NRC FORM 366 (7-77) U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
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	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
0 2	During review of SEP Topics, it was determined that following a LOCA with
0 3	concurrent loss of off-site power and loss of either diesel generator, the
0 4	running service water pump(s) may trip as a result of going to runout
0 5	Runout occurs as a result of the CCW heat exchanger outlet valves failing to
0 6	to fully open position (results from loss of instrument air which occurs
0 7	after loss of offsite power). Condition not analyzed by FSAR; accordingly,
7 8	reportable per TS 6.9.2.a(9). system cause cause comp valve
Ú 9 7 8	W A 10 X 12 Z 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 15 SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
	TO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 30 31 22
	ACTION FUTURE OFFICE SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NORD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER WANUFACTURER TO BE SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER WANUFACTURER TO BE SUPPLIED TO BE SU
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0	Event resulted from apparent oversight in initial plant design and FSAR
1 1	accident analysis. Problem eliminated by installation of hard stops on
1 2	ICCW heat exchanger service water outlet valves and throttling service water
1 3	pump P-7B discharge valve to restrict flow and prevent pump runout.
1 4	9 80
15	G 28 000 0 29 NA C 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
	CIVITY CONTENT TLEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 NA NA NA
7 8	9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
1 7	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) [O O O 37 Z 38 NA
T E	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41) NA
7 8	9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
1 9	Z 42 NA
, ,	9 PUBLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY
2 0	NA IIIIIIII
09090 R ADI	0074 820901 0CK 05000255

JGKeppler, Administrator Attachment to LER 82-024 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255

During review of Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) topics, a potential problem with the service water system was discovered. Following a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with a concurrent loss of off-site power, a loss of instrument air will occur, resulting in the component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger service water discharge valves failing to the full open position. With a loss of diesel generator 1-1, service water pump P-7B will stop. Calculations indicate that runout and subsequent trip of the remaining service water pumps, P-7A and P-7C, may occur, resulting in a loss of service water flow. Similarly, a loss of diesel generator 1-2 will cause a loss of P-7A and P-7C and a possible runout and trip of P-7B. This condition apparently resulted from an oversight in initial plant design and was overlooked during preparation of the FSAR accident analysis.

To correct the problem, hard stops were installed on the operators of the CCW heat exchanger discharge valves to limit the service water flow in the event of a loss of instrument air. To eliminate the problem with a loss of diesel generator 1-2 and only one service water pump running, the discharge valve for P-7B was throttled. Computer model calculations and system testing indicated no runout would occur and all components would receive adequate flow.