coil of the actuation relay GE Model 12HFA 51A49F had coated the relay contacts, preventing electrical contact. Like the Millstone 1 event, the remaining main steamline high flow channels "A", "B" and "D" were operable and would have initiated isolation upon an actual high flow condition.

During earlier surveillance and coil replacement programs, testing did not identify a failure in the mechanism which would prevent the relay contacts from opening. Subsequent evaluation of the Millstone 1 relay by GE Power Systems Management Business Department in Philadelphia, led to the following analysis: A piece of the spool flange fell into the gap between the open armature and pole face. When the relay was energized the armature attempted to close but was prevented from sealing against the pole face due to the piece of spool flange in the air gap. At this point the contacts could have been just touching. This created a fixed air gap in the magnetic circuit. The increase in the current caused by an air gap produced an excessive temperature rise in the coil. This excessive temperature rise, thru conduction and convection to the armature assembly and shading ring and eventually the piece of spool flange caused the loose piece of spool flange and remaining spool flange to soften, melt and move. As the piece of spool flange in the gap melted, the air gap closed permitting the normally open contacts to fully close. In addition, the closure of the gap reduced the current to normal. This reduction in current caused a lower temperature and melted LEXAN then hardened and created a bond between the armature and the pole face. Thus, when the coil was deenergized the return spring force was not enough to break this bond. Subsequent testing of the coil shows that the coil is in normal operating condition (no shorted turns).

Although the examples cited above relate to BWRs, the GE type HFA relays are also commonly used in the safety system logic circuits of pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The above information identifies means whereby the function of a major safety-related system can be jeopardized or compromised by relay malfunctions.

GE has notified its BWR and PWR customers of its findings and has reiterated the need for periodic visual inspections. In addition, GE has also amplified its earlier recommendations. In the event that cracked spools or evidence of overheating is observed, GE recommends that either the entire

relay be replaced with a HFA Century Series relay or that the LEXAN or NYLON coil spool be replaced with Century Series TEFZEL coil spools.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, or this office.

Sincerely,

Edward L. Jordan, Director  
Division of Engineering and  
Quality Assurance  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact: W. Laudan  
301-492-4766

Attachment:  
Recently issued IE Information Notices

mkm  
5/4/82  
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DEQA:IE  
WLaudan  
4/ /82

DEQA:IE  
ADromerick  
4/ /82

DEQA:IE  
RBAer  
4/ /82

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DEQA:IE  
EJordan  
5/6/82

RECENTLY ISSUED  
IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date of Issue	Issued to
82-12	Surveillance of Hydraulic Snubbers	4/21/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-11	Potential Inaccuracies in Wide Range Pressure Instruments used in Westinghouse Designed Plants	04/09/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-10	Following up Symptomatic Repairs to Assure Resolution of the Problem	04/09/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-09	Cracking in Piping of Makeup Coolant Lines at B&W Plants	03/31/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-08	Check Valve Failures on Diesel Generator Engine Cooling System	03/26/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-07	Inadequate Security Screening Programs	03/16/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-06	Failure of Steam Generator Primary Side Manway Closure Studs	03/12/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-05	Increasing Frequency of Drug-Related Incidents	03/10/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-04	Potential Deficiency of Certain AGASTAT E-7000 Series Time-Delay Relays	03/10/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
82-03	Environmental Tests of Electrical Terminal Blocks	03/04/82	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP

OL = Operating License  
CP = Construction Permit

MAY 14 1982

*M. Caruso*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director  
Division of Licensing

FROM: G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Safety Assessment  
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS MEETING  
ON MAY 5, 1982

On May 5, 1982, an Operating Reactor Event meeting was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors, and their representatives on events which occurred since the last meeting. The list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Attachment 2. In addition to these events, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Attachment 3.

The next Operating Reactor Events meeting is scheduled for May 19, 1982.

*G.C. Lainas*

G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Safety Assessment  
Division of Licensing

Attachments:  
As stated

cc w/attachments:  
Meeting Attendees

ORAB Members

- |              |             |
|--------------|-------------|
| H. Denton    | T. Novak    |
| E. Case      | G. Lainas   |
| R. Mattson   | R. Tedesco  |
| R. Vollmer   | T. Ippolito |
| S. Hanauer   | G. Holahan  |
| T. Murley    | H. Thompson |
| C. Michelson | M. Ernst    |
| C. Heltemes  | W. Inners   |
|              | L. Shao     |

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*PDR*

SURNAME	DL:ORAB/SL	DL:ORAB/SL	DL:ORAB	DL:AD/SA		
	MCaruso:sh	GHolahan:sah	TIPPEL to	GLainas		
DATE	5/12/82	5/17/82	5/14/82	5/14/82		



MEETING ATTENDEES

H. Denton  
M. Conner  
M. Caruso  
T. Speis  
V. Rooney  
J. Carter  
M. Grotenhuis  
D. Muller  
R. Wessman  
E. Imbro  
B. Mills  
A. Pattou, IE  
C. Gould, IE  
F. Witt  
F. Schroeder  
T. Novak  
M. Fairtile  
R. Ramirez  
G. Holahan  
G. Lainas  
C. Nelson  
T. Ippolito

## OPERATING REACTORS EVENT BRIEFING

MAY 5, 1982

- HATCH 1 - UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN DUE TO CONDUCTIVITY INCREASE, APRIL 24, 1982 (MFAIRTILE)
  - PLANT SHUTDOWN AFTER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT ON CONDUCTIVITY EXCEEDED (10  $\mu$ MHO/CM)
  - COOLANT PH DROPPED TO 4.0, CHLORIDES REACH HIGH OF 2.0 PPM
  - 35 OUT OF 124 LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR CASINGS FAILED
  - CAUSE OF EVENT THOUGHT TO BE RESIN LOSS FROM DEMINERALIZERS INTO RCS
  - CHLORIDES REDUCED TO 1 PPM
  - LICENSEE PREPARING RECOVERY PLAN AND RESPONSES TO STAFF CONCERNS OVER IMPACT OF OFF-NORMAL CHEMISTRY
  - PM AND REGION II WILL MEET WITH LICENSEE PRIOR TO RE-START
  
- VERMONT YANKEE, APRIL 24, 1982 - REACTOR SCRAM WITH HPCI/RCIC ACTUATION (VROONEY)
  - FEEDWATER REGULATOR VALVE CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIP ON HIGH WATER LEVEL
  - AUTO START OF STANDBY PUMP AND MANUAL RESTART OF TRIPPED FEEDWATER PUMPS INITIATED ON LOW LEVEL
  - FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIP AGAIN ON HIGH WATER LEVEL
  - AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW WATER LEVEL
  - AUTOMATIC HPCI/RCIC AND D/G START AND MSIV CLOSURE ON LOW-LOW WATER LEVEL
  - HPCI/RCIC TRIP ON HIGH WATER LEVEL
  - MSIV'S MANUALLY REOPENED
  - REACTOR WATER LEVEL NORMAL, PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE STABILIZED
  - ECCS INITIATION NOT NOTICED BY OPERATORS FOR 2 HOURS

- TURKEY POINT 3 AND 4 - TRIP OF BOTH UNITS RESULTING IN BLACKOUT OF 700,000 CUSTOMERS (MGROTEHUIS)
  - AT 4:50 PM GROUND FAULT ON UNIT 3 CONDENSATE PUMP RESULTED IN LOSS OF FW
  - UNIT 3 REACTOR TRIP ON LOW SG LEVEL
  - UNIT 3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER OUT-OF-SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE, CAUSING DG START
  - SHEDDING OF NON-VITAL LOADS CAUSED A LOSS OF POWER TO A UNIT 4 ROD POSITION INDICATION PANEL WHICH WAS USING A NON-VITAL ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE BECAUSE OF A PREVIOUS INVERTER FAILURE
  - TURBINE RUNBACK CAUSED BY DROPPED ROD SIGNAL RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP AT 4:58 PM
  - GRID PERTURBATION RESULTED IN TWO FOSSIL UNITS TRIPPING AND A 20 TO 50 MINUTE BLACKOUT 700,000 CUSTOMERS
  
- SONGS-2, RCS LEAKAGE, APRIL 28, 1982 (HRood)
  - LEAKS DETECTED IN SI CHECK VALVES AND RC DRAIN TANK VALVES DURING POST CORE HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTS
  - 3.0 GPM LEAK IN ONE SI CHECK VALVE, ESTIMATED 20 GPM LEAK IN THE SECOND SI CHECK VALVE
  - PLANT SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURE FOR RCS LEAKAGE
  
- ST. LUCIE 1 - PRESSURIZER SPRAY CONTROL VALVE LEAK, APRIL 24, 1982 (CNELSON)
  - 20 GPM LEAK TO CONTAINMENT DETECTED AT 2:15 PM
  - LEAK ISOLATED BY MANUALLY CLOSING VALVES AT 3:30 PM
  - PLANT OPERATING WITH FULL CAPACITY REDUNDANT SPRAY LINE
  - WILL INSPECT AND REPAIR DURING OUTAGE SCHEDULED FOR MAY 5

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
ITEMS OF INTEREST

Week Ending April 23, 1982

1. The following Significant Enforcement Action was taken during the past week:

EN-82-13, Consumers Power Company (Palisades) - On April 21, 1982 the Region III Administrator modified an Order issued to the licensee on March 9, 1981. The Order modified and relaxed the restrictions on the licensee to allow the licensed operators to work overtime in accordance with the limits prescribed in the NRC's general policy (46 Federal Register 7352).

2. The following Preliminary Notifications were dispatched during the past week:

- a. PNO-I-82-31, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (Nine Mile Point Unit 1) - Linear Indications In Reactor Recirculation System Piping.
- b. PNO-II-82-40, Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Units 1 and 2) - Media Interest In North Anna Event.
- c. PNO-II-82-41, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Surry Units 1 and 2) - Unplanned Gaseous Release.
- d. PNO-II-82-42, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Surry Units 1 and 2) - Fire In Steam Generator Repair Building.
- e. PNO-II-82-43, Carolina Power and Light Company (Robinson Unit 2) - Radiation Dosimeter Discrepancy.
- f. PNO-II-82-44, Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Unit 1) - Minor Fire In Auxiliary Building.
- g. PNO-II-82-45, Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Units 3 and 4) - Bomb Threat.
- h. PNO-III-82-38A and 38B, Toledo Edison Company (Davis-Besse Unit 1) - Damage to Auxiliary Feedwater Header, Updates.
- i. PNO-III-82-41, Toledo Edison Company (Davis Besse Unit 1) - Turbine Blade Damage.
- j. PNO-III-82-42, Commonwealth Edison Company (LaSalle Unit 1) - LaSalle Unit 1 Receives Low-Power License, Begins Fuel Load.
- k. PNO-III-82-43, Medical College of Ohio (Toledo, Ohio) - Cesium-137 Vaginal Applicator Therapy Misadministration, Exceeding 10% Above the Prescribed Treatment Dose.

- l. PNO-IV-82-15, Arkansas Power and Light Company (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2) - Plant Shutdown Due to Steam Generator Blowdown Line Leak.
- m. PNO-V-82-14D, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco) - High Pressure Injection Thermal Sleeve Degradation.
- n. PNO-V-82-17 and 17A, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco) - Auxiliary Feedwater OTSG Header Information.
- o. PNO-V-82-18, Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3) - Strike Involving San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
- p. PNO-V-82-19, Washington Public Power Supply System (Washington Nuclear Project Number One) - Executive Board Meeting On BPA Recommendation to Suspend/Slow Down Construction of WNP-1 For Two to Five Years.

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
ITEMS OF INTEREST

Week Ending April 30, 1982

1. There were no Significant Enforcement Actions taken during the past week.
2. The following Preliminary Notifications were dispatched during the past week:
  - a. PNO-I-81-128B, W. R. Grace and Company (Wayne, New Jersey) - Radioactive Materials Discovered Offsite, Update.
  - b. PNO-I-82-33, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee) - Reactor Scram And HPCI/RCIC Actuation.
  - c. PNO-I-82-34, Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham) - Impersonation of NRC Inspector.
  - d. PNS-I-82-02, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Salem), General Public Utilities (Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2), Jersey Central Power and Light Company (Oyster Creek) - Bomb Threat.
  - e. PNS-I-82-03, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Salem) - Suspected Sabotage.
  - f. PNO-II-82-46, Virginia Commonwealth University (Medical Center, Richmond, Virginia) - Lost I-125 Radiotherapy Seeds.
  - g. PNO-II-82-47, Duke Power Company (Oconee Unit 3) - Shutdown Greater Than Two Days.
  - h. PNO-II-82-48, Georgia Power Company (Hatch Unit 2) - Water Spill In Turbine Building.
  - i. PNO-II-82-49, Carolina Power and Light Company (Robinson Unit 2) - Broken Reactor Coolant Pump Bolts.
  - j. PNO-II-82-50, Georgia Power Company (Hatch Unit 1) - Unplanned Shutdown Due to Conductivity.
  - k. PNO-II-82-51, Duke Power Company (Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3) - Degraded Tendons In The Shield Wall.
  - l. PNO-III-82-44, Commonwealth Edison Company (LaSalle) - Receipt of Allegations And Request For Suspension Of Operating License.
  - m. PNO-IV-82-16, Public Service Company of Colorado (Fort St. Vrain) - Unplanned Release Of Radioactive Gases.

- n. PNO-V-82-14F, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco) - High Pressure Injection Thermal Sleeve Degradation.
- o. PNO-V-82-20, Portland General Electric Company (Trojan) - Reactor Fuel Degradation.
- p. PNO-V-82-21, Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre) - Declaration Of Unusual Event Due To RCS Leakage.
- q. PNS-V-82-01, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco) - Bomb Threat.

e. Enforcement Staff

The following payments of civil penalties were received during the past week:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company (Robinson) - \$40,000, Enforcement Notification 81-44A dated February 23, 1982.
2. Georgia Power Company (Hatch) - \$40,000, Enforcement Notification 82-06 dated March 25, 1982.
3. Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah) - \$50,000, Enforcement Notification 82-05 dated March 25, 1982.
4. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee) - \$30,000, Enforcement Notification 81-40A dated March 29, 1982.



INCOMPLETE ITEMS

Meeting Date	Responsible Branch	Task Description	Comment
10/31/80	ORAB/IE	Generic review of Tech Specs to assure decay heat removal capability in all modes and surveillance of heat exchangers.	OREM under development; revise draft circular to include 5/6/81 events.
12/31/80	DE(MTEB)	Review of VEPCO claim that turbine disc failure would not penetrate turbine casing.	5/19/81 awaiting topical report from Westinghouse.
1/7/81	RRAB	Review Hatch 1 & 2 history of problems with mechanical system.	Resources not programmed, reviewers priority NTCP (3 week effort required).
1/20/81	ORAB	Followup of Palisades Loss of DC Battery Power.	OREM under development is being updated.
4/8/81	IE	Include description of Millstone 1 event in IE Notice.	Awaiting information.
5/6/81	IE	Investigate cracking in FW regulatory valves at Beaver Valley; determine if generic problem.	Awaiting information.
5/6/81	ORAB/AEOD/DSI	Continue review of loss of DC.	OREM (ORAB) in concurrence.
5/6/81	DST	Review pump seal failures.	Ongoing review.
5/6/81	ORAB	Compile plant by plant list of briefing events since 12/80.	12/80 to 11/81 list presented on 12/16/81
5/13/81	DST	Review TS action statements requiring rapid shutdown (1 hr) with respect to safety significance.	i.e., CR-3 filter requirement. W TS 3.0.3 and 3.5.2 included review as result of 2/12/82 McGuire event.

Meeting Date	Responsible Branch	Task Description	Comment
5/13/81	DSI	Establish a plan to assure adequate review of Bulletin 79-27.	A. DSI developed bulletin review approach-Complete. B. DL has lead to coordinate bulletin supplement with IE.
6/3/81	IE	Provide followup regarding San Onofre contaminated sand-source identification.	
7/24/81	DL/DST/DE	Provide recommendations to change SRP as necessary as a result of North Anna fire investigation.	
7/24/81	DE	Address MSIV failures in licensing review of Zimmer and LaSalle.	
8/7/81	ORAB	Check Beaver Valley requirement for availability of power to ECCS valves.	To be assigned subject to availability of resources.
9/7/81	DSI/DHF	Determine the acceptability of reactor water level oscillations; evaluate the effect of high drywell temperature on the level water columns.	Task Interface Agreement established.
9/7/81	DL	PM to have meeting with licensees and NSSS suppliers on thermal shield bolt failures and their safety significance.	Meeting held on 9/9/81.
10/28/81	DL	PM to update report on Hatch 1 fuel damage.	Information Report from Georgia Power & Light Co. due 10/82
10/28/81	DL	PM to update report on St. Lucie steam generator tube problem.	
10/28/81	IE	Write Information Notice on Dresden 3 diesel generator cooling water system failure.	Complete; IE Notice 82-08

Meeting Date	Responsible Branch	Task Description	Comment
10/28/81	PM	Notify the board about the cracks in Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 batteries	
12/2/81	DL	PM to update reports on Dresden 3 diesel generator cooling water system failure.	
12/2/81	IE	Provide update on Pilgrim cable damage and SRV failures.	Due 12/9/81.
12/2/81	ORB#2	Ippolito to consult with GE before developing generic letter on two-stage and three-stage Target-ROC SRVs.	
12/9/81	DL	PM to report cause of Aux FW pump failures at Zion 2.	
1/7/82	ORAB	Collect sequence of events and data on St. Lucie RCS blowdown for DST use in code and model verification.	If DSI requires data, the licensee wants formal request for it.
	IE	Review recent fire system actuations and consider development of an Information Notice.	
	DE	Review recent fire system actuations and consider the need for modifications to requirements or reviews.	Reviewer assigned; Draft Review Plan in preparation
1/7/82	ORAB	Consolidate position on Air Systems involve industry Info/Reg. Rep. Groups.	Under development.
1/7/82	DE/ORAB	Keep Steam Generator Tube Integrity Report up-to-date (include Millstone 2 experience).	Ongoing.

Meeting Date	Responsible Branch	Task Description	Comment
1/22/82	ORAB	Assess whether a generic T/S change is needed to distinguish between inoperability of control function vs scram function.	To be assigned subject to availability of resources.
2/11/82	IE	Provide follow-up on Palisades loss of cooling tower pump event with regard to on use of overcooling during transient.	
3/3/82	IE	McGuire - Loss of two charging pumps due to cavitation. Followup and an Information Notice	Draft Information Notice in IE review
3/3/82	DL	T. Novak to follow up with BWR regulatory response group on HPCI steam supply line break logic error.	
2	IE	Follow up for GE recommendation on HFA relay lexan coil spool melting.	
3/3/82	DL	Consult with RE:III regarding need for assistance for Zion steam generator hinge and aluminum cover problem.	Task Plan (TIA) in preparation (TAC #48043)
3/17/82	DSI	Determine how S/G manway failure is bounded by LOCA break spectrum analysis.	
3/17/82	DE	Investigate the adequacy of materials used for S/G manway cover studs.  Investigate the use of furmanite for temporary leak stoppage of high pressure systems.	TIA issued (NRR 82-5)
3/31/82	IE	Followup and report boron concentration stratification in RWST at San Onofre Unit 2; determine if generic problem.	

Meeting Date	Responsible Branch	Task Description	Comment
4/21/82	DE	Establish applicability of the Westinghouse wide range pressure instrument uncertainty to EQ program.	
4/21/82	DE	Arrange for an independent consultant for inspection of Robinson Reactor Vessel for cracks.	
5/5/82	IE	Investigate adequacy of licensee notification of Vermont Yankee Excess Feedwater event	Region I report under review
5/5/82	ORAB	Compare Vermont Yankee Excess Feedwater event with FSAR Chapter 15 analysis of event	Region I report under review
5/5/82	DHFS	Review adequacy of Vermont Yankee control room design in light of operator actions during 4/24/82 excess feedwater event	Plan for review due by 5/12/82
5/5/82	OLB/LQB	Review operators and STA qualification in light of 4/24/82 event at Vermont Yankee	Plan for review due by 5/12/82
5/5/82	TTRB	Review Vermont Yankee EOP in light of 4/24/82 event	Plan for review due by 5/12/82