



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

January 26, 1994

Mr. J. F. Klapproth  
Fuel Licensing Manager  
Mail Code 188  
GE Nuclear Energy  
175 Curtner Avenue  
San Jose, California 95125

Dear Mr. Klapproth:

Reference: Letter from J.F.Klapproth (GE) to USNRC, "Rectification of Inconsistency in One Dimensional Core Transient Model"

By your letter, and affidavit dated October 29, 1993, you submitted the information, "Rectification of Inconsistency in One Dimensional Core Transient Model", JFK93-50, MFN-176-93, and requested that it be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790. In addition, a nonproprietary version of this document was also submitted at the same time, in order to allow for proper docketing.

You stated that the submitted information which was specifically marked should be considered exempt from mandatory public disclosure for the following reasons:

The information identified is classified as proprietary because it contains detailed results of analytical models, methods and processes, including computer codes, which GE has developed, requested NRC approval of, and applied to perform evaluations of the BWR.

The development and approval of the ODYN computer code used in this analysis was achieved at a significant cost, in excess of three million dollars to GE, over a period of more than 15 years.

The development of the evaluation process along with the interpretation and application of the analytical results is derived from the extensive experience database that constitutes a major GE asset.

The staff has reviewed your application and the material in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.790 and, on the basis of GE's statements, has determined that the submitted information sought to be withheld contains trade secrets or proprietary commercial information. Therefore, the GE letter, JFK93-50, MNF-176-93 marked as proprietary, will be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(b)(5) and Section 103(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Withholding from public inspection shall not affect the right, if any, of persons properly and directly concerned to inspect the documents. If the need arises, we may send copies of this information to our consultants working in this area. We will, of course, ensure that the consultants have signed the appropriate agreements for handling proprietary information.

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1-4, Part 2 (Rules of Practice)

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COMMISSION

If the basis for withholding this information from public inspection should change in the future such that the information could then be made available for public inspection, you should promptly notify the NRC. You also should understand that the NRC may have cause to review this determination in the future, for example, if the scope of a Freedom of Information Act request includes your information. In all review situations, if the NRC makes a determination adverse to the above, you will be notified in advance of any public disclosure.

Sincerely,

/s/

Robert C. Jones, Chief  
Reactor Systems Branch  
Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

May 12, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman  
Commissioner Rogers  
Commissioner Curtiss  
Commissioner Remick  
Commissioner de Planque

FROM: James M. Taylor  
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT ON PRIMARY WATER STRESS CORROSION  
CRACKING OF ALLOY 600 COMPONENTS

9300020  
1429/93

Enclosed for your information is an update on primary water stress corrosion cracking of Alloy 600 (INCONEL) in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The staff will send an information paper to the Commission after it issues the safety evaluation on this subject. The staff is scheduled to issue its safety evaluation 60 days after it receives the two remaining safety analyses of the consequences of postulated cracking of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations from the PWR Owners Groups at the end of June 1993.

Having reviewed the information to date, including the inspection results and findings, the staff maintains its view that this issue is of low safety significance since all cracks reported to date, with perhaps one exception, are short in length and axially oriented in an extremely flaw-tolerant material. Further, the effects of wastage by borated water of a creviced area such as between CRDM penetration and the reactor head have been evaluated on the bases of laboratory testing and similar field experience. The results indicate that any degradation would occur very slowly and, therefore, an event such as ejection of a CRDM continues to be unlikely.