

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

August 31, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303


Subject: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Reportable Substantial Safety Hazard
Incomplete ECN issued by
Gilbert Associates, Inc.
REF: Letter from E.H. Crews to
J. P. O'Reilly dated 10/24/79

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

On August 18, 1982, Mr. Virgil Brownlee of the NRC Region II was notified of a substantial safety hazard as described in 10CFR21 involving the issuance of an incomplete ECN by Gilbert Commonwealth. The details of this substantial safety hazard are found in the attached report.

This substantial safety hazard is being reported under our 10CFR50.55e procedure and is considered to be the final report.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

JG:OWD:tdh

Attachment

cc: see page two

8209080454 820831
PDR ADOCK 05000395
S PDR

OFFICIAL COPY

IE 19

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Page two
August 31, 1982

cc: V. C. Summer w/o attach
T. C. Nichols, Jr. w/o attach
G. H. Fischer w/o attach
O. W. Dixon, Jr.
H. N. Cyrus
H. T. Babb
D. A. Nauman
M. B. Whitaker, Jr.
W. A. Williams, Jr.
O. S. Bradham
R. B. Clary
M. N. Browne
A. R. Koo.
H. Radin
Site Q. A.
C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
G. J. Braddick
J. L. Skolds
J. B. Knotts, Jr.
B. A. Bursey
I&E (Washington)
Document Management Branch
*(55e,21, LER only)
NPCF
File

10CFR21 - SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD

1. Name and Address of Reporting Individual

John M. Gesn

SCE&G - 328 Main Street

Columbia, SC

2. Identification of Basic Component

Issuance of an incomplete Engineering

Change Notice

3. Identification of Firm Supplying Component

Gilbert Commonwealth

4. Nature of Defect, Substantial Safety Hazard Created, and Evaluation

In the letter from E.H. Crews to J.P. O'Reilly of 10/29/79, SCE&G reported the potential failure of ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves and stated as the corrective action that the elastomers in class 1E ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves would be replaced with viton. Gilbert Commonwealth issued an ECN to accomplish this change. During a review of the ECN by SCE&G it was discovered that the solenoid valves that operate XVA 9311 A&B and XVA 9312 A&B were not included on this ECN. These valves are the containment isolation valves for the line leading to and from RM-A2, the containment building atmospheric monitor. In the occurrence of a design basis event these containment isolation valves could possibly stay open due to the potential failure of the solenoid valves to allow the venting of air off the diaphragm of the air operated valves. A 3/4 inch tube in the system piping is open to the atmosphere and this would allow a direct leak path from the containment building to the environment.

5. Date Information of Defect Was Obtained

August 4, 1982

6. Number and Location of Defect

Four valves were affected. These
solenoid valves operate XVA 9311 A&B
and XVA 9312 A&B

7. Corrective Action

The generic corrective action should
be addressed to Gilbert Commonwealth.
SCE&G will replace the
elastomers in the solenoid valves
that operate XVA 9311 A&B and XVA
9312 A&B with viton.

8. Advice to Purchasers or Licensees

None