

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Region I

Report No. 50-423/82-08

Docket No. 50-423

License No. CPPR-113 Priority -- Category A

Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

P. O. Box 270

Hartford, Connecticut 06101

Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3

Inspection at: Waterford, Connecticut

Inspection conducted: June 22-30 and July 1-30, 1982

Inspectors: J. C. Mattia  
J. C. Mattia, Senior Resident Inspector

AUG. 6, 1982  
date signed

\_\_\_\_\_  
date signed

Approved by: T. Elsass  
T. Elsass, Chief, Reactor Projects  
Section 1B, DRPI

8/23/82  
date signed

Inspection Summary:

Unit 3 Inspection on June 22-30 and July 1-30, 1982 Report No. 50-423/82-08

Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspector (189 Hrs.). Areas inspected: Follow up of previous inspection findings, review of licensee's actions on NRC Bulletins and Circulars, welding, concrete placement, nondestructive examination, reactor pressure vessel internals, electrical supports and plant tours.

Violations: None

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)

R. Busch, Project Manager (Berlin)  
F. Comstock, FQA Technician  
A. Cooper, Construction Specialist  
K. Gray, Construction QA Supervisor  
W. Langdon, Construction Engineer  
K. Murphy, QA Specialist  
S. Orefice, Project Engineer (Berlin)  
J. Putnam, Senior Construction Engineer  
T. Sullivan, Resident Engineer - New Site Construction  
S. Toth, System Superintendent Generation Construction

#### Stone and Webster Corporation (S&W)

G. Basileco, Engineering Assurance Engineer (Boston)  
F. Bearham, QA Program Administrator (Boston)  
J. Carty, Site Engineering Group Manager  
R. Flodstrom, Assistant Superintendent Field QC  
J. Kappas, Superintendent of Construction  
J. Lannon, Field Quality Control Engineer  
R. LeDoux, Document Control Supervisor  
W. MacKay, Resident Manager  
G. Marsh, Senior Engineer, Welding/NDE  
M. R. Matthews, Assistant Superintendent Field QC  
P. Nelson, Engineering Assurance Engineer  
W. Orr, Senior QC Inspector  
G. Palmer, Engineering Assurance Division (Boston)  
L. Peterson, Field QC Inspector Supervisor  
R. Rudis, Engineering Assurance Engineer (Boston)  
G. G. Turner, Superintendent, Field QC  
W. Voss, Senior Field QC Engineer  
C. Watters, Assistant Chief of Engineering Assurance (Boston)  
G. Wilson, Field QC Inspector

#### Westinghouse Corporation

J. Dolan, Site Manager  
E. Harlow, Site Representative  
C. Peterson, Site Representative

Note: The inspector also conferred with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of inspection.

## 2. Licensee Action On NRC Issued Circulars and Bulletins

- a. The inspector reviewed the records relating to the following NRC Circulars to verify receipt, review for applicability, and that routing of the Circulars to the organizations responsible for action had been accomplished:

- Circular 79-11 (Design/Construction Interface Problem)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. The Stone & Webster existing Procedures NEAM 69, Rev. 3 and EAP 3.4, Rev.0 address the items discussed in the Circular. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 79-13 (Replacement Of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors).

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. The inspector reviewed a S&W letter dated June 9, 1982, which stated that MS-3 does not have a fire pump, and the MS-1 & 2 pumps are to be used. It was verified by the licensee that MS-1 & 2 fire pump does not have the defective Cummins #118848 magnetic switches and #199573 relay contactors. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 79-22 (Stroke Times For Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV))

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. The inspector reviewed documentation which stated that a surveillance program which meets the requirements of ASME XI; IWV 3500 In-Service Testing will be in effect for the MS-3 PORV Valves. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 79-23 (Motor Starters And Contactors Failed To Operate)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. S&W letter dated May 4, 1981, stated that only one Gould Motor Control Center (3NHS-MCC 8B1) was purchased for MS-3, and it was corrected by Gould prior to shipping. The NSSS stated that Gould Starters and Contactors are not used for their scope of supply. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-01 (Service Advice For G.E. Induction Disc Relays)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. S&W letter dated July 2, 1982, stated that this specific G.E. Induction Disc Relay is not used on MS-3. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-02 (Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. A licensee letter dated April 30, 1980, stated that Millstone Station Administrative Control Procedure, ACP-1.12 addresses this Circular. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-04 (Securing of Threaded Locking Devices on Safety-Related Equipment)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. The licensee station operating group in their commitment No.3047, states that a review of station installation and maintenance procedures will be performed to verify that the securing of Locking Devices has been addressed. The inspector also verified that it was on their "Commitment Follow Program" list dated 4/21/82. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-05 (Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and On-Site Supply)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. The licensee's operations group has this item on their "Commitment Follow Program" list (Nos. 1352, 3252 & 3253) and the recommendations in the Circular will be addressed prior to MS-3 becoming operational. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-10 (Failure To Maintain Environmental Qualification Of Equipment)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. The licensee's operations group has this item on their "Commitment Follow Program" list (No. 3048) and will address the Circular recommendations in their maintenance procedures and administrative policies at the appropriate time. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-11 (Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures)

The inspector reviewed a letter dated Sept. 8, 1980, from MS-3 Emergency Diesel Generator supplier stating that the Lube Oil Coolers are rolled tubes and not soldered joints; therefore, they are not susceptible to the failure mode described in the Circular. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-12 (Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key May Fall Out Of Place When Mounted Below Horizon Axis)

This Circular had been reviewed by the appropriate organizations. A S&W letter dated July 2, 1982, stated that there are ten valves involved for MS-3. S&W issued an Engineering Design & Coordination Report (E&DCR) No. P-B-3250 to instruct construction on how to modify these valves. The inspector verified that the E&DCR was issued (2/13/81). This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-14 (Radioactive Contamination Of Plant Demineralized Water System & Resultant Internal Contamination)

A S&W letter dated July 6, 1982, stated that all hose connections for potable and demineralized water utilize sillcocks with integral vacuum breakers to prevent backflow. All piped connections are designed without pathways to possibly contaminated systems to prevent contamination. A directive (#MP2669) was issued by the licensee's operations group not allowing the use of demineralized water for human consumption. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-17 (Fuel Pin Damage Due To Water Jet From Baffle Plate Corner)

The inspector reviewed licensee letter dated Jan. 7, 1981, stating that the MS-3 design is different and fuel pin damage due to water jet as described in the Circular is not feasible. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 79-12 (Prevention Of Unplanned Releases Of Radioactivity)

The inspector reviewed a S&W letter dated July 6, 1982, stating that MS-3 has design features such as tank overflows, floor drains, etc., to prevent unplanned releases. The licensee's operation group issued a Commitment #3258 to address this Circular recommendations and concerns in future station procedures. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-18 (Safety Evaluations For Changes To Radio-Active Waste Treatment Systems)

A licensee's memorandum dated 9/18/80, stated that MS-3 Station Administrative Control Procedures ACP 3.04, 1.04 & 1.05 require that safety evaluations be conducted and documented. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 81-01 (Design Problem Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches Manufactured By Honeywell, Inc.)

The inspector reviewed A/E & NSSS documentation which stated that Honeywell Pushbutton Switches are not used for MS-3 equipment supplied by them. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 80-15 (Loss Of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown)

The inspector reviewed A/E & NSSS documentation which stated that MS-3 design meets all recommendations of the Circular. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 81-02 (Performance Of NRC Licensed Individual While On Duty)

The inspector reviewed documentation stating that licensee's Administrative Control Procedure 6.01 was upgraded to address concerns of the Circular. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 81-03 (Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation)

The inspector reviewed documentation stating that the Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Contractor will be required to meet the calibration and test requirements of this Circular. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 81-05 (Self-Aligning Rod End Bushings For Pipe Supports)

The inspector reviewed documentation stating that two MS-3 Purchase Orders #10586 & 11035 have supplied struts with oversize spacers. New spacers have been supplied and the A/E will replace the oversize spacers. This item is considered closed.

- Circular 81-06 (Potential Deficiency Affecting Certain Foxboro 10 To 15 Milliampere Transmitters)

The inspector reviewed documentation from the A/E & NSSS stating that the Foxboro 10 To 15 Milliampere Transmitters are not used for MS-3.

This item is considered closed.

- Circular 81-09 (Containment Effluent Water That Bypasses Radioactivity Monitor)

A S&W letter dated April 30, 1982, stated that no pathways exist for significant unmonitored discharges, and that if there were any significant radioactive leakages, they could be isolated.

This item is considered closed.

- b. The inspector reviewed the records relating to the following NRC issued Bulletins to verify receipt, review for applicability, and that routing of the Bulletin to organizations responsible for action has been accomplished and that appropriate action was taken when required:

- Bulletin 79-13 (Cracking In Feedwater System Piping)

The inspector reviewed a S&W letter dated April 14, 1982, outlining a solution to the problem. The NSSS concurred with the solution. S&W issued an E&DCR No. P-P-4227 to instruct construction on how to modify the Field Weld Joints. S&W also recommended an increased frequency for inservice inspection for these specific Weld Joints. The inspector could not ascertain that the inservice inspection frequency was increased. This item is considered open pending review of additional documentation.

- Bulletin 79-06 (Review Of Operational Errors & System Misalignments During TMI Incident)

The inspector reviewed a S&W letter dated April 26, 1982, stating that a review of the design aspects of Auxiliary Feedwater System to accomplish actions on small breaks and for single failure was conducted. Based upon this review, S&W revised their design. All other concerns in the Bulletin are procedural and the licensee has committed to addressing these. The inspector verified that this was on their "Commitment Follow Program" list dated April 21, 1982.

This item is considered closed.

- Bulletin 79-28 (Possible Malfunction Of NAMCO Model EA-180 Limit Switches At Elevated Temperatures)

The inspector reviewed documentation from the A/E and NSSS stating that NAMCO Model EA-180 Limit Switches are not used on MS-3.

This item is considered closed.

- Bulletin 80-03 (Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Adsorber Cells)

The inspector reviewed licensee's actions taken and noted that eight of the fourteen CVI Corporation Model No. HEPA(R) II, 4" thick adsorber cells will be inspected for discrepancies. This item is considered open.

- Bulletin 80-09 (Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies)

The inspector reviewed A/E and NSSS documentation stating that ITT Model AH-90 or HN-90 Series Hydramotor Actuators are not used on MS-3.

This item is considered closed.

- Bulletin 80-21 (Valve Yokes Supplied By Malcolm Foundry, Inc.)

The inspector reviewed A/E and NSSS documentation stating that no Malcolm Foundry cast parts are used on MS-3.

This item is considered closed.

- Bulletin 80-23 (Failures Of Solenoid Valves Manufactured By Valcor Engineering Corp.)

The inspector reviewed A/E and NSSS documentation stating that no Valcor Solenoid Valves are used on MS-3.

This item is considered closed.



### 3. Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (423/79-11-01): S&W issued Change Notice #3 to their Procedure NEAM-31, Revision 5, which details the issue, maintenance and use of the MS-3 Excluded Equipment List (EEL). The inspector reviewed a July 12, 1982 issue of this EEL and verified that the appropriate NRC Bulletins and Circulars are listed.
- b. (Open) Violation (423/81-12-04): The inspector continued his ongoing review of the licensee's corrective action on document control. The inspector reviewed the S&W audit results which are as follows:

<u>Date (Week Ending)</u>	<u>No. Dwgs. Checked</u>	<u>No. Dwg. Sta. Checked</u>	<u>% Error</u>
4/9/82	332	46	4.2
4/16/82	1505	68	2.1
4/23/82	2265	73	2.4
4/30/82	828	68	3.1
5/7/82	618	57	3.2
5/14/82	465	56	2.8
5/21/82	422	58	6.6
5/18/82	417	54	6.9
6/4/82	712	62	18.8
6/11/82	535	54	4.5
6/18/82	399	43	6.2

Based upon the above results, the inspector informed the licensee that corrective action is not adequate, and that he was recommending that a NU management meeting be held with NRC management. NRC Region I Management discussed this item with licensee's management, and was assured that changes have been made to **reduce the number of errors.**

The inspector reviewed the results of S&W audits that were performed after the NRC telephone call to determine if the changes made were effective. The audit results are as follows:

<u>Date (Wk. Ending)</u>	<u>No. Dwgs. Checked</u>	<u>No. Dwg. Sta. Checked</u>	<u>% Error</u>
6/25/82	648	55	0.3
7/2/82	428	52	0.0
7/9/82	425	56	0.0

The above results indicate that the document control has improved. The inspector will re-inspect this area at a subsequent inspection.

- c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (423/81-02-18): The inspector reviewed the NUSCO QA training records to verify that the requirements of their training procedure NQA-1.05, Revision 0 are being implemented.

The complete records for five QA personnel, plus the supervisor, were reviewed. Some discrepancies were noted and were corrected. No violations were identified and this item is closed.

- d. (Open) Unresolved Item (423/81-11-03): Rework of deformed containment penetrations. S&W on 6/8/82 issued N&D #1418 which stated that unauthorized rework had been performed on four penetrations. The inspector had identified and informed the licensee of this item in August of 1981. It has taken almost one year for S&W to come to the conclusion that an N&D was required. The inspector also stated that this is not timely corrective action for NRC findings. This item is open pending review of engineering disposition of the N&D.

#### 4. Concrete Placement

The inspector observed portions of concrete placement No. C-2165. The inspector verified that for the portions he observed, the requirements of S&W Specification C-999 and Quality Standard QS-10.13 were adhered to. The following are the specific items inspected:

- Verified that the preplacement inspection by QC had been performed.
- That the inspection personnel were located in close proximity to the truck discharge and final placement location.
- The quality requirements (slump, air content & temperature) of concrete being placed was verified by testing and that they met the design mix requirements.
- Consolidation of concrete in the forms was adequate.
- The form work was adequate and the rebar cover was as required.
- S&W concrete pour card was properly filled out.

No violations were identified.

#### 5. Geological Fault Found In The Discharge Tunnel

The inspector observed the excavation and mapping of six areas surrounding the Geological Fault found in the discharge tunnel. The investigations of these areas were requested by a NRC Geotechnologist during his visit to the site.

6. Piping Weld Activities

The following Weld Joints in various stages of completion were inspected for compliance with ASME Section III Code, S&W Specification No. 968, and various S&W Weld Technique Sheets:

<u>Weld Joint Identification</u>	<u>Weld Technique</u>	<u>Location</u>
CI-RCS-504-D, Field Weld #20	W12F, Rev. 3	Containment
CI-CHS-503, FW #20	W12F, Rev. 3	"
BZ-2A-74-1 (Fillet Welds for Pipe Support)	W39M, Rev. 3	"
CHS-002-428-2, FW 2 & 3	W12E, Rev. 4	Pipe Fab. Shop
CHS-002-80-2, FW 11 & 18	" "	" " "
GWS-750-18-3, FW 3, 5 & 7	" "	" " "
CI-SIL-166, FW 12	W12F, Rev. 3	Containment
CI-SIL-7, FW 8	" "	"
CI-MSS-50-3, FW 3	W11B, Rev. 1	"
GWS-001-102-3, FW 15	W12E, Rev. 4	Aux. Bldg.
CI-GWS-7, FW 2	W12F, Rev. 3	" "
CI-CHS-37, FW 12	W12F, Rev. 3	" "
CI-CHS-39, FW 6 & 7	" "	" "
CI-CHS-6, FW 11 & 47	(Fit-Up only & modifica- tion per CRN-GWS-6-001)	Aux. Bldg.
GWS-001-102-3, FW 12	W12E, Rev. 4	Aux. Bldg.

No violations were identified.

7. Welding Of Cable Tray Supports

The inspector inspected welding activities associated with the installation of electrical cable tray seismic supports in the Auxiliary Building. These supports were located at elevation 66'-6" and near column lines F5-F9. The welding was in accordance with S&W Weld Technique Sheet W70G, Rev. 4.

No violations were identified.

8. Liquid Penetrant Examinations

The inspector observed liquid penetration examinations being performed by two recently certified S&W Level II Examiners in the Auxiliary Building. The examination was in accordance with S&W Procedure QAD 9.32 ML, Rev. 0. The inspector also verified that the two examiners were qualified in accordance with S&W Procedure QAD 2.5.

No violations were identified.

## 9. Load Indicating Washers

The licensee informed the inspector of two problems noted with the use of Load Indicating Washers. The concerns are addressed in S&W Nonconformance and Disposition Reports (N&D) Nos. 1478 & 1508, and are as follows:

- a. (N&D 1478) - Manufacturer's technical information (May, 1979) changed required gap from 0.010 inch to 0.005 inch. Site has been using 0.010" from May 1979 to March 1982. The inspector reminded the licensee that reportability in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) time limits should be considered. The licensee evaluated this and determined that it is not reportable. The inspector requested that a procedure be obtained from the manufacturer to verify that they are in compliance with AISC, Section 5 requirements, and also what type of sampling plan they are using for each lot they ship to their suppliers.
- b. (N&D 1508) - Thames Valley Steel Corporation has informed S&W that the 7/8" diameter load indicating washers used on the Containment enclosure building from Bethlehem Steel Lot #500421B have failed to provide the necessary tension with the specified gap. The licensee is evaluating this for reportability (10CFR50.55(e)), and also verifying that this lot of defective washers was used only on the enclosure building.

The above items are considered unresolved pending review by the NRC of licensee's actions. (423/81-08-01).

## 10. Plant Tours

The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work, and the construction status in several areas of the plant. The inspector examined work for any obvious defects or noncompliance with Regulatory requirements or license conditions. Particular note was taken of the presence of Quality Control Inspectors and Quality Control evidence such as inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation.

No violations were identified during the various tours conducted; however, the following conditions were observed:

- a. The inspector noted excessive debris under the Reactor Pressure Vessel and In-Core Monitoring Piping area. The licensee was informed of this condition and the area was cleaned.
- b. The inspector noted that at elevation 71 ft. inside the Containment Building, the Exhaust Purge Valves were open and the valve seals not protected. Also, some debris was inside the penetration. The licensee was informed of this condition and corrective action was taken.

- c. The inspector noted that there was an extensive amount of weld splatter on the stainless steel Boric Acid Tank CHS-TK-5. The licensee was informed of this condition. The records indicate that S&W had reported this condition in Inspection Report (IR) #M2000213 but called it a brown discoloration. The IR was amended and is awaiting engineering disposition.
- d. At several different locations in various buildings the inspector noted that electrical junction boxes were open and conduit openings inside the boxes were not protected from debris entering from nearby construction activities. The licensee was informed of this condition and corrective action was taken.
- e. The inspector noted that electricians were routing cable and making terminations inside the main control panel in the Control Building. The inspector inspected several of the safety related terminations and verified that the Crimpers, Serial Nos. 05523, 05520 & 05521 were in calibration. The S&W Conductor Termination Sheets used by the electricians were not fully in accordance with the requirements of E&DCR #FE-7561. The improper color of Termination Sheet was in use and the sheet was not completely filled out. The licensee was informed of this condition and appropriate corrective action was taken.
- f. In the Auxiliary Building the inspector noted that inside Penetration No. 3RCP-C13V (Sleeve #81A), several areas had been excavated inside the penetration sleeve. The inspector asked S&W Field QC if there was a Nonconformance Report issued for the laminations that construction was grinding out. They stated that the work was being performed in accordance with S&W Weld Procedure W200C for base metal repair/rework. The inspector informed the licensee of his concerns on this rework which are as follows:
- Procedure W200C discusses conditions such as nicks, scratches, gouges, punch marks, etc., that can be reworked/repared. Laminations were not mentioned.
  - Magnetic Particle Inspection was not performed inside of penetration to determine how extensive the laminations are. (Note: Penetration sleeve has a heavy coat of paint)
  - Some grinding (excavations) were approximately 25 inches inside the penetration sleeve, and repair welding will be next to containment concrete, and accessibility (18 inch diameter) will also be limited.

The above item is considered unresolved pending review of engineering disposition of Nonconformance Report when issued.(423/82-08-02)

### 11. Reportability Of Significant Deficiencies

The inspector reviewed several S&W Nonconformance Reports (N&D) that have been issued and not dispositioned by S&W Engineering to determine if they have been evaluated for reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) requirements. The following N&D's were reviewed:

<u>N&amp;D No.</u>	<u>Date Issued</u>
0646	3/6/81
1086	12/16/81
1165	2/6/82
1210	3/1/82

During this review the inspector noted that the N&D is not evaluated for reportability (note: there is a block #23 on S&W N&D Form for this evaluation) until the S&W Engineering Department disposes the N&D. The inspector informed the licensee that the S&W Procedure QS-15.1, entitled "Nonconformance and Disposition Report" as written does not allow significant items to be reported to NRC Region I in the allowable time period. Various discussions were held at different levels of management in NRC and licensee organizations. The licensee has agreed to correct this condition so that significant deficient items are evaluated for reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) and Region I requirements. This item is considered unresolved pending review by NRC of the licensee's actions. (423/82-08-03)

### 12. Fuel Building Concrete Placement

The inspector was informed that during concrete placement (C-3968) in the Fuel Building Transfer Canal, one of the two concrete pipelines plugged during pumping and the concrete was pushed and pulled with vibrators from the west side to east side of placement. There are several areas with probable cold joints (note: some areas are not accessible to visually inspect). This item is considered unresolved pending review by NRC of the corrective actions taken by the licensee (423/82-08-04).

### 13. Reactor Coolant Equipment Supports

S&W Field QC has issued several Nonconformance Reports concerning the Reactor Coolant Equipment Supports manufactured and supplied per S&W Purchase Order M-129, M-130 and M-515. S&W has evaluated and determined that there was not a significant breakdown of the vendor's QA program and therefore not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The following documents were reviewed by the inspector to determine if there was a significant breakdown in the vendor's QA program.

<u>S&amp;W Reports/Letters</u>	<u>Date Issued</u>
Letter to manufacturer discussing numerous non-conformances	2/19/82
Rec'g. Insp. Rept. M2052089	6/28/82
" " " M2052049	5/24/82
N&D #1481	6/30/82
" #1470	6/25/82
" #1462	6/23/82
" #1461	6/23/82
" #1460	6/23/82
" #1402	6/2/82
" #1395	5/27/82
" #1390	5/15/82
" #1340	5/5/82
" #1337	5/3/82
" #1178	2/12/82
" #1148	1/26/82
S&W Report of Problem	6/30/82

Stone & Webster sent a Field QC Engineer to the manufacturer (July 12 - 23, 1982) to review the Procurement QA Program (Subvendor), receipt inspection and material certifications. Some of the deficient items noted will require an ASME Code Case, which S&W is preparing. The NRC Inspector concurs, at this time, that a significant breakdown in vendor's QA Program has not occurred, and if the ASME accepts the code cases, the other problems will be insignificant. This item is considered unresolved pending review of ASME's disposition of code cases (423/82-08-05).

#### 14. Machining In Reactor Pressure Vessel

The inspector observed the machining of the lower radial support clevis in accordance with Westinghouse Drawing 685J389, Revision 9. The machining is under Westinghouse's technical direction. The inspector verified that the drawing used at the location is the correct revision. No violations were identified.

#### 15. Welding Of Electrical Penetrations

The inspector inspected the welding being performed on electrical penetrations No. 1A-3 & 5. The welding was in accordance with S&W Weld Technique Sheet W86K, Revision 1. The inspector also verified that the temperature adjacent to welding was below the required maximum value for protecting the electric cables and pressure seals. No violations were identified.

16. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.

17. Management Meetings

At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.