

ATTACHMENT IV  
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

PLANT SYSTEMS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency busses, and
- b. One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3

ACTION:

- a. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per <sup>quarter</sup>~~31 days~~ on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
  - 1) Verifying that each motor-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1535 psig on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;
  - 2) Verifying that the steam turbine-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1625 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 120 gpm when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 900 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3;

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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**b. At least once per 31 days by:**

1) 3) Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

2) 4) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path is in the fully open position whenever the auxiliary Feedwater System is placed in automatic control or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER.

**c. b-** At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

- 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the ESW supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps actuates to its full open position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure-Low test signal
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal, and
- 3) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater motor-operated discharge valve limits the flow to each steam generator from the motor-driven pump to less than or equal to 320 gpm.

4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying normal flow to at least two steam generators from one auxiliary feedwater pump.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (Continued)

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply from the Essential Service Water pumps to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974.

#### 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the charcoal adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1975 and N510-1980 will be used as procedural guides for surveillance testing. Surveillance testing provides assurance that system and component performances continue to be in accordance with performance specifications for Wolf Creek Unit 1, including applicable parts of ANSI N509-1976.

#### 3/4.7.7 EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING

The OPERABILITY of the Emergency Exhaust System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the Auxiliary Building following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the charcoal adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 and N510-1980 will be used as procedural guides for surveillance testing. The surveillance requirements associated with the HEPA filters, charcoal adsorbers and heaters are stated in 4.9.13.

BASES

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3/4 9.10 and 3/4 9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gas activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4 9.12 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE

The restrictions placed on spent fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool ensure inadvertent criticality will not occur.

3/4 9.13 EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM - FUEL BUILDING

The limitations on the Emergency Exhaust System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity with automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 and N510-1980 will be used as procedural guides for surveillance testing.