



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 7  
License No. NPF-10

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for license and the applications for amendment thereof (dated May 14, July 9, and July 12, 1982) for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (the facility) filed by the Southern California Edison Company on behalf of itself and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside and The City of Anaheim, California (licensees) comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The Southern California Edison Company\* is technically qualified to engage in the activities authorized by this operating license in accordance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - E. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;

\*The Southern California Edison Company is authorized to act as agent for the other co-owners and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility.

F. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraphs 2.C(1), 2.C(2), and 2.C(5) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 are hereby amended to read as follows:

(1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 7, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4)

a. \* \* \*

b. \* \* \*

c. Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall provide affirmation of implementation of the maintenance program procedures.

d. Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall provide affirmation of implementation of the improved surveillance program procedures.

3. In addition, paragraphs 2.C(23), 2.C(24), and 2.C(25) to Operating License No. NPF-10 are hereby added, to read as follows:

(23) Emergency Preparedness Conditions

a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982

Within five (5) months of initially exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:

- i. Demonstrate that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.1-12, pp. 136-140),

at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response organizations (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, and Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).

- ii. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).
  - iii. Provide plans demonstrating that SCE and offsite jurisdictions have developed and stand ready to implement arrangements for medical services for members of the offsite public. Documentation of the arrangements and provisions made shall be provided to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board as well as to the NRC staff (see Initial Decision, Section III, pp. 43-47, and Section V, Paragraph D, pp. 216-217).
  - iv. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (Making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).
- b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2) will apply.

(24) RCS Depressurization System (PORV's)


By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, requesting additional information relative to the capability of San Onofre 2 and 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operated relief valves (PORVs).

(25) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Motor Bearings

By October 30, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposed hardware modification and schedule for implementation that will increase the reliability of the AFW motor-driven pumps in the event of a break in the high energy line feeding the steam-driven pump. In the interim, prior to the installation of a hardware modification acceptable to the NRC staff, SCE shall perform an augmented in-service inspection of the steam line in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.

4. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: SEP 7 1982

AMENDMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10DOCKET NO. 50-361

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>Overleaf</u> <u>page</u>	<u>Amended</u> <u>Page</u>
	3/4 3-57
	3/4 3-58
3/4 3-60	3/4 3-59
3/4 3-62	3/4 3-61
3/4 7-32	3/4 7-31

TABLE 3.3-11

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS  
MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE\*

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
1	<u>Containment</u>						
	Cable Tray Areas Elev 63'3"			10			
	Cable Tray Areas Elev 45'			9			
	Cable Tray Areas Elev 30'			4			
	Elevator Machinery Room			1			
	Combustible Oil Area						
	Two steam generator rooms						32
	Charcoal Filter Area	2					
	Elev 45'						
2	<u>Penetration</u>						
	Elev 63'6"						12
4	<u>New Fuel Storage Area and</u>						
	<u>Spent Fuel Pool Areas</u>						
	Spent Fuel Pool			4			
	New Fuel Pool			3			
5	<u>Control Building Elev 70'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 423				2		24
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 449				3		24
6	<u>Control Building Elev 70'</u>						
	Radiation Chemical Lab Rms 421, 420			1			
7	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u>						
	Chemical Storage Area Rm 503						1
	Radwaste Control Panel Rm 513						1
	Storage Area Rm 523						1
	Hot Machine Shop			1			
8	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u>						
	Waste Decay Tank Rms 511A						None
9	<u>Fuel Handling Building Elev 45'</u>						
	Emgy. A.C. Unit Rm 309-Train A	1			1		
	Emgy. A.C. Unit Rm 301-Train B	1			1		
10	<u>Penetration</u>						
	Elev 45'						6

\* The fire detection instruments located within the Containment are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Tests.

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
11	<u>S.E.B. Roof and Main Steam Relief Valves</u>			None			
12	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 305				3		42
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 315				3		40
13A	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Emgy. HVAC Unit Rm 309A			1			
13B	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u>						
	Emgy. HVAC Unit Rm 309B			1			
14	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Boric Acid Makeup Tank Rm 204B			None			
	Boric Acid Makeup Tank Rm 204A			None			
15	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u>						
	ESF Switchgear Rm 308A						2
	ESF Switchgear Rm 308B						2
16	<u>Radwaste Elev 37' &amp; 50'</u>						
	Ion Exchangers			None			
17	<u>Diesel Generator Building</u>						
	Train A				3		4
	Train B				3		4
18	<u>Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank</u>						
	<u>Underground Vaults</u>			None			
20	<u>Condensate Storage Tank T-121</u>			None			
21	<u>Nuclear Storage Tank T-104</u>			None			
22	<u>Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room</u>				2		6
23	<u>Fuel Handling Bldg Elev 30'</u>						
	Spent Fuel Pools Heat Exchange Room 209			None			
28	<u>Penetration Elev. 30'</u>			2			

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
29	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 236			3			51
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 224			3			52
30	<u>Electrical Tunnel Elev 30'6"</u>			13			50
31	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>			29			
32A	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Fan Room Rm 219 & Corridor Rm 221	2		1			
32B	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Fan Room Rm 233 & Corridor Rm 234	2		1			
34	<u>Radwaste Elev 9' &amp; 24'</u>						
	Secondary Radwaste Tank Rms 126A,B & 127A,B			None			
35	<u>Radwaste Elev 9' &amp; 24'</u>						
	Spent Resin Tank Rms 125A,B			None			
36	<u>Fuel Handling Building Elev 17'6"</u>						
	Spent Fuel Pool Pump Rm 107				2		
37	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Letdown Heat Exchanger Rms 209A,B			None			
38	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Letdown Control Valve Rms 218A,B			None			
39	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Filter Crvd Tank Rm 216			None			
40	<u>Radwaste Elev 9' &amp; 24'</u>						
	Primary Radwaste Tank Rms 211A,D			None			
41	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u>						
	Cable Spreading Rm 111A			17			36
	Cable Spreading Rm 111B			14			36
42	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 110			6			44
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 112			6			39



TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
43	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u> Emgy. Chiller Rm 115 Emgy. Chiller Rm 117			2 2			
44	<u>Intake Structure</u> Pump Rm T2-106 Pump Rm T3-106			4 4			
45	<u>Penetration Area Elev 9' &amp; 15'</u> Piping Penetration Area 15'	None					
48	<u>Safety Equipment Building 9'</u> CCW HX and Piping Rm 022-025	None					
50	<u>Radwaste Elev 9'</u> Charging Pump Rms 106A-F			6			
51	<u>Radwaste Elev 9'</u> Boric Acid Makeup Tank Rms 105A-D	None					
53	<u>Electrical Tunnel Elev 9'6", 11'6", (-) 2'6"</u>			21	54		
54	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6" &amp; 8'</u> Shutdown HX Rms 003, 004, 016, 018	None					
55	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 8'</u> Chemical Storage Tank Rm 019			1			
56	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 8'</u> Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Rms 020, 021	None					
57	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Pump Rm 005			1			
58	<u>Radwaste Elev 37'</u> Reactor Trip System Rms 308A-D, 309-A-C			9			
59	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Pump Rm 001			1			

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning		Actuation	
		HEAT	FLAME SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME SMOKE
60	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Pump Rm 015				1
61	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Component Cooling Water Pump Rms 006, 007, 008				3
62	<u>Radwaste Elev 50'</u> Volume Control Valve Rooms	None			
63	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Corridor				12
64	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Vital Power Distribution Rms 310A-H				8
65	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Battery Rms 306B-J				8
66	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Evacuation Rm 311				1
67	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u> Cable Riser Gallery Rm 506A Cable Riser Gallery Rm 506B			2	4
				2	4
68	<u>Penetration 9' - 63'6"</u> Cable Riser Shaft			1	21
69	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 5'3"</u> Salt Water Cooling Piping Rm 010	None			
70	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u> Duct Shaft Rms 222A,B	None			
72	<u>Control Building Elev 70'</u> Corridor 401	None			
75	<u>Refueling Water Storage Tank</u> <u>T-005</u>	None			
76	<u>Refueling Water Storage Tank</u> <u>T-006</u>	None			

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
78	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u> Corridor Rm 105			4			
79	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> ESF Switchgear Rm 302A ESF Switchgear Rm 302B			2 2			
80	<u>Radwaste Elev 37' &amp; 50'</u> Duct Shaft Rms			None			
81	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u> Duct Shaft Rms 527A,B			None			
83	<u>Salt Water Cooling Tunnel</u>						6*
84	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 8'</u> HVAC Rm 017						3

\*3 in UNIT 2, 3 in UNIT 3

TABLE 3.7-5

Safety Related Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems

<u>Hazard</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Systems</u>	<u>System Type</u>
Reactor Coolant Pumps	Containment	4	Deluge-Water Spray
R.R. Tunnel	Fuel Hand. Bldg.	1	Wet Pipe
Truck Ramp	Radwaste Bldg.	1	Wet Pipe
Cable Tunnel	Section 1	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 2	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 3	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 4	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 5	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 6	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 7	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 8	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 9	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 10	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel Riser	Fuel Hand. Bldg.	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Gallery	Radwaste Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 9 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 30 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 50 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 70 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Spreading Room	Control Bldg.	4*	Deluge-Water Spray
Emergency A.C. Unit - Train A	Fuel Handling Bldg.	1**	Deluge-Water Spray
Emergency A.C. Unit - Train B	Fuel Handling Bldg.	1**	Deluge-Water Spray
Diesel Generator	DG Building	2	Pre-action Sprinkler
HVAC Room 309A; Corridor 303	Control Bldg. 50'	1	Wet Pipe
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room	Tank Bldg. 30'	1	Pre-action Sprinkler
Fan Room 233 and Corridor 234	Control Bldg. 30'	1	Wet Pipe
Salt Water Cooling Pumps and Salt Water Cooling Tunnel	Intake Structure	1	Wet Pipe
CCW Heat Exchangers and Piping Room; A/C Room 017	Safety Equipment Bldg.	1	Wet Pipe
Corridor 401	Control Bldg. 70'	1	Wet Pipe
Corridor 105	Control Bldg. 9'	1	Wet Pipe

\*One half of these systems are designated Unit 3, but are required to be OPERABLE for Unit 2 operation.

\*\*Charcoal filter deluge systems are manually actuated.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### FIRE HOSE STATIONS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

---

3.7.8.3 The fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 inoperable, route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from an OPERABLE hose station within 1 hour if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise route the additional hose within 24 hours. Restore the fire hose station to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the station to OPERABLE status.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

---

4.7.8.3 Each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by visual inspection of the stations accessible during plant operation to assure all required equipment is at the station.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
  1. Visual inspection of the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station.
  2. Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and
  3. Inspecting all gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings.
- c. At least once per 3 years by:
  1. Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no flow blockage.
  2. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above the maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.