GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

September 10, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report Update
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-39/03X-1

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report Update to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-39/03X-1 in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report Update
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-39/03X-1

Report Date

September 10, 1982

Occurrence Date

July 1, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing, the backup valve monitoring channel (thermocouple) for Safety Valve NR28J was found to be inoperable. This condition is permitted by a limiting condition for operation as given in paragraph 3.13.B.2 of the Technical Specifications.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in steady state of operation.

Major Plant Parameters:

Power: Reactor - 1521 MWt
Generator - 505 MWe

Mode Switch Position: RUN

Description of Occurrence

During the performance of the "Thermocouple Valve Monitoring System Monthly Channel Check" procedure, the thermocouple for Safety Valve NR28J was found to be inoperable (not meeting procedural acceptance criteria).

In accordance with Section 3.13.B.2 of the Technical Specifications, the acoustic monitors (primary indication) for safety valves NR28J, NR28H and NR28K were checked. Since the acoustic monitors for all three valves were operable, the limiting condition for operation was met by reducing the setpoint of the acoustic monitor on one of the adjacent valves (NR28H).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the thermocouple failure was due to one terminal screw inside primary containment backing out, causing the terminal to make intermittent contact, thus resulting in erratic readings.

Analysis of Occurrence

There are two types of instruments installed on the safety and relief valves in order to detect inadvertant valve opening. The primary indication is an acoustic monitor which senses acoustic levels at the valve discharge. The backup indication is a thermocouple which senses the temperature at the valve discharge. Per Technical Specifications, the adjacent safety valves must have operable acoustic monitors, if a safety valve thermocouple is declared inoperable. In this case, the setpoint of one of the adjacent acoustic monitors is reduced, due to the fact that the valves are physically close together so that the acoustic monitor for the adjacent valve detects the opening of the valve next to it. Since the acoustic monitor for the affected safety valve was operable, appropriate actions were taken per Technical Specifications, and as the thermocouple serves as a backup indication for the acoustic monitor, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action taken was to reduce the setpoint of an adjacent safety valve's acoustic monitor.

During a recent outage, the subject terminal screw was replaced, tightened, and placed back in service. The setpoint of the adjacent safety valve's acoustic monitor was increased to its original setting.

Failure Data

This thermocouple previously failed and was replaced during an outage on May 25, 1982.