

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/8/0/5/8/2/ (8) /0/8/2/6/8/2/ (9)
 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On August 5, 1982, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, Fire Door S71-19 between the "1H" Emer-/
 /0/3/ / gency Diesel Generator Room and the Turbine Building would not latch. On August /
 /0/4/ / 6, 1982, Fire Door S54-2 between the Unit 1 Air Handler Room and Chiller Room and/
 /0/5/ / Fire Door S54-13 between the Unit 2 Air Handler Room and Chiller Room would not /
 /0/6/ / close automatically. Since in each case a fire watch was immediately posted the /
 /0/7/ / public health and safety were not affected. These events are reportable pur- /
 /0/8/ / suant to T.S. 3.8.15. /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
 CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /A/B/ (11) /E/ (12) /A/ (13) /X/X/X/X/X/X/ (14) /Z/ (15) /Z/ (16)
 LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
 REPORT NO. REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.
 (17) NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/4/8/ /-/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/E/ (18) /X/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /C/1/7/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The latch on Fire Door S71-19 was out of adjustment. The latch was adjusted and /
 /1/1/ / the operation of the door verified. Fire Door S54-2 and S54-13 (Unit 1 and 2 /
 /1/2/ / respectively) would not close because the door reclosure devices could not over- /
 /1/3/ / come the differential pressure between the Chiller Room and Air Handler Room. /
 /1/4/ / The devices were readjusted and door operability verified. /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
 /1/5/ /H/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / Operator Discovery /

ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
 RELEASED OF RELEASE /1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39)
 NUMBER TYPE /1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41)
 NUMBER /1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION
 TYPE /1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
 /2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-338
Attachment to LER 82-048/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

On August 5, 1982, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, the fire door between the "1H" Emergency Diesel Generator Room and the Turbine Building would not latch.

On August 6, 1982, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, the fire doors between the Unit 1 Control Room Air Handler Room and Chiller Room and the Unit 2 Control Room Air Handler Room and Chiller Room would not close automatically.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since in each case a fire watch was immediately posted, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

Fire Door S79-19 would not properly latch because the door latch was out of adjustment.

Fire Doors S54-2 and S54-13 would not close automatically because the action of the reclosure devices (one on each door) was not able to overcome the differential pressure between the Units 1 and 2 Control Room Air Handler Rooms and Chiller Rooms.

Immediate Corrective Action

In each event a fire watch was immediately posted and a Maintenance Report initiated. For Fire Door S71-19 subsequent action included the readjustment of the door latch. Further action taken on Fire Door S54-2 and S54-13 included readjustment of the door reclosure mechanisms until the doors would close automatically.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further actions are scheduled at this time.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Design modifications to fire doors between the Emergency Diesel Rooms and the Turbine Building are being pursued.

Generic Implications

Degradation of this fire door between the Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms and the Turbine Building is a recurring event due to the differential pressure during diesel operation.