

August 25, 1982

DMB 016

Dockets Nos. 50-313 & 368

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Stolz, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #4, DL
FROM: Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager, Operating Reactors Branch #4
SUBJECT: FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
CONCERNING ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN MEANS FOR ANO-1 & 2 -
APPENDIX R

Time & Date: August 31, 1982, Tuesday
10:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Location:

Purpose: To discuss questions (Enclosure 1)
concerning the alternate safe shutdown
means for ANO-1 & 2

Requested Participants: NRC-Guy Vissing, Charles Trammell,
Jan Stevens, Vince Panciera, Raj Goel

AP&L-Larry Parscale, Ted Enos

Other-John Taylor, B&W
H. George, TERA

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
1. Questions

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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PDR ADOCK 05000313
F PDR

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|---------|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| OFFICE | ORB#4:DL | | | | | | |
| SURNAME | GVissing/cb | | | | | | |
| DATE | 8/ /82 | | | | | | |

MEETING NOTICE DISTRIBUTION
OPERATING REACTORS, DIVISION OF LICENSING

Docket File
NRC PDR
L PDR

Regional Administrator
U. S. N. R. C., Region IV

ORB#4 Rdg
JStolz
Project Manager
GLainas
JHeltemes, AEOD
OELD
IE-3
OSD-3
SShowe, IE (PWR)
Licensing Assistant
Receptionist, Bethesda
ACRS-10
Program Support Branch
PTKuo (seismic reviews only)

RMattson
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Meeting Notice File
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FPagano, EPLB
SRamos, EPDB
MJambour
NRC Participants:

C. Trammell
J. Stevens
V. Panciera
R. Goel

POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNITS 1 and 2

BNL Questions/Information Requests on Licensee's 7/1/82 Submittal

1. The licensee should define the systems required to bring the plant to both hot and cold shutdown conditions. This includes all required mechanical and electrical support systems. The equipment, instrumentation and cable in each fire area should be tabulated.
2. For the fourteen fire zones that the licensee indicates are in full compliance with Appendix R, but require some sort of manual or non-routine operation, the licensee should describe the safe shutdown equipment and cables that would be effected by a fire and the specific operator actions that would be required to obviate these effects.
3. The licensee should present additional detail in regards to the operator actions that would be required to provide alternate shutdown independent of the control room and cable spreading rooms. Is the licensee going to prepare emergency procedures to implement these operator actions?
4. Will the loss of offsite power affect the capability of supplying diesel generator fuel oil, via the transfer pumps, to both units.
5. Performance goals of Section III.L
 - a. Will the reactor trip system be used for shutdown?
 - b. What is the source of boration and makeup water?
 - c. Will the pressurizer heaters, or some means of pressure control, be used for shutdown? If so, please describe.
 - d. Will indications be available for source range monitoring and any necessary tank levels?
 - e. What are the ventilation and electrical distribution systems required for alternate shutdown.
 - f. What are the systems required to achieve cold shutdown?
6. Can the units be brought to cold shutdown within 72 hours?

7. Associated Circuits:

- a. Please detail the scope of the associated circuits reviewed. Was it for all areas containing safe shutdown cables, or for only process monitoring cables for alternate shutdown?
 - b. For the common power source situation, has the licensee addressed the 4kV systems? Is the circuit protection coordinated, and is this an ongoing program?
 - c. For the spurious signal and common enclosure concerns, the licensee should demonstrate compliance in these areas by providing a detailed zone by zone analysis, or by providing a description of design philosophy that obviates these concerns.
8. Has the licensee identified all cables or equipment whose failure due to the effects of a fire may cause spurious operation and violate a high/low pressure interface, thereby creating a LOCA? If so, please list and identify the resolution of any violations.
9. The licensee should clarify whether any cases of fires in shutdown logic trains or panels have been identified which could affect the operation or maloperation of safe shutdown equipment. If so, what has been done to correct the situations?
10. Has the licensee verified that at least one set of instruments and associated cables required for safe shutdown will be operable following a fire in any area of the plant?