P. O. BOX 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408



FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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September 9, 1982 L-82-402

Mr. James P. O Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389, 10 CFR 50.55(e), 82-015 Broken Phase Insulators in Heat Trace Panels

On August 13, 1982, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) notified the Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) of a potential deficiency regarding the insulators in the chemical and volume control system heat tracing power panels. Attached please find our final resolution of this issue.

Very truly yours,

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
Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems and Technology

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Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

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I. Summary

During a planned start up inspection, cracks were discovered in the heat trace power panel phase insulators. It has been determined that overstressing of the insulators during shipping and/or receiving is the most probable cause of the subject cracking. An evaluation was performed and corrective action has been implemented.

Per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and part 21, this concern has been evaluated and deemed n n-reportable.

II. Description

A planned start up inspection of the heat trace power panels revealed cracks in the panel phase insulators. The insulators retained their required position and the cracks did not prevent them from insulating the power panels from the bus. An investigation has determined the most probable cause of cracking to be overstressing of the insulators during shipment or receipt handling.

III. Corrective Action

A nonconformance report (NCR 389E) was issued and the insulators have been replaced with spare components.

IV. Safety Implications

The heat tracing panels are part of the chemical and volume control system. The heat tracing system is designed to prevent boric acid precipitation in sections of the CVCS system which contain concentrated boric acid solution. Under worst case conditions, the cracked insulators could cause a loss of power to the heat tracing panels. This loss of power is annunciated locally as well as in the control room. Assuming worst case condition at least three (3) hours will be available before boric acid precipitation is expected thereby providing the operator ample time in which to borate the Reactor Coolant System. Also the refueling water tank is an alternate source of borated water which can be utilized to borate the RCS. Therefore, the capability to safely operate or shutdown the plant is not affected. Additionally, the required repair to the heat tracing panels is extremely minor. We deem the incident non-reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) and part 21.

V. Conclusion

With the above mentioned correct ve action, this item is resolved and closed regarding part 50.55(e) reporting requirements. All pertinent documentation regarding this item will be maintained at the site.