

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | C | T | M | N | S | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
 7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 40 47 54 57 60 67 70 74 75 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 101

0 1 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 9
 7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On February 16, 1982, at 1415 hours, while performing Main Steam Isolation Valve
 0 3 | Closure Functional Surveillance Test, the relay did not de-energize when the Main
 0 4 | Steam Isolation Valve (1-MS-1C) was actuated to a 10 percent closed position. The
 0 5 | logic channel was immediately placed in the tripped condition. Technical Specification
 0 6 | 3.1 (Table 3.1.1) states that reactor protection system scram trip level setting be
 0 7 | less than or equal to 10 percent valve closure. There were no consequences. The other
 0 8 | logic channel on the valve tripped.

0 9 | C | D | E | B | I | N | S | T | R | U | S | Z | 11 12 13 14 15 16
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

17 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 3 | L | 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN: E Z 18 19
 FUTURE ACTION: Z 19
 EFFECT ON PLANT: B 20
 SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21
 HOURS: 0 0 0 0 22
 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 23
 NFRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y 24
 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N 25
 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: 0 0 0 7 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The armature on the limit switch came out of adjustment. The armature was readjusted
 1 1 | and tested satisfactorily. The Main Steam Isolation Valve position switch is manu-
 1 2 | factured by NAMCo, Type SL-3.
 1 3 |
 1 4 |

1 5 | E | 1 | 0 | 0 | NA | B | Routine Surveillance
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

1 6 | Z | Z | NA | NA
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | NA
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

1 9 | Z | NA
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

2 0 | N | NA | 8209090169 820901 PDR ADOCK 05000245 S PDR
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-15/3L
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

Identification of Occurrence

Reactor protection signal was not generated from a Main Steam Line Isolation Valve 10 (ten) percent closure.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Prior to occurrence the unit was operating at a steady state power level of 100 percent.

Description of Occurrence

On February 16, 1982, at 1415 hours, while performing Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Functional Surveillance Test, the relay did not de-energize when the Main Steam Isolation Valve (1-MS-1C) was actuated to a 10 percent closed position. The logic channel was immediately placed in the tipped condition. Technical Specification 3.1 (Table 3.1.1) states that reactor protection system scram trip level setting be less than or equal to 10 percent valve closure. At the next possible drywell entry, August 1, 1982, the 'C' Main Steam Line was isolated to allow inspection of the MSIV switch.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Containment entry and investigation revealed that the armature on the limit switch was out of adjustment. This prevented the Reactor Protection relay from being de-energized at the 10 percent closed valve position which in turn would prevent a scram.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Main Steam line isolation valve closure scram is set to scram when the isolation valves are ten percent closed from full open in three out of four lines. This scram anticipates the pressure and flux transients which occur during normal or inadvertent isolation valve closure. By scrambling at this setting the resultant transient is insignificant.

Each valve has a switch/relay system in each protection system logic channel. Therefore, placing the logic channel in the tipped condition provided no decrease in safety, only redundancy. The other logic channel was available and would have initiated the required trip had the valve actually closed ten percent from full open.

Corrective Action

The armature was readjusted on the limit switch and then tested satisfactorily.

The Main Steam Isolation Valve position switch is manufactured by NAMCO, type SL-3.

The most recent similar reoccurrences are 81-16/3L and 81-22/3L.